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Brexit poses several challenges for future interaction between the EU and the UK 
in the areas of criminal justice and police cooperation. A new legal framework 
will be required to sustain the EU’s relations with the UK – an active participant 
in numerous EU criminal justice and police cooperation instruments – once 
it leaves the Union. The negotiations on the exit of the UK from the EU must 
grapple with the crucial questions of how and to what extent can the two parties 
continue to maintain effective arrangements for fighting cross-border crime, 
while at the same time guaranteeing compliance with the rule of law and 
fundamental rights.
This report is the result of intensive deliberations among members of a Task 
Force set up jointly by CEPS and the School of Law at Queen Mary University 
of London, who met regularly throughout the first half of 2018. It examines the 
feasibility of retaining the current EU–UK framework for cooperation in these 
critical fields and explores possible alternatives to the status quo. It also delves 
into the conditions under which the UK could continue to participate in EU 
instruments and EU agencies engaged in cooperation in criminal matters and 
to have access to justice and home affairs databases and other information-
sharing tools. In their conclusions, the members offer a set of specific policy 
options for the EU and the UK to consider after Brexit with a view to developing 
an effective partnership in the areas of criminal justice and security based on 
trust and shared values.  
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PREFACE 
he exit of the UK from the EU is planned to take place on 29 March 
2019. The UK’s withdrawal from the bloc poses a number of questions 
and challenges for the future EU–UK relationship in the field of 
criminal justice and police cooperation. 
The Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS) in Brussels and the 
School of Law at Queen Mary University of London (QMUL) set up a Task 
Force to examine the key issues, main options and alternative models for 
EU–UK cooperation on issues related to security and justice after Brexit. The 
CEPS/QMUL Task Force provided a closed-door platform for debate that 
enabled a selected group of academics, experts, practitioners, policy-makers 
and private sector representatives to scrutinise how the UK’s participation 
in EU criminal justice and police cooperation instruments may evolve in 
different post-Brexit scenarios. 
The rapporteurs would like to express their gratitude to Peter Hustinx, 
former European Data Protection Supervisor (EDPS), and Michael Kennedy, 
former President of the College of Eurojust, for their active and supportive 
role and inputs as chairs of the Task Force. They would also like to thank all 
the Task Force members and participants for their cooperation and 
invaluable contributions during the process leading to the completion of this 
report.  
The report draws on the debates that took place – under the Chatham 
House rule – in four meetings:  
 Lunchtime meeting, held at QMUL on 2 February 2018; 
 Task Force meeting on “EU–UK criminal justice cooperation and 
access to evidence across the Atlantic: Current challenges and possible 
options after Brexit”, which took place at CEPS in Brussels on 21 
February 2018; 
T 
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 Task Force meeting on “EU–UK cooperation in the fight against crime 
and terrorism: Available instruments and ways forward after Brexit”, 
held at CEPS in Brussels on 4 April 2018; and 
 Final Task Force meeting, which was organised at QMUL on 16 May 
2018. Before this final meeting, a preliminary version of the report was 
circulated among the members of the Task Force, who provided 
extremely useful comments and observations. 
The full list of the Task Force members, participants and speakers 
invited to these meetings appears in the appendix.  
The rapporteurs would like to thank the experts and officials who 
kindly agreed to be interviewed in the context of this research. In all, 13 
interviews were conducted with representatives of EU institutions and 
agencies (Eurojust, Europol, eu-LISA and the European Commission), senior 
or retired UK officials working for the National Crime Agency, the Crown 
Prosecution Service and the Serious Fraud Office, as well as leading UK 
lawyers and barristers specialised in criminal law (especially in extradition 
and mutual legal assistance). All of the interviewees agreed to be quoted as 
part of this research in exchange for being granted anonymity.  
The report was finalised at the end of June 2018. Minor amendments 
were made in July and early August to update the text in light of new 
documents and judgments. 
Sergio Carrera 
Valsamis Mitsilegas 
Marco Stefan 
Fabio Giuffrida 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
he EU and the UK have a mutual interest in maintaining strong 
cooperation in the fields of security (police) and criminal justice. 
However, as of Brexit day, scheduled for 29 March 2019, the UK will 
become a third country vis-à-vis the EU. To ensure strong criminal justice 
and police cooperation after Brexit, the EU and the UK need to develop a 
legal framework that meets the reciprocal demands of maintaining an 
effective relationship to fight cross-border crime, which at the same time is 
principled (value-based) and compliant with rule of law and fundamental 
rights standards. 
Respect for the benchmarks set forth in EU primary law and in the 
European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) represents an essential 
precondition to maintain trust and sustain EU–UK cooperation after Brexit. 
Any departure of the parties from these principles would lead to the freezing 
and potential termination of any future EU–UK security and justice treaty 
post-Brexit.  
EU–UK criminal justice and police cooperation after Brexit  
The extent to which EU law will apply to the UK as of Brexit day and until 
the end of the so-called transition or implementation period depends on the 
Withdrawal Agreement, the conclusion of which is essential to avoid a ‘cliff-
edge’ situation where the UK exits EU instruments and bodies of judicial and 
police cooperation without any transition provisions. The transition period, 
which would run from Brexit day until the end of 2020, would also allow the 
parties more time to work on the shape and content of their post-withdrawal 
arrangements. 
T 
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If an agreement is not found by the autumn of 2018 at the latest, the 
parties could decide to extend the period available to negotiate and conclude 
the Withdrawal Agreement. To this end, Article 50(3) of the Treaty on 
European Union requires unanimity in the European Council and the 
agreement of the UK (Figure ES1). 
Figure ES1. Brexit timeline 
 
Note: QMV = qualified majority voting; EP = European Parliament. 
* Strong QMV: 72% of the 27 Member States, i.e. 20 Member States representing 65% of the 
EU-27 population. 
Source: European Commission (https://ec.europa.eu/ireland/file/brexit-timeline-
webjpg_en).  
The shift in the UK’s status from EU Member State to third country 
raises the question of how to develop and sustain – after the end of the 
transition period – a new EU–UK partnership on security and criminal 
justice. Regardless of the legal framework that will regulate future EU–UK 
relations, the negotiation and conclusion of any international agreement 
between the UK and the EU will be subject to the rules on the EU’s external 
action in the field of criminal justice and police cooperation. 
The UK Government is seeking to create a new model of cooperation 
with the EU encompassing practical operational cooperation (i.e. joint 
investigation teams (JITs) and mutual recognition instruments), EU agencies 
(namely Europol and Eurojust) and data-driven law enforcement. Under EU 
law, cooperation on security and criminal justice is governed by different 
principles and subject to a different set of rules. 
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The EU needs to take into account these specificities when engaging in 
post-Brexit cooperation with the UK, regardless of the political willingness 
of the parties to develop comprehensive and far-reaching relationships in 
these areas. There is no precedent for an agreement between the EU and third 
non-Schengen countries in the area of freedom, security and justice (AFSJ) 
that would match the UK’s requests for a ‘security treaty’. While negotiations 
should strive to establish a partnership that may allow judicial and police 
cooperation to continue as smoothly as possible, any future EU–UK 
cooperation will depend on the extent to which the UK is found to comply 
with key EU law standards.  
EU law benchmarks for criminal justice and police cooperation after Brexit 
The fields of criminal justice and police cooperation are radically different 
from other EU policy areas. Measures adopted in the frame of the AFSJ 
impinge on fundamental rights and freedoms of individuals, and they 
encroach upon punitive powers at the heart of Member States’ sovereignty. 
EU action in the domains of judicial and police cooperation in criminal 
matters is based on fundamental rights, as enshrined in the EU Charter and 
as interpreted by the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU). 
Respect of these legal standards represents the essential condition for 
any future partnership on judicial and police cooperation between the EU 
and the UK. To ensure trust, cooperation on these matters should be 
conditional upon the UK’s continued participation in the ECHR. The 
European Commission has stressed that future cooperation could be 
terminated if the UK departs from the ECHR. Any post-Brexit agreement 
between the EU and UK on criminal justice and police matters should 
include a freezing mechanism providing for the possibility for either of the 
parties to suspend cooperation in cases where human rights violations are 
ascertained.  
After Brexit, a paradoxical situation is likely to emerge: if the UK 
wishes to have close cooperation with the EU on security and criminal 
justice, it would have to accept more EU law than it presently does as an EU 
Member State. The UK’s willingness to continue to reap the security benefits 
of EU cooperation may be contingent on the UK complying with the EU 
acquis, including the acquis on the protection of fundamental rights, part of 
which it is currently at liberty to disregard under its opt-outs. This acquis 
covers EU suspects and victims’ rights in criminal proceedings as well as 
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data protection and privacy standards. The legality of post-Lisbon legislation 
on defence rights is inextricably linked with the effective operation of mutual 
recognition in criminal matters, including the Framework Decision on the 
European Arrest Warrant (EAW). Yet, in the Brexit negotiations, little 
attention has been paid so far to the panoply of EU instruments concerning 
guarantees and safeguards in criminal proceedings. 
Instruments of mutual recognition: Status quo and alternative options  
The UK’s proposal to sustain cooperation on the basis of existing EU 
measures does not chime with the EU’s position, according to which third 
countries do not benefit from any privileged access to EU instruments.  
Participation in EU mutual recognition instruments (e.g. the EAW and 
the European Investigation Order) builds on some underpinning principles 
– mutual trust at the forefront – that apply only to EU Member States. Mutual 
trust is based on the presumption that each Member State ensures a high 
level of protection of fundamental rights and rule of law standards, 
including an independent judiciary upholding effective judicial protection 
of individuals. The recent CJEU ruling in Aranyosi and Căldăraru clarified that 
‘mutual trust’ does not mean ‘blind trust’: human rights compliance must be 
queried and ascertained on the ground, and on the basis of concrete 
evidence. So far, no third countries have joined EU mutual recognition 
instruments. 
At the same time, reverting to extra-EU instruments – such as the 
Council of Europe or United Nations conventions – to frame EU–UK judicial 
cooperation in criminal matters after Brexit would be inefficient. Defendants 
are likely to raise more claims in extradition proceedings after Brexit. 
Nevertheless, and despite the expected impact on the length of the 
procedures, this might enhance the protection of the rights of suspects 
involved in extradition proceedings.  
Among the arrangements on extradition, the Agreement between the 
EU and Iceland and Norway on the surrender procedure between the latter 
and the EU (‘EU–Norway and Iceland Agreement on surrender’) could be a 
model to follow, as it would keep EU–UK extradition proceedings 
judicialised. Most of the rules that have sped up the surrender procedure in 
the EU feature in this agreement as well, yet their application is optional. 
Outside the EU framework, Member States are on average inclined to 
introduce a number of rules and exceptions that have been waived in the 
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EAW Framework Decision, notably the bar on the extradition of own 
nationals. Unlike Norway and Iceland, however, the UK does not participate 
in the Schengen acquis on the free circulation of people. Even though 
participation in the Schengen acquis may not represent a legal prerequisite 
for cooperation on extradition under the EU–Norway and Iceland 
Agreement on surrender, the issue is extremely relevant at the political level 
and the Commission attaches great importance to it. 
To maintain smooth cooperation in the field of mutual legal assistance 
(MLA), the parties may explore the feasibility of a new MLA agreement, 
which should go beyond the existing arrangements between the EU and 
third countries. Confiscation and seizure of assets should also be addressed 
in future EU–UK arrangements. The current alternatives – to be found in 
MLA treaties – do not provide for rules and procedures that are comparable 
with existing EU instruments in terms of speed and ease of cooperation 
If the UK concludes an extradition agreement with the EU, the EU 
Charter of Fundamental Rights will apply to the extradition proceedings 
with the UK because of that same agreement. Among other provisions, 
Article 19 of the Charter – which prohibits extradition to a state where there 
is a serious risk that the extradited person would be subjected to torture or 
other inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment – will apply to the 
extradition requests that the UK sends to EU countries. In the absence of an 
agreement, the Charter will apply provided that the case before the national 
judicial authorities falls within the scope of EU law, e.g. because the person 
whose extradition is sought has exercised his or her right to freely move 
within the EU.  
Data protection and the exchange of data for law enforcement and criminal 
justice purposes 
In Schrems, the CJEU set out some principles to follow when third countries’ 
standards on data protection are assessed: third countries should ensure a 
level of protection of fundamental rights that is “essentially equivalent” to 
that guaranteed by EU law read in light of the Charter. 
The procedure, based on an adequacy decision, would establish a 
comprehensive framework of cooperation for EU–UK data exchange after 
Brexit. The Commission has called for a ‘guillotine clause’ for the future EU–
UK partnership in the field of security and justice, if the adequacy decision 
is withdrawn or declared invalid by the CJEU. 
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Although the UK is in the process of implementing the EU data 
protection package, this would not necessarily be sufficient to obtain a 
straightforward adequacy decision. The Commission will have to 
periodically scrutinise UK law, and its application, even in fields that are 
currently out of the reach of EU law, such as national security. UK 
international commitments and some pieces of UK legislation, such as the 
Investigatory Powers Act 2016, may be stumbling blocks for finding that the 
UK ensures a level of protection of fundamental rights that is essentially 
equivalent to that guaranteed by EU law.  
In addition to the adequacy decision, personal data can also be 
exchanged when appropriate safeguards with regard to the protection of 
personal data are provided for in a legally binding instrument. These 
appropriate safeguards may be given in sectoral agreements, such as a UK–
Europol agreement. This piecemeal approach, however, may prolong the 
negotiations.  
Post-Brexit access to EU databases 
The UK’s participation in EU databases could not be maintained after Brexit. 
ECRIS (the European Criminal Records Information System) is an 
information-exchange system to which only EU countries have access, 
whereas SIS II (the second-generation Schengen Information System) is a 
Schengen-related measure. There may be some leeway to accommodate the 
UK’s participation in the Prüm framework, as the latter is not linked to the 
Schengen acquis.  
Despite the UK having pushed for the adoption of EU Directive 
2016/681 on the use of passenger name record (PNR) data for law 
enforcement purposes, it could not be part of this instrument as a third 
country. Should the UK wish to access PNR data concerning intra-EU flights, 
it could conclude a PNR agreement with the EU, which would have to abide 
by the data protection standards that the CJEU set out in its Opinion 1/15.  
Until recently, Brexit talks between the EU and the UK have not 
addressed interoperability. As a Member State, the UK decided to opt into 
the proposed EU interoperability legislation in May 2018. That 
notwithstanding, the country has also agreed that by the end of the transition 
period it “shall cease to be entitled to access any network, any information 
system, and any database established on the basis of Union law” (Article 7 
of the draft Withdrawal Agreement). 
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The main problem with regard to the UK joining the interoperability 
legislation is that the latter may run counter to the principle of purpose 
limitation. By opting into the Commission’s new interoperability proposals, 
the UK would not only be able to gain access to large troves of sensitive data 
(including, inter alia, EU citizens’ biometrics) during the transition period, 
but it might also be in a position to copy and retain them once it becomes a 
third country, i.e. after the completion of its withdrawal from the bloc. This 
scenario would pose profound legal and fundamental rights challenges 
under EU law.  
UK participation in EU agencies after Brexit 
The UK will need ad hoc agreements to continue to exchange personal data 
with Europol and Eurojust. This approach might keep a relationship with 
Eurojust that could be partially similar to the current one. The UK may post 
liaison prosecutors at Eurojust and may continue to participate in JITs 
financed by the agency, yet it is likely to lose its leading role in the field. The 
Second Protocol to the 1959 Convention on Mutual Legal Assistance in 
Criminal Matters could represent the legal basis for JITs with EU Member 
States. The impact of Brexit on the UK’s future relationship with Europol is 
likely to be more visible. There is no precedent of granting a third country 
direct access to Europol’s databases or allowing it to lead Europol’s 
operational projects. The position of Denmark is not comparable with the 
status that the UK will have after Brexit.  
It will be mostly in the interest of the EU to push for the recognition of 
the European Public Prosecutor’s Office (EPPO) as a competent authority in 
extradition and MLA proceedings with the UK. It will be also in the interest 
of the UK to keep a strong relationship with the EPPO, as the latter may be 
in possession of information or evidence that UK authorities will need to 
access. 
The EU and the UK could deepen forms of ‘soft’ cooperation (e.g. the 
secondment of UK officials in EU Member States, and vice versa), which can 
enhance trust on the ground among judicial authorities, along the lines of 
what currently happens within the European Judicial Network or similar 
fora. Still, the exchange of information in an informal way between EU and 
UK authorities, outside clear legal frameworks, may be problematic from a 
rule of law perspective and does not bode well for the protection of 
fundamental rights. The EU and UK’s commitment to shared values after 
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Brexit will be crucial to guarantee smooth cooperation between the parties. 
This should include a firm commitment to continued participation in the 
ECHR and compliance with the European Court of Human Rights’ 
standards. At present, the EU’s approach to the future EU–UK partnership 
on security and criminal justice includes a guillotine clause, if the UK leaves 
the Convention or is condemned by the Strasbourg Court for non-execution 
of a judgment in the area concerned. 
Role of the Court of Justice in the future EU–UK security and justice 
partnership 
In existing EU agreements with third countries concerning judicial 
cooperation and in the Schengen Association Agreements, the CJEU does not 
have the power to settle disputes among the parties on the application of the 
Treaties. Yet, independent of the future outlook for EU–UK arrangements, 
the case law of the CJEU will have a relevant impact on the UK after Brexit, 
as the Court will remain competent to ultimately and authoritatively 
interpret EU law. Within the EU, national authorities will continue to have 
the power or the obligation to ask the CJEU to rule on the compatibility of 
the UK’s requests for criminal justice and police cooperation with EU law. 
The CJEU may also prevent the entry into force of any EU–UK agreements. 
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INTRODUCTION 
uring the last two decades, the European Union has actively engaged 
in the development of an area of freedom, security and justice (AFSJ). 
Underpinned by EU fundamental rights and rule of law standards, 
the criminal justice and police cooperation policies developed in the 
framework of the AFSJ are governed by a dynamic body of secondary 
legislation. Different legal instruments have been progressively adopted to 
address the complex relationship between the repressive and the defensive 
facets of criminal law. These pieces of EU legislation regulate specific aspects 
of cross-border judicial cooperation in criminal matters, such as extradition 
and exchange of evidence, but they also establish common minimum 
procedural safeguards for people involved in criminal proceedings. These 
instruments lay the foundations of the criminal justice-led approach to 
criminality in the Union.1 
In the pursuit of its own security strategy, the EU has increasingly 
focused on an ‘intelligence-led’ or data-driven approach to operational 
cooperation in respect of policies aimed at countering crime and terrorism.2 
This approach largely relies on measures enabling a preventive justice logic 
involving law enforcement authorities’ access to and exchange of 
information of individuals across the EU, as well as with transatlantic 
partners like the US and Canada. Such preventive justice measures prioritise 
the collection and transfer of data as a way to monitor risk factors and 
potential security threats that are assessed constantly, and regardless of 
whether concrete criminal acts have been committed. This preventive justice 
                                                     
1 Carrera and Mitsilegas (2017), p. 113.  
2 Occhipinti (2013).  
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approach permeates the measures adopted in the framework of the EU 
‘Security Union’. The latter has also led to the creation of an increasing 
number of large-scale databases, which are expected to be interconnected 
soon for the purpose of police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters, 
and to be made accessible to a wide range of actors involved in security and 
policing.3 
Furthermore, EU agencies and bodies have become key players in 
coordinating and supporting the activities of competent national authorities, 
and they also serve as information-gathering hubs. They include Europol 
(EU Agency for Law Enforcement Cooperation), Eurojust (EU Judicial 
Cooperation Unit), eu-LISA (European Agency for the operational 
management of large-scale IT systems in the area of freedom, security and 
justice), and the future European Public Prosecutor’s Office (EPPO). These 
bodies also engage in criminal justice and police cooperation with third 
countries in different ways.  
The UK has a mixed record in the development of EU cooperation 
policies on criminal justice and law enforcement. The UK has adopted a ‘wait 
and see’ approach to new EU criminal justice initiatives and it has opted out 
from, or altogether not opted into a number of EU instruments. On the other 
hand, the UK has played a significant role in shaping EU criminal law, for 
instance championing the intelligence-led approach to the fight against 
criminality and application of the principle of mutual recognition in the field 
of criminal justice. 
While heading towards its withdrawal from the Union, the UK calls 
for a “new, deep and comprehensive partnership” with the EU, which is 
capable of “maintaining and strengthening” current levels of law 
enforcement and criminal justice cooperation.4 UK negotiators are also 
calling for a special deal that ensures a continued, uninterrupted and secure 
flow of personal data, including for law enforcement purposes, between the 
EU and the UK after Brexit.5 However, a high degree of uncertainty still 
exists as to EU–UK relationships in the field of criminal justice and police 
cooperation in a post-Brexit scenario.  
                                                     
3 European Commission (2017a). 
4 HM Government (2018a), p. 4.  
5 HM Government (2018b), p. 7.  
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The EU has concluded some international agreements that cover 
different security matters, as well as the transfer of data for law enforcement 
purposes. The extent to which future EU–UK arrangements in these areas 
may replicate, build on or depart from these agreements depends on a 
variety of different factors. 
The (political) willingness of the UK and the EU to constructively 
engage in the negotiations required to design solutions meeting the mutually 
recognised need to sustain strong cooperation between the parties is a 
precondition. Yet, the room for manoeuvre to explore creative solutions is 
not unfettered, as the EU will have to act within the boundaries of its legal 
and institutional framework laid down in the 2009 Lisbon Treaty. The 
‘Lisbonisation’ of the AFSJ has meant the transfer of policies on criminal 
justice and policing to shared legal competence between the EU and its 
Member States. It has also extended (chiefly since 2014) a full role to the 
European Commission in enforcing national implementation of EU legal 
standards in these domains, as well as their democratic scrutiny by the 
European Parliament and judicial control by the Court of Justice of the 
European Union (CJEU). 
Upon analysis of existing models of EU cooperation with third 
countries and of the EU legislation regulating Member States and third 
countries’ participation in the relevant AFSJ instruments, this report 
examines the feasibility of keeping the current EU–UK framework for 
criminal justice and police cooperation and explores possible alternatives. 
Despite the current narrative, which tends to conflate these areas of police 
(security) and judicial cooperation into a single framework, it seems 
appropriate to keep them separate: cooperation in the field of security 
(police) and cooperation in the field of criminal justice have their own 
principles and rules that pose different challenges for both the EU’s internal 
policy and its external relations with third countries. 
Part I of this report focuses on the EU constitutional framework 
regulating the UK’s current and future position within the AFSJ. Attention 
is paid to the sui generis status of the UK as a Member State, which opted 
back into 35 criminal justice and police cooperation instruments and is now 
in the process of leaving the bloc. After discussing the UK’s approach to post-
Lisbon EU criminal law, and some cross-cutting issues of the Brexit 
negotiations, part I identifies the key EU rules that apply in respect of third 
countries’ participation in the AFSJ. These include the hotly debated issue of 
4 | INTRODUCTION 
dispute resolution and the role of the CJEU, as well as the conditions to be 
met for the transfer of data to third countries for law enforcement purposes.  
Part II examines the impact of Brexit on judicial and police cooperation 
in criminal matters and the existing options for the UK to participate in AFSJ 
instruments and bodies after its withdrawal from the EU. Specific attention 
is devoted to the three areas in which the UK Government has expressed its 
desire to remain as close as possible to the EU, i.e. mutual recognition in 
criminal justice matters, justice and home affairs (JHA) agencies and bodies, 
and access to databases/information-sharing mechanisms.6 The analysis will 
take into account the latest normative and policy developments aimed at 
enabling access, collection, storage and exchange of data for the purposes of 
law enforcement cooperation, as they are unfolding on both sides of the 
Atlantic. Part II also discusses the added value and the risks of enhancing 
‘soft’ measures of cooperation, such as posting UK liaison officers in EU 
countries.  
Part III concludes by summarising the main findings of the Task Force. 
It highlights the key issues and conditions required for post-Brexit EU–UK 
cooperation in the fields of security and justice to be handled in a way that 
meets the reciprocal demands of ensuring an effective relationship to fight 
cross-border crime, which is at the same time principled (value-based) and 
compliant with rule of law and fundamental rights standards enshrined in 
the EU Charter and in other regional human rights instruments, and 
crucially the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR).  
 
 
                                                     
6 Other relevant topics could not be included in this report, such as sanctions, customs 
cooperation and the issues connected with the UK’s participation in EU directives 
harmonising criminal law and procedural safeguards, although a number of those issues will 
be touched upon in some parts of the following analysis. Likewise, the report does not engage 
with the problems related to the competence of UK devolved jurisdictions in the field of 
criminal justice, and the impact of Brexit on them. For this reason, further references to the 
UK should be understood as referring to the English and Welsh criminal justice systems only. 
  
 
PART I 
EU CONSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK 
FOR UK PARTICIPATION IN THE 
AFSJ BEFORE AND AFTER BREXIT 
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1 CURRENT POSITION OF THE UK 
IN THE AFSJ  
riminal law has been one of the most contentious areas of EU 
competence to legislate over the past 20 years,7 and even more so 
since the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty. Many perceive EU 
action in this field as a challenge to state sovereignty and to the state’s 
monopoly over the use of force. The perceived challenge of EU action in 
criminal matters has generated a degree of scepticism in certain EU Member 
States as to the desirability of further European integration in this regard. 
Perhaps nowhere else in the EU has this scepticism been expressed more 
vocally than it has been in the United Kingdom. The first subsection 
examines the UK’s approach to post-Lisbon EU criminal law, while section 
1.2 zooms in on the choice of the UK to opt back into 35 EU instruments in 
December 2014. The last section (1.3) describes the significant contribution 
by the UK to the development of EU criminal law.  
1.1 Approach to the EU’s post-Lisbon criminal justice system  
The entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty has led to efforts by the UK to 
extend the pre-Lisbon provisions enabling UK opt-outs in the field of EU 
migration law to the field of EU post-Lisbon criminal law. Protocol No. 21 to 
the Lisbon Treaty extended the right of the UK not to participate in EU law 
to the whole of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) 
                                                     
7 Mitsilegas (2016c), pp. 517ff., from which the following two sections draw.  
C 
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Title V on the area of freedom, security and justice, including criminal law 
measures.8 The right not to participate also extends to legislation amending 
existing measures that are binding upon the UK. The UK Government 
decides on its participation in post-Lisbon measures on a case-by-case basis.9  
The UK has a mixed record regarding participation in post-Lisbon EU 
criminal law pursuant to Protocol No. 21. The UK has participated in the 
major judicial cooperation instrument adopted after Lisbon, Directive 
2014/41 on the European Investigation Order (EIO), which applies the 
principle of mutual recognition in the field of evidence.10 The UK’s 
participation in the EIO Directive may be seen as having been achieved 
against the odds in view of the increasingly Eurosceptic political climate at 
Westminster but may be explained by the necessity to ensure that the UK 
remains in the first category of countries in a progressively integrated system 
of judicial cooperation. Less encouraging is the UK’s participation in post-
Lisbon measures of EU criminal procedural law granting rights to 
individuals. While the UK has opted into the first two post-Lisbon measures 
on the rights of suspects and defendants in criminal proceedings,11 it has not 
participated in the other three measures, including Directive 2013/48 on the 
right of access to a lawyer.12 The non-participation of the UK in this measure 
may come as a surprise given the fact that the Directive introduces minimum 
standards, which would arguably lead to minimum – if any – legislative 
changes to domestic criminal procedure. A number of our interviewees 
agreed that the UK criminal justice system already complies with the 
guarantees set out in EU legislation.  
                                                     
8 Protocol No. 19 covers the UK’s participation in the Schengen acquis. 
9 See Arts 3 and 4 of Protocol No. 21. 
10 OJ L 130/1, 1.5.2014 (‘EIO Directive’). See more in section 3.3, part II below.  
11 Directive 2010/64/EU on the right to interpretation and translation in criminal proceedings, 
OJ L 280/1, 26.10.2010; Directive 2012/13/EU on the right to information in criminal 
proceedings, OJ L 142/1, 1.6.2012.  
12 OJ L 294/1, 6.11.2013. The UK has not opted into either Directive (EU) 2016/343 on the 
strengthening of certain aspects of the presumption of innocence and of the right to be present 
at the trial in criminal proceedings, OJ L 65/1, 11.3.2016 or Directive (EU) 2016/1919 on legal 
aid for suspects and accused persons in criminal proceedings and for requested persons in 
European arrest warrant proceedings, OJ L 297/1, 4.11.2016.  
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Non-participation may be explained by the UK Government’s 
reluctance to take part in a constitutionalised post-Lisbon framework where 
institutions such as the Commission and the CJEU play a key role in 
evaluating the domestic implementation and interpretation of EU directives. 
More specifically, there are clear UK Government concerns about 
participating in post-Lisbon EU criminal law in terms of its impact on 
domestic law in light of judicial scrutiny by the Court of Justice. These 
concerns also explain the latest tendency by the UK Government not to opt 
into the text of the Commission’s proposals, but rather to try to influence – 
to the extent possible – negotiations and opt into them post-adoption if the 
adopted measure appears to be acceptable to the UK. This is the strategy, for 
example, that the UK has followed in relation to Directive 2011/36 on 
trafficking in human beings.13  
This ‘wait-and-see’ strategy is increasingly coupled with a strategy 
attempting to broaden the field of measures where the UK opt-out applies. 
With respect to international agreements, the UK has argued that Articles 1 
and 2 of Protocol No. 21 “are not restricted to provisions in agreements 
concluded under a Title V legal base, but to those adopted or concluded 
‘pursuant to’ Title V”.14 Moreover, the UK has questioned the legal basis of 
measures adopted outside Title V of the TFEU but which are deemed to 
include a criminal law component (such as the Fourth Anti-Money 
Laundering Directive (2015/849))15 and has challenged legal basis choices, 
intervening in legal basis litigation before the Court of Justice with limited 
success.16 This approach may at times prolong the legal and political 
uncertainty regarding the commitment of the UK to participating in key 
aspects of the EU criminal justice system.  
                                                     
13 OJ L 101/1, 15.4.2011.  
14 House of Lords, European Union Committee (2015), para. 38.  
15 OJ L 141/73, 5.6.2015.  
16 See Case C-431/11, United Kingdom v Council, Judgment of 26 September 2013; Case C-
137/12, Commission v Council, Judgment of 22 October 2013; Case C-377/12, Commission v 
Council (the Philippines case), Judgment of 11 June 2014; Case C-81/13, United Kingdom v 
Council (the Turkey case), Judgment of 18 December 2014.  
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1.2 Effects of selective participation in the AFSJ  
UK concerns regarding the impact of the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty 
on the transfer of sovereign powers to the EU in the field of criminal justice 
resulted in a further political compromise. This compromise addressed 
measures that had been adopted before the entry into force of the Lisbon 
Treaty, under the largely intergovernmental third pillar. Protocol No. 36 on 
transitional provisions can be seen as an attempt by the British Government 
to argue that the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty would not lead to a 
transfer of sovereignty from the UK to the EU – and thus avoiding a 
referendum on the Lisbon Treaty. Protocol No. 36 retained the pre-Lisbon 
limited powers of EU institutions with regard to third pillar law for five years 
after the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty.17 At least six months before 
the end of that period, the UK could notify the Council of its non-acceptance 
of the full powers of the EU institutions in third pillar law.18 In the case of a 
decision not to accept these powers, third pillar law would cease to apply to 
the UK,19 but the latter may subsequently notify its wish to participate in 
such legislation that has ceased to apply to it.20 
This transitional period came to an end on 1 December 2014, a date that 
marked a significant step forward towards constitutionalising EU criminal 
law by granting EU institutions their full powers of scrutiny with regard to 
third pillar law still in force after Lisbon. In addition to the enhanced powers 
of the Commission and the CJEU to monitor the implementation of third 
pillar law by Member States, a pivotal constitutional change in this context 
is the normalisation of the Court’s jurisdiction to give preliminary rulings. 
This impact is particularly visible in the case of the UK, which did not grant 
its judiciary the power to interact with the Court of Justice through the 
preliminary ruling procedure under the third pillar.  
In July 2013, the UK notified the presidency of the EU that, pursuant 
to Article 10(4) of Protocol No. 36, it did not accept the powers of the EU 
institutions; accordingly, third pillar law would cease to apply in the UK 
                                                     
17 Art. 10(1) and (3) of Protocol No. 36; the Lisbon Treaty entered into force on 1 December 
2009.  
18 Art. 10(4) of Protocol No. 36. 
19 Ibid. 
20 Art. 10(5) of Protocol No. 36.  
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from 1 December 2014.21 The UK eventually indicated, however, that it 
would seek to opt back into 35 (out of around 133) third pillar measures, 
which included the vast majority of measures applying the principle of 
mutual recognition in criminal matters (including Framework Decision 
2002/584/JHA on the European arrest warrant (EAW)),22 legislation 
establishing Europol and Eurojust, legislation on joint investigation teams 
(JITs) and criminal records. Third pillar law that has ceased to apply to the 
UK since 1 December 2014 includes, inter alia, several measures on 
substantive criminal law and the Framework Decision (2008/947/JHA) on 
the mutual recognition of probation decisions.23 
The current position of the UK, based on a ‘pick-and-choose’ model of 
differentiated integration in criminal matters is nevertheless problematic in 
an interdependent and increasingly integrated EU area of criminal justice 
after Lisbon.24 The opting back into the EAW Framework Decision is a case 
in point, as the UK does not participate in a crucial measure on the rights of 
suspects and accused persons in criminal proceedings, namely Directive 
2013/48 on access to a lawyer. It could be argued that from a black letter 
perspective the current position of the UK is tenable: under the Lisbon 
Treaty, the UK can opt into (or opt out from) any post-Lisbon legislative 
proposal in the field of criminal justice on a case-by-case basis (and has 
decided not to participate in Directive 2013/48).  
At the same time, this argument runs counter to a teleological 
approach that respects the objectives and the integrated nature of the AFSJ. 
The selective participation of the UK in this context is problematic not only 
from the perspective of the protection of fundamental rights, but also from 
the perspective of the coherence of EU law.25  
The legal basis for Directive 2013/48 (as with the other directives 
implementing the Stockholm roadmap) is Article 82(2) TFEU. This provision 
                                                     
21 Council doc. 12750/13, 26.7.2013.  
22 OJ L 190/1, 18.7.2002 (‘EAW Framework Decision’).  
23 For a full list, see notice 430/03, OJ C 430/17, 1.12.2014.  
24 See also McCartney (2013); Weyembergh (2017), pp. 289–91; written evidence of Fair Trials 
International to the Home Affairs Sub-Committee of the House of Lords’ Select Committee 
on the European Union, “Brexit: The proposed UK–EU security treaty”, PST0010, 25 May 
2018, para. 11.  
25 Mitsilegas et al. (2014).  
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grants express competence to the EU to legislate on aspects of criminal 
procedure (including explicitly the rights of the defence) where necessary to 
facilitate the operation of the principle of mutual recognition in criminal 
matters. The legality of post-Lisbon legislation on defence rights, including 
Directive 2013/48, is thus inextricably linked with the effective operation of 
mutual recognition in criminal matters, including the EAW Framework 
Decision. As the Treaty is currently worded, defence rights measures under 
Article 82(2) TFEU cannot exist independently of measures on mutual 
recognition. Participating in the enforcement measures but not in the 
measures granting rights in order to facilitate judicial cooperation thus 
challenges the coherence of Europe’s area of criminal justice. 
The marked preference for EU law enforcement measures informs the 
current UK position in the Brexit negotiations, while little attention has been 
paid to the panoply of EU instruments concerning guarantees and 
safeguards in criminal proceedings. Some of our interviewees nonetheless 
claimed that the latter instruments – and especially Directive 2012/29 
establishing minimum standards on the rights, support and protection of 
victims of crime26 – have had a positive impact on persons involved in 
criminal proceedings in the UK, although those instruments did not bring 
about any radical change in the UK criminal justice system.  
After Brexit, a paradoxical situation is likely to emerge: the UK’s 
willingness to continue to reap the current security benefits of EU 
cooperation may be contingent on the UK complying with the EU acquis, 
including the acquis on the protection of fundamental rights, part of which it 
currently is at liberty to disregard under its opt-outs as an EU Member State. 
Brexit is likely to put the UK in the position of having to accept more EU law 
than it presently does as an EU Member State.  
The request of the Irish Supreme Court for a preliminary ruling in the 
O’Connor case, recently overtaken by the request in R O, may be seen as 
corroborating this stance.27 The Irish Court has requested the CJEU to rule 
                                                     
26 OJ L 315/57, 14.11.2012. The Law Society of Scotland lists this directive among the 
instruments of priority for future EU–UK relations (written evidence of the Law Society of 
Scotland to the Home Affairs Sub-Committee of the House of Lords’ Select Committee on the 
European Union, “Brexit: The proposed UK–EU security treaty”, PST009, 25 May 2018, p. 5).  
27 Irish Supreme Court, Minister for Justice v O’Connor [2018] IESC 3, 1 February 2018, which 
has been recently overtaken by R O (Case C-327/18 PPU).  
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on whether EAWs coming from the UK should continue to be executed, even 
when the surrendered person is likely to serve (part of) his or her sentence 
in UK prisons after Brexit, namely when that person will no longer be able 
to enjoy his or her rights under the Treaties, the Charter of Fundamental 
Rights of the European Union or relevant EU legislation. The Court of Justice 
has not issued its judgment yet;28 still, this decision of the Irish Court shows 
that the EU AFSJ rests on a bundle of rights and obligations from which it is 
not easy or in some cases possible to extricate certain instruments, especially 
from the outside.29 
1.3 Contributions to the development of EU criminal law 
and police cooperation 
Despite the sui generis approach, the UK has been an active contributor to the 
development of EU criminal law and police cooperation, particularly as 
regards the latter, on four different levels: operations, strategy, legislation 
and implementation.30  
At the operational level, the UK is one of the leading drivers of and 
highest contributors to EU databases and EU information-sharing 
mechanisms.31 Discussions during the Task Force highlighted that the non-
participation of the UK in these tools and mechanisms post-Brexit may prove 
costly for the UK and the EU, as each could lose access to important 
information that is stored by the other party and which may be crucial to 
prevent or detect serious crime in the EU or in the UK.  
The UK has also contributed to EU criminal law in terms of strategy. 
As the UK House of Lords’ European Union Committee points out, the UK 
has been a leading protagonist in shaping the nature and direction of 
                                                     
28 Just before this report was finalised, Advocate General Szpunar delivered his Opinion, 
where he argues that EAWs issued by the UK before the default Brexit date (29 March 2019) 
should continue to be executed (Opinion of Advocate General Szpunar, Delivered on 7 
August 2018, Case C-327/18 PPU, R O). 
29 See also Bárd (2018), pp. 4–6. 
30 Mitsilegas (2017), pp. 246ff., upon which this section draws.  
31 See chapter 5, part II below. 
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cooperation on police and security matters.32 A recent example of the UK 
pushing for further EU action in the field of security is calls for the adoption 
of an EU passenger name record (PNR) system.33 The UK has also assumed 
a leading role in furthering European integration while trying to stave off 
integration attempts that were deemed to challenge unduly state sovereignty 
in criminal matters. A key example has been the UK’s leadership in securing 
application of the principle of mutual recognition in the field of criminal law, 
an idea put forward by the then UK Home Secretary Jack Straw at the Cardiff 
European Council in 1998.  
The strategic input of the UK is also linked with the considerable 
impact that UK officials have made in the development, drafting and 
implementation of secondary EU criminal law. UK Government officials 
have participated actively in the negotiations of EU instruments in Brussels34 
and UK Members of the European Parliament have significantly contributed 
to the adoption of some of these instruments.  
Another UK contribution lies at the level of implementation of EU 
criminal law at the national level. Here, the high level of both advocacy and 
parliamentary scrutiny within the UK has resulted in substantive 
contributions in reshaping the relationship between criminal law and 
fundamental rights at the domestic level. A recent example has been the 
amendment of the UK Extradition Act 2003 to include proportionality as an 
express ground for refusal to execute an EAW. While this ground for refusal 
arguably goes beyond current EU law in the field, the emphasis on the limits 
of mutual recognition on the grounds of protecting human rights and on 
proportionality (which has been debated in the UK for a long time) has 
recently been mirrored in both secondary EU law instruments (e.g. the EIO 
Directive) and in the CJEU’s case law on the EAW.35  
All these examples demonstrate the multi-faceted contribution of UK 
actors to the development of the EU criminal justice and police cooperation 
acquis. The EU will develop criminal law with the UK’s influence being less 
marked after Brexit. It remains to be seen whether this will have an impact 
                                                     
32 House of Lords, European Union Committee (2016), para. 27.  
33 See section 5.2, part II below. 
34 Nowell-Smith (2012).  
35 See section 3.2, part II below. 
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on the content and direction of EU criminal law in the future. Some experts 
and a number of our interviewees voiced concerns that EU legislation will 
pay less attention to principles and rules of common law and adversarial 
systems of criminal justice.36 
                                                     
36 Written evidence of the Scottish Crown Office and Procurator Fiscal Service to the Home 
Affairs Sub-Committee of the House of Lords’ European Union Committee, “Brexit: Future 
UK–EU security and police cooperation”, FSP0003. See also Hanratty (2018), p. 7.  
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2 BREXIT AND THE AFSJ: 
ONGOING NEGOTIATIONS 
AND CROSS-CUTTING ISSUES 
n 29 March 2017, the UK Government formally notified the European 
Council of its intention to leave the EU. Article 50 of the Treaty on 
the European Union (TEU) sets out a timeframe of two years for the 
UK to withdraw from the EU (see Figure 1). 
The UK will remain a Member State until the formal date of 
departure.37 As of Brexit day, scheduled for 29 March 2019, the UK will 
become a third country vis-à-vis the EU. The Withdrawal Agreement will 
determine the extent to which EU law applies to the UK as of Brexit day and 
until the end of 2020, that is, until the end of the so-called transition or 
implementation period. According to the latest version of the draft 
Withdrawal Agreement, the EU and the UK have agreed upon the date of 31 
December 2020 as the end of the transition period.38 
                                                     
37 Łazowski (2017).  
38 European Commission, “Draft Agreement on the withdrawal of the United Kingdom of 
Great Britain and Northern Ireland from the European Union and the European Atomic 
Energy Community highlighting the progress made (coloured version) in the negotiation 
round with the UK of 16–19 March 2018” (2018e) (‘draft Withdrawal Agreement’). 
O 
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Figure 1. Brexit timeline 
 
Notes: QMV = qualified majority voting; EP = European Parliament. 
* Strong QMV: 72% of the 27 Member States, i.e. 20 Member States representing 65% of the 
EU-27 population. 
Source: European Commission (https://ec.europa.eu/ireland/file/brexit-timeline-
webjpg_en).  
2.1 The Withdrawal Agreement  
The Withdrawal Agreement is meant to regulate the UK’s ‘exiting status’ 
during the transition period and the role of this country within EU 
institutions and decision-making processes over the same time span. At the 
time of writing, the last version publicly available of the draft Withdrawal 
Agreement is that published by the Commission in March 2018. The relevant 
provisions for the purposes of this report can be found in Title V on ongoing 
police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters (Articles 58-61), and Title 
VII on data and information processed or obtained before the end of the 
transition period (Articles 66–71). 
The draft Withdrawal Agreement is based on the principle that, during 
the transition period, the UK remains bound by EU acts applicable to it upon 
its withdrawal, unless otherwise agreed.39 This applies to the AFSJ measures 
that already bind the UK, and the latter may choose to participate in 
instruments amending, replacing or building upon such measures. The UK, 
                                                     
39 Art. 122(1) of the draft Withdrawal Agreement. 
CRIMINAL JUSTICE & POLICE COOPERATION BETWEEN THE EU & THE UK AFTER BREXIT | 17 
 
however, is not allowed to opt into new measures during the transition 
period,40 although the EU may invite the UK “to cooperate in relation to 
these new measures”, “under the conditions set out for cooperation with 
third countries”.41 Negotiators have agreed upon these rules.  
Since EU law on judicial and police cooperation will continue to apply 
until the end of 2020, the first question that arises is what will happen to 
those cooperation proceedings that are ongoing on 31 December 2020. The 
current version of the draft Withdrawal Agreement provides that they will 
remain subject to EU law until their completion, if initiated before the end of 
the transition period. That is, if the request or order to execute (e.g. an EAW 
or EIO), or the judgment to recognise, is received by the competent authority 
before the end of the transition period.42 The same principle applies to 
ongoing law enforcement and police cooperation proceedings, and to the 
procedures concerning exchange of information: they will remain subject to 
EU law if initiated (i.e. the competent authority has received the request) 
before the end of the transition period (see Figure 2).43 Notably, the 
negotiators have not found an agreement yet on any of these provisions 
concerning ongoing judicial and law enforcement cooperation proceedings.  
Likewise, there is not yet an agreement on Article 82 of the draft 
Withdrawal Agreement, which states that the Court of Justice continues to 
have jurisdiction for the proceedings that are initiated before the end of the 
transition period (e.g. if the requests for preliminary rulings have already 
been referred to it).44 Albeit not yet agreed, Article 83 of the draft Withdrawal 
Agreement also foresees the possibility to extend the jurisdiction of the CJEU 
after the end of the transition period. This could be allowed if a UK court or 
tribunal believes that a question concerning EU law, “relating to facts that 
occurred before the end of the transition period”, “is necessary to enable it 
to give judgment in that case”.45 In such cases, UK courts may request the 
CJEU to give a preliminary ruling in accordance with Article 267 TFEU. 
                                                     
40 Art. 122(5) of the draft Withdrawal Agreement.  
41 Ibid. 
42 Art. 58 of the draft Withdrawal Agreement. For the slightly different rules on the EAW, see 
section 3.2, part II below. 
43 Art. 59 of the draft Withdrawal Agreement. 
44 Art. 82 of the draft Withdrawal Agreement. 
45 Art. 83(2) of the draft Withdrawal Agreement.  
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Figure 2. The Withdrawal Agreement and beyond: Options and consequences in 
the field of security 
 
Source: Authors’ elaboration. 
The Withdrawal Agreement will be a fully-fledged EU international 
agreement, and as such it must be negotiated and concluded in accordance 
with Article 218(3) TFEU.46 That notwithstanding, and unlike other EU 
international agreements, the parties only have two years from the moment 
when Article 50 TEU was triggered to conclude the Withdrawal Agreement. 
If no agreement is reached within this period, and “unless the European 
Council, in agreement with the Member State concerned, unanimously 
decides to extend this period”,47 EU primary and secondary law will cease 
to apply to the withdrawing Member State on the day of its departure, and 
the UK’s membership of the EU will end abruptly. 
                                                     
46 Art. 50(2) TEU. At the end of the negotiation period, the Union negotiator will present an 
agreement proposal to the Council and the European Parliament, taking into account the 
framework of the future relationship of the UK with the EU. The European Parliament must 
give its consent, by a vote of simple majority, including Members of the European Parliament 
from the UK. The Council will conclude the agreement, by a vote of qualified majority. The 
UK must also ratify the agreement according to its own constitutional arrangements. 
47 Art. 50(3) TEU.  
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This scenario is commonly referred to as the ‘cliff-edge’. Against this 
backdrop, it appears particularly worrying that no agreement whatsoever 
has been achieved between the parties on some key provisions of the text 
under negotiation, including the rules concerning judicial and police 
cooperation. This may be due to the fact that the draft Withdrawal 
Agreement has been produced by the EU, and the extent to which the 
competent UK authorities were allowed to engage in the determination of its 
content has so far been limited. This is reflective of the conundrum that the 
EU is facing when, on the one hand, it pretends that with the UK as a 
Member State it is ‘business as usual’ and, on the other, already treats that 
Member State as a third party in the negotiation of new agreements. 
The negotiators, however, have found agreement on other important 
provisions regulating the future status of the UK. First, as of Brexit day the 
country will no longer participate in the decision-making of the EU 
institutions, nor in the governance of EU agencies.48 As Brexit talks currently 
stand, it seems therefore that the UK will be excluded from the AFSJ system 
of governance from 29 March 2019, regardless of whether a Withdrawal 
Agreement is agreed upon and concluded by that date. Second, negotiators 
have agreed that – at the end of the transition period and unless otherwise 
provided in the Withdrawal Agreement – the UK “shall cease to be entitled 
to access any network, any information system, and any database 
established on the basis of Union law”.49  
In essence, the UK will be a third country after 29 March 2019 as it will 
exit the EU and it will not participate in the decision-making or governance 
of EU bodies, offices or agencies. If an agreement on the transition period is 
found,50 EU law should continue to apply to the UK during the transition 
period. At the end of this period, EU law will cease to apply to the UK, 
although the ongoing judicial and law enforcement cooperation proceedings 
will continue to be subject to EU law until their completion.  
                                                     
48 Art. 6 of the draft Withdrawal Agreement. 
49 Art. 7 of the draft Withdrawal Agreement.  
50 It ought to be noted that, according to a recent report of the Home Affairs Committee of the 
House of Commons on EU–UK cooperation in the field of security and criminal justice, “[a] 
‘no deal’ Brexit is an increasingly plausible outcome”. In the same document, the Committee 
declared that it was “unconvinced that the Government is planning adequately to prevent the 
most unthinkable of outcomes from becoming a reality” (House of Commons, Home Affairs 
Committee (2018b), para. 65). 
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2.2 EU and UK stances on a post-Brexit security partnership  
The shift in the UK’s status from EU Member State to third country raises the 
question of how to develop and sustain – after the end of the transition 
period – a new EU–UK partnership in the fields of security and criminal 
justice.  
Both EU and UK leaders have confirmed the intention to cooperate on 
criminal justice and police matters after Brexit. This is a field where there is 
a clear common interest in replicating the current scenario to the largest 
extent possible, and some of our interviewees were positive about the swift 
conclusion of one or more agreements between the EU and the UK. As they 
argued, the EU and the UK “will find an agreement because they have to”. 
Others have been more sceptical, especially since the first phase of Brexit 
negotiations has neglected issues related to criminal justice and police 
cooperation, which are likely to require intense and long discussions 
between the parties.  
The UK Government has been vocal about its wish to strike a “new 
Treaty”51 in the field and set out its view in a document published in May 
2018 (“Framework for the EU–UK Security Partnership”, hereinafter also 
‘2018 Framework’).52 In July 2018, the UK Government issued a White Paper 
on the future UK–EU relationship. As the House of Commons noted, in this 
White Paper there is no reference to a security treaty,53 although the 
Government refers to a “coherent and legally binding agreement on internal 
security”.54 At this stage, it is not clear whether there is any difference 
between the two proposals. However, as the White Paper’s “core principles 
… are broadly consistent with previous statements”,55 including the 2018 
Framework, the following analysis will stick to the latter’s wording. 
                                                     
51 Theresa May, “PM speech at Munich Security Conference: 17 February 2018” 
(www.gov.uk/government/speeches/pm-speech-at-munich-security-conference-17-
february-2018). 
52 The security partnership envisaged by the UK includes issues related to external security 
but the following remarks will focus on internal security. 
53 House of Commons, Home Affairs Committee (2018b), para. 27.  
54 HM Government (2018d), p. 56.  
55 House of Commons, Home Affairs Committee (2018b), para. 27. 
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The UK Government calls for a “new internal security treaty”56 with 
the EU. The UK proposes to sustain “cooperation on the basis of existing EU 
measures”, as this “represents the most efficient and effective means of 
achieving our shared objectives”.57 This new “internal security treaty” would 
ensure that the UK – after Brexit – continues to participate in EU measures 
concerning the field of judicial and police cooperation. The UK Government 
seeks the conclusion of a treaty that replicates some existing models 
concerning other fields, such as trade and aviation. In the technical note 
concerning the security partnership, the UK Government mentions some 
examples, namely the Schengen Association Agreements, the European 
Economic Area Agreement and the European Common Aviation Area 
Agreement, and it clarifies that 
the UK is not seeking to join the [European Economic Area] or 
[Schengen Association Agreements]. But these precedents 
demonstrate that the UK’s proposals are legally viable, and based 
on EU precedent in other fields. ... Each of the above-mentioned 
models has the same basic structure – a treaty enabling cooperation 
on the basis of EU measures in a specific field, with the relevant EU 
measures ... then listed in annexes.58 
It also adds:  
Building on these precedents an Internal Security Treaty should: 
a. Provide a legal base for cooperation between the parties on 
EU measures in a specific field; 
b. Specify a clear scope, with relevant EU measures falling 
within that scope on which the parties agree to continue 
cooperating listed in an annex; 
c. Contain provision that, where mutually beneficial, new EU 
measures falling within scope may be added to the annex by 
mutual agreement to ensure a dynamic relationship; 
                                                     
56 HM Government (2018a), p. 15.  
57 Ibid. (emphasis added).  
58 HM Government (2018c), p. 7. 
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d. Set out horizontal provisions to govern the relationship, 
which would cover governance and safeguards (e.g. in 
relation to human rights).59 
The UK Government is therefore seeking to create a new model of 
cooperation with the EU in the field of criminal justice and police 
cooperation. According to the UK’s position, the agreement should 
especially focus on three areas: practical cooperation, EU agencies and data-
driven law enforcement. Practical cooperation includes JITs60 and mutual 
recognition instruments, notably the EAW and the EIO. With regard to EU 
agencies, the UK Government highlights the added value of Eurojust and 
Europol and it states that it “is critical that the strength of these bodies are 
not weakened”.61 The new treaty should also facilitate “data-driven law 
enforcement as real time information sharing has proved to be invaluable in 
recent years”.62 The Government mentions a number of EU databases and 
information-sharing mechanisms to which it wishes to have access in the 
future (the second-generation Schengen Information System (SIS II), the 
European Criminal Records Information System (ECRIS) and exchange of 
PNR data). Finally, the UK Government lists a number of horizontal issues 
that the new treaty should address, such as dispute resolution mechanisms, 
a secondment programme and adequate guarantees for human rights.  
In substance, the UK proposal is to bring under the same ‘security 
treaty framework’ different cooperation instruments that pertain to two 
distinct areas of EU law, namely security (police) and justice. Despite the 
current narrative, which tends to conflate these two areas into a single 
framework, they should be kept separate. In fact, cooperation in the field of 
security (police) and cooperation in the field of criminal justice are each 
governed by their own principles and a specific set of rules that the EU needs 
to take into account when engaging in arrangements with third countries, 
regardless of the political willingness of the parties to develop 
comprehensive and far-reaching relations. 
The fields of criminal justice and police cooperation are furthermore 
radically different from other fields: measures adopted in the frame of the 
                                                     
59 Ibid.  
60 See section 4.2, part II below.  
61 HM Government (2018a), p. 19.  
62 Ibid., p. 21 (emphasis in the original). See more in chapter 5, part II below.  
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AFSJ impinge on fundamental rights and freedoms of individuals, and they 
encroach upon punitive powers at the heart of Member States’ sovereignty. 
The latter have agreed over the years to give up some of their longstanding 
prerogatives to set up a system of unprecedented cooperation, yet this has 
been possible within the context of the European Union, where a number of 
rules and guarantees, including fundamental rights standards set out in the 
Charter, are binding on all Member States and are subject to the oversight of 
the Court of Justice. 
Ultimately, this is the premise allowing for the application of the 
mutual recognition principle in the field of criminal justice within the EU. 
This principle is in fact based on the (rebuttable) assumption that all EU 
countries’ legal and institutional systems share common standards and 
provide sufficient protection for fundamental rights and rule of law 
safeguards. This understanding informs the current EU position, which does 
not square with the demands of the UK.  
The Commission envisages a future partnership based on four 
building blocks: effective exchange of information; support for operational 
cooperation between law enforcement authorities; judicial cooperation in 
criminal matters; and measures against money laundering and terrorism 
financing.63 As for the shape of such a partnership, it only clarified that 
internal security will be “a component of a wider EU–UK partnership” and 
that the “detailed modalities” of cooperation in the field will be “designed at 
the end of negotiations, as the form follows the content”.64  
At the same time, according to the Commission the UK will be 
considered a “3rd country outside Schengen”65 for future police and judicial 
cooperation. In early June 2018, the EU’s chief negotiator noted that the UK 
is seeking to “maintain the status quo, ... which is paradoxical seeing as the 
country decided itself to leave the European Union”.66 Michel Barnier added 
that the UK “seems to want to maintain the benefits of the current 
relationship, while leaving the EU regulatory, supervision, and application 
                                                     
63 European Commission (2018d), p. 5.  
64 Ibid., p. 8.  
65 European Commission (2018c).  
66 Press statement by Michel Barnier following this week’s round of negotiations, Brussels, 8 
June 2018 (http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_STATEMENT-18-4105_en.htm).  
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framework”,67 clarifying that “these benefits are not accessible outside the 
EU system”.68 
This chimes with the position of the European Parliament, according 
to which “third countries (outside the Schengen area) do not benefit from 
any privileged access to EU instruments, including databases, in this field”.69 
It calls for “separate arrangements ... to be found with the UK as a third 
country as regards judicial cooperation in criminal matters, including on 
extradition and mutual legal assistance, instead of current arrangements 
such as the European Arrest Warrant”.70  
It seems difficult to reconcile the positions of the EU and of the UK as 
regards their future partnership in the fields of security and justice. The issue 
is likely to gain increasingly more attention closer to Brexit day, while so far 
“[i]nternal security ... has involved little more than an hour’s discussion with 
Task Force 50”.71 
A comprehensive EU–UK security partnership would clearly 
demonstrate “political commitment to the relationship between the UK and 
the EU”.72 However, such an agreement will have to address several legal 
issues that, falling under distinct fields of EU law (such as police cooperation, 
exchange of personal information and participation in EU agencies, on the 
one hand, and extradition and mutual legal assistance on the other), pose 
very different challenges. The CJEU may also have different powers as 
regards each of these issues.73 At the time of writing and from an EU 
perspective, the conclusion of separate post-Brexit EU–UK agreements 
                                                     
67 Ibid.  
68 Ibid.  
69 European Parliament, Resolution of 14 March 2018 on the framework of the future EU–UK 
relationship, para. 26. 
70 Ibid., para. 27.  
71 Uncorrected oral evidence of R. Jones, Director of Future European Policy, Home Office, to 
the Home Affairs Sub-Committee of the House of Lords’ Select Committee on the European 
Union, “Brexit: The proposed UK–EU security treaty”, 15 May 2018, Q82. 
72 Uncorrected oral evidence of H. Farrand-Carrapico, Senior Lecturer in Politics and 
International Relations, Aston University, to the Home Affairs Sub-Committee of the House 
of Lords’ Select Committee on the European Union, “Brexit: The proposed UK–EU security 
treaty”, 21 March 2018, Q16.  
73 Regarding the role of the CJEU, see more in subsection 2.2.2, part I below.  
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concerning different matters appears therefore more acceptable in legal and 
political terms. This solution may also provide more legal certainty than a 
holistic approach in as far as it does not blur police and criminal justice 
cooperation instruments. On the other hand, the result may be more 
cumbersome from a procedural point of view. 
Whatever the shape and content of the future EU–UK partnership, the 
EU is likely to be careful in handling the negotiations with the UK. Excessive 
concessions to the latter may cause upset among other EU partners, 
especially among those countries that – unlike the UK – are also part of the 
Schengen acquis.74 It is telling that, in an internal Commission document 
published at the beginning of 2018, the “risk of upsetting relations with other 
countries” features among the “factors determining the degree of the EU 
cooperation with third countries”.75 Although the UK will be a key partner of 
the EU, it is also true that it will be only one partner, with the consequence 
that the “creativity”76 that the UK is asking for from the EU cannot be 
without limits. Nonetheless, the negotiations should strive to establish a 
partnership that may allow judicial and police cooperation to continue as 
smoothly as possible. If the UK ceased abruptly to participate in, and 
contribute to, EU procedures and instruments of cooperation, there would 
be “a clear mutual loss of operational law enforcement and criminal justice 
capability”.77 That said, the UK is likely to suffer more from a ‘hard Brexit’ 
                                                     
74 “There is a strong sense in Brussels that they cannot give the UK better treatment than they 
are giving to third countries that are part of Schengen. That is a very important thing, which 
I did not feel some months ago. It is growing more and more in the debate on these questions 
in Brussels” (uncorrected oral evidence of C. Mortera-Martinez, Research Fellow and Brussels 
Representative, Centre for European Reform, to the Home Affairs Sub-Committee of the 
House of Lords’ Select Committee on the European Union, “Brexit: The proposed UK–EU 
security treaty”, 28 March 2018, Q24).  
75 European Commission (2018a), p. 7. As Michel Barnier himself declared, “we must ensure 
that we do not discriminate against third countries” (Speech by Michel Barnier at the Berlin 
Security Conference, Berlin, 29 November 2017 (http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_ 
SPEECH-17-5021_en.htm).  
76 Theresa May, “PM speech at Munich Security Conference: 17 February 2018” 
(www.gov.uk/government/speeches/pm-speech-at-munich-security-conference-17-
february-2018).  
77 HM Government (2018a), p. 13.  
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scenario, given that this would sever the country’s possibility to rely on EU 
cooperation instruments in its relations with the remaining 27 EU partners.  
2.2.1 EU law benchmarks for post-Brexit criminal justice and police 
cooperation  
Regardless of the legal framework that will regulate future EU–UK relations, 
the negotiation and conclusion of any international agreement between the 
UK and the EU will be subject to the rules on the EU’s external action in the 
field of criminal justice and police cooperation. The EU is currently entrusted 
with the (shared) competence to develop external action in a number of 
AFSJ-related matters, including criminal justice and law enforcement 
cooperation and cybercrime, as well as data protection. A consistent body of 
Union law and international agreements has in fact been developed in these 
policy areas over the years.78 The ever-more prominent international role 
played by the EU in these fields has progressively allowed the Union to 
develop cooperation with some strategic partners (namely the US) while 
ensuring its own normative benchmarks. 
As such, future EU–UK cooperation will depend on the extent to which 
the UK is deemed to comply with crucial EU law standards and EU human 
rights and values.79 For instance, it is worth noting that the new EU–US 
‘Umbrella Agreement’80 provides for the respect of EU data protection 
standards in transatlantic data transfers, also when personal information is 
exchanged for reasons relating to the prevention, investigation, detection 
and prosecution of criminal offences. A central principle set forth in this 
agreement is that the transborder data flow should not compromise the data 
protection standards to which EU citizens are eligible under EU law.81  
                                                     
78 Carrera et al. (2015).  
79 The Petruhhin judgment of the CJEU is a case in point (see subsection 3.2.1, part II below). 
80 Agreement between the United States of America and the European Union on the protection 
of personal information relating to the prevention, investigation, detection, and prosecution 
of criminal offences, OJ L 336/3, 10.12.2016 (‘Umbrella Agreement’). 
81 See the speech at the Center for Strategic and International Studies by Věra Jourová, 
Commissioner for Justice, Consumers and Gender Equality, “EU-U.S. data flows and data 
protection: Opportunities and challenges in the digital era”, 31 March 2017 
(http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-17-826_en.htm).  
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In other words, EU external action must be consistent with EU internal 
action, with the TEU affirming that the Union must not only respect, but also 
promote its internal values in its external action. EU standards on human 
rights will be the benchmark for the external action of the EU and of its 
Member States.82 The Commission attaches great importance to such 
standards, which encompass the safeguards provided for by the ECHR. The 
Commission has already singled out the continued participation of the UK 
in the ECHR as a prerequisite for future partnership with the EU in the field 
of police and criminal justice. The current EU approach to this partnership 
foresees the inclusion of a “guillotine clause” to be activated “if the UK 
leaves the Convention or is condemned by the European Court of Human 
Rights ... for non-execution of an ECHR judgment in the area concerned”.83 
This proposal implies that from the EU’s perspective, the UK’s participation 
in the ECHR constitutes a key safeguard and an essential condition for 
maintaining cooperation on criminal justice and police matters after Brexit.84 
According to some experts, the UK could already enter the “exit mode” 
and “kick start setting-up its own external relations regime straight away”.85 
Yet, EU external competence in the field of law enforcement cooperation pre-
empts Member States from engaging in external action, at least in cases 
where a bilateral initiative could undermine primary and secondary EU law 
standards. 
Therefore, if the UK and EU Member States conclude bilateral 
agreements, EU Member States will be under the duty to comply with EU 
law in their relationships with the UK, especially in cases where the EU has 
                                                     
82 See also section 2.3 below.  
83 European Commission (2018d), p. 7. Among many others, the importance of the UK’s 
commitment to remain a party to the ECHR has been stressed by Fair Trials International in 
its written evidence to the Home Affairs Sub-Committee of the House of Lords’ Select 
Committee on the European Union, “Brexit: The proposed UK–EU security treaty”, PST0010, 
25 May 2018, para. 12.  
84 In the White Paper of July 2018, the UK Government stated that the future EU–UK 
partnership in the field of security and criminal justice “should also include a mutual 
commitment to individuals’ rights, noting that the UK will remain a party to the ECHR after 
it has left the EU” (HM Government (2018d), p. 56). 
85 Wessel and Łazowski (2017).  
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acted internally.86 Furthermore, EU officials interviewed for the purpose of 
this report doubted the actual willingness of EU Member States to engage in 
bilateral commitments, especially when it comes to data exchange. The EU 
has developed models of cooperation that provide a baseline for future data 
transfer arrangements with third countries. The Commission has already 
stressed its intention to explore the possibility to replicate the Umbrella 
Agreement model with third countries.87 
Finally, in terms of procedure, Article 218 TFEU should apply to the 
conclusion of future EU international agreements with the UK. This 
procedure grants new roles to the European Commission and the European 
Parliament, the latter being required to give its consent to the conclusion of 
the agreement. The same procedure will also apply to any future UK 
agreements with EU agencies, such as Europol and Eurojust, which are no 
longer allowed to directly conclude international agreements with their 
partners from the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty.88  
Any treaty negotiated between the UK and the EU could also be subject 
to referral to the CJEU prior to its ratification. Should this be the case, the 
Court will have to assess the compatibility with EU Treaties89 and, if it finds 
that the agreement is not compliant with EU law, that agreement “may not 
enter into force unless it is amended or the Treaties are revised”.90 This was 
for instance the fate of the Agreement between Canada and the EU on the 
exchange of PNR data, which has been struck down by the Court of Justice 
and will have to be renegotiated.91 As for the timing of these potential judicial 
proceedings, it is worth noting that the European Parliament adopted the 
resolution on seeking an opinion from the CJEU on the EU–Canada 
Agreement on 25 November 2014 and the judgment was issued on 26 July 
2017, namely more than two and a half years later.  
                                                     
86 Mitsilegas (2017), pp. 243–44. 
87 Commission (2017b). 
88 Until the new Eurojust Regulation enters into force, Eurojust is still allowed to conclude 
international agreements with third countries. See more in section 4.1, part II below.  
89 Art. 218(11) TFEU.  
90 Ibid.  
91 See more in section 5.2, part II below.  
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2.2.2 Dispute resolution and role of the Court of Justice in security 
and justice matters 
After the triggering of Article 50 TEU, the issue of post-Brexit dispute 
resolution has been subject to fierce debates.92 With regard to the field of 
judicial and police cooperation, some of our interviewees and other experts 
have argued that the expression “dispute resolution” is inappropriate. As Sir 
Francis Jacobs put it, 
[i]f one is looking at enforcement of criminal judgments and the 
European arrest warrant and suchlike, the only dispute mechanism 
that you can have ... is a court. ... The court must have the jurisdiction 
to review and if necessary quash any decision, or alternatively to 
decide to give effect to it. ... Although the language of arbitration is 
used in this context ... , that is a totally inappropriate concept ... . Of 
course there could always be measures on the interstate level for 
ironing out disagreements in the way in which a particular 
arrangement is being applied. ... But in terms of what we ordinarily 
understand by resolving disputes, it must affect the individual, and 
that can only be done by a court.93  
Discussions on dispute resolution seem to have conflated at least three 
different facets. The first is dispute resolution stricto sensu, namely the 
disagreement about a specific clause of any future EU–UK agreement. 
Second, dispute resolution sometimes seems to be confused with, or used as 
an inappropriate synonym for, interpretation of the Withdrawal Agreement, 
of any other EU–UK agreement, and even of EU law, should the UK continue 
to apply part of it in some specific sectors. Third, debates on dispute 
resolution have sometimes concerned issues related to the access of citizens 
to courts, including the CJEU and/or a new EU–UK court, if ever the latter 
is established.  
                                                     
92 See, for instance, the several documents published in the inquiry on “Brexit: Enforcement 
and dispute resolution” of the Justice Sub-Committee of the House of Lords’ Select Committee 
on the European Union. See also Hogarth (2017).  
93 Oral evidence of F. Jacobs, Professor of Law, King’s College London and former Advocate 
General, to the Home Affairs Sub-Committee of the House of Lords’ Select Committee on the 
European Union, “Brexit: Judicial oversight of the European Arrest Warrant”, 29 March 2017, 
Q5.  
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The draft Withdrawal Agreement deals with dispute settlement 
mechanisms related to this Agreement only – and thus concerns the 
transition period. Article 157 provides for the establishment of a joint 
committee, comprising representatives of the EU and of the UK. In 
accordance with Article 162(1), if any dispute in the interpretation or 
application of the Withdrawal Agreement arises, it may be brought before 
the joint committee by the EU or the UK. This article has not been agreed yet, 
as it also provides that the joint committee may decide to submit the dispute 
to the CJEU for a ruling, which would be binding on the EU and the UK. The 
UK Government does not agree with this provision as it “is very rare for the 
highest court of one party to an international agreement to be the final arbiter 
of disputes under that agreement where another nation state is involved”.94  
This seems a valid legal point if one looks at the existing EU 
agreements in the fields of security and justice. The EU has struck some 
sectoral agreements with a few third countries, such as Norway and Iceland 
(extradition and mutual legal assistance), Japan (mutual legal assistance), 
Australia (exchange of PNR data), and the US (extradition, mutual legal 
assistance and exchange of PNR data).95 The agreement with Norway and 
Iceland concerning the association of these countries with the 
implementation, application and development of the Schengen acquis 
(‘Schengen Association Agreement of Norway and Iceland’) is also worth 
mentioning.96 These agreements will be discussed in the next sections. At this 
stage, it has to be noted that none of them provides for the competence of the 
Court of Justice to settle disputes concerning their application or 
interpretation. By and large, these agreements lay down a political or 
diplomatic mechanism to solve potential conflicts (usually consultation 
between the parties). They may also foresee the possibility to suspend, or 
even terminate the agreement if the dispute is not solved.97 
Still, the lack of binding powers of the CJEU in respect of dispute 
resolution stricto sensu does not mean that the UK will not be affected by the 
                                                     
94 Ibid., Q49.  
95 The Agreement between Canada and the European Union on the transfer and processing 
of Passenger Name Record data is to be renegotiated after Opinion 1/15 of the CJEU. See more 
in section 5.2, part II below.  
96 OJ L 176/36, 10.7.1999. 
97 See, for instance, Art. 11(3) of the Schengen Association Agreement of Norway and Iceland.  
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case law of the Court of Justice. On the contrary, the latter will play a critical 
role in any future EU–UK relationship, and especially in the fields of security 
and justice. As seen above, the UK will have to comply with EU law if it 
wishes to pursue meaningful cooperation with EU Member States, and the 
CJEU will remain competent to ultimately and authoritatively interpret EU 
law. First, in addition to the scrutiny of any EU–UK agreement before its 
entry into force, the Court will be entrusted with the review of the legality of 
any EU act concerning future EU relationships with the UK. For instance, if 
the Commission adopts an adequacy decision concerning the UK, so 
allowing the transfer of personal data to this country, the Court may annul 
that decision if it deems it incompatible with EU data protection standards.98  
Second, upon request of national courts of EU Member States, the 
CJEU can interpret any EU–UK agreement after its entry into force. If the EU 
and the UK regulate their future extradition arrangements in a treaty ad hoc 
or in the context of a broader EU–UK security treaty, for example, EU 
national judges will always have the right (or even the duty) to ask the CJEU 
whether the agreement on which extradition is sought is compatible with EU 
law. If the CJEU rules in the negative, extradition should not be granted.99  
Third, national judges could refer a preliminary question to the CJEU 
even in the absence of any future EU–UK agreement in some instances. For 
example, EU national courts may ask for the intervention of the CJEU if the 
UK’s request for extradition is believed to be in breach of EU fundamental 
rights, as enshrined in the Charter, should there be a connection with EU law 
in that case.100  
In her Mansion House speech (March 2018), Prime Minister Theresa 
May admitted that “even after we have left the jurisdiction of the [European 
Court of Justice], EU law and the decisions of the ECJ will continue to affect 
                                                     
98 The Commission’s adequacy decision concerning the transfer of personal data to the US in 
the field of trade was annulled by the CJEU in Schrems (Case C-362/14). See section 2.3, part I 
below.  
99 See more in subsection 3.2.1, part II below, where the Pisciotti case (Case C-191/16) is 
discussed. 
100 See the Petruhhin case (Case C-182/15), which is summarised in subsection 3.2.1, part II 
below.  
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us”.101 A few weeks earlier, she stated that, in the field of security, “when 
participating in EU agencies the UK will respect the remit of the European 
Court of Justice”.102 The European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018 states that 
the case law of the CJEU – after Brexit – will not be binding on the UK,103 
rather persuasive, as it could be taken into account by UK courts.104 The UK 
prime minister acknowledged that if “Parliament passes an identical law to 
an EU law, it may make sense for our courts to look at the appropriate ECJ 
judgments so that we both interpret those laws consistently”.105 The 2018 
Framework issued by the UK Government simply states that in the future 
EU–UK security treaty there should be “a strong and appropriate form of 
dispute resolution ... in which both sides can have the necessary 
confidence”.106 
Finally, in the White Paper issued in July 2018, the UK Government 
reiterated that “[w]here the UK participates in an EU agency, the UK will 
respect the remit of the Court of Justice of the European Union”,107 which 
would mean that “if there was a challenge to a decision made by an agency 
that affected the UK, this could be resolved by the CJEU, noting that this 
would not involve giving the CJEU jurisdiction over the UK”.108 It is 
interesting to note that the House of Commons commented on the point, 
arguing that “[i]f the Government is willing to respect the remit of the 
European Court in relation to Europol, we see no reason why it should not 
                                                     
101 Theresa May, “PM speech on our future economic partnership with the European Union” 
(Mansion House Speech), 2 March 2018 (www.gov.uk/government/speeches/pm-speech-
on-our-future-economic-partnership-with-the-european-union).  
102 Theresa May, “PM speech at Munich Security Conference: 17 February 2018” 
(www.gov.uk/government/speeches/pm-speech-at-munich-security-conference-17-
february-2018) (emphasis added). 
103 “[A] court or tribunal may have regard to anything done on or after exit day by the 
European Court, another EU entity or the EU so far as it is relevant to any matter before the 
court or tribunal” (s. 6(2) of the European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018, emphasis added).  
104 HM Government, Department for Exiting the European Union (2018), pp. 2–3.  
105 Theresa May, “PM speech on our future economic partnership with the European Union” 
(Mansion House Speech), 2 March 2018 (www.gov.uk/government/speeches/pm-speech-
on-our-future-economic-partnership-with-the-european-union). 
106 HM Government (2018a), p. 25.  
107 HM Government (2018d), p. 62. 
108 Ibid. (2018d), p. 92. 
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apply this principle to other forms of security cooperation, including data 
protection and extradition”.109 
Ultimately, the post-Brexit dispute settlement will depend on the 
nature and the rules of future EU–UK arrangements. The more that EU law 
will apply to the UK after Brexit, the less can the role of the CJEU be curtailed 
in EU–UK agreements. If the parties regulate their future relationships in the 
domains of security and justice along the lines of existing EU agreements 
with third countries, the ‘red line’ of the UK Government on the end of the 
CJEU’s jurisdiction in the UK110 is likely not to be crossed: the CJEU does not 
usually have binding powers in settling disputes concerning EU agreements 
between the EU and third countries. Even so, any EU–UK relationship will 
remain under the scrutiny of the CJEU from the EU side and the CJEU’s case 
law will continue to have a significant impact on the UK and on its future 
cooperation with the EU.  
2.3 The exchange of data for law enforcement and criminal 
justice purposes  
Data protection and the exchange of information (including personal data) 
represent crucial issues for the future of EU–UK criminal justice and police 
cooperation. 
A number of provisions dealing with the processing of data and 
information have been included in Title VII of the draft Withdrawal 
Agreement. No agreement has yet been reached by the negotiators on Article 
67, which provides for the application of EU data protection rules to data 
concerning data subjects outside the UK that are obtained or processed by 
the UK before the end of the transition period or processed by the UK after the 
expiry of the transition period on the basis of the Withdrawal Agreement. 
The parties have instead agreed on the policy objective of Article 68 of the 
draft Withdrawal Agreement,111 according to which requests for assistance 
received before the end of the transition period will continue to be subject to 
EU rules. These rules are Article 61 of the General Data Protection Regulation 
                                                     
109 House of Commons, Home Affairs Committee (2018b), para. 55.  
110 HM Government (2017b), p. 13.  
111 The text, however, requires drafting changes or clarifications.  
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(GDPR)112 and – more importantly for the purposes of this report – Article 
50 of Directive 2016/680 on protecting personal data processed for the 
purpose of criminal law enforcement,113 which applies to mutual assistance 
requests covering, inter alia, information requests and requests to carry out 
prior authorisations and consultations, inspections and investigations.  
The EU and the UK have a mutual interest in maintaining strong 
cooperation on the cross-border transfer of personal data for law 
enforcement purposes after Brexit.114 The UK has played an important role 
in shaping the content of EU instruments enabling the collection and 
exchange of a wide range of personal data for law enforcement purposes,115 
and EU–UK police and judicial cooperation largely depends on the sharing 
of such data.116 However, these data flows between EU Member States, 
relevant EU bodies (e.g. Europol and Eurojust) and UK law enforcement and 
judicial actors can only be ensured in a post-Brexit scenario where the UK as 
a third country complies with EU legal standards applying to transfers of 
data for reasons related to the prevention, investigation, detection or 
prosecution of criminal offences. 
In particular, EU external action on criminal justice, policing and 
surveillance must be compatible with the EU Charter and secondary EU law 
on data protection. The powers of the Commission and the standards to be 
respected when exchanging personal data with third countries as part of an 
activity falling within the scope of Union law have been progressively 
clarified by the CJEU. In Schrems,117 the Court found that the decision of the 
                                                     
112 OJ L 119/1, 4.5.2016.  
113 Directive (EU) 2016/680 on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing 
of personal data by competent authorities for the purposes of the prevention, investigation, 
detection or prosecution of criminal offences or the execution of criminal penalties, and on the 
free movement of such data, OJ L 119/89, 4.5.2016.  
114 Alegre et al. (2017), p. 60. 
115 Mitsilegas (2017), pp. 237–38. 
116 See Oral evidence of N. Hurd, Minister for Policing, to the House of Commons’ Home 
Affairs Committee, “Home Office delivery of Brexit: Policing and security co-operation”, 23 
January 2018, Q148. 
117 Case C-362/14, Maximillian Schrems v Data Protection Commissioner, Judgment of 6 October 
2015, para. 73. The following remarks on this judgment build on Mitsilegas (2016b), pp. 57–
58.  
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European Commission on the adequacy of the protection provided by the 
safe harbour privacy principles and related frequently asked questions 
issued by the US Department of Commerce was invalid.118 The Court of 
Justice looked at the wording of Article 25(6) of Directive 95/46 on data 
protection (now Article 45 of the GDPR),119 which provided for the adoption 
by the European Commission of adequacy decisions concerning the transfer 
of personal data to third countries.  
The Court recognised that a third country cannot be required to ensure 
a level of protection identical to that guaranteed in the EU legal order.120 At 
the same time, the phrase “adequate level of protection” should be 
understood as requiring the third country to ensure a level of protection of 
fundamental rights and freedoms that is “essentially equivalent to that 
guaranteed within the European Union by virtue of Directive 95/46 read in 
light of the Charter”.121 The Court explained that, if there were no such 
requirement, the objective of ensuring a high level of data protection would 
be disregarded, and this high level of data protection could easily be 
circumvented by transfers of personal data from the EU to third countries 
for processing in those countries.122  
Directive 95/46 on data protection did not apply to the processing of 
personal data in the field of criminal law123 and the principles set out by the 
Court of Luxembourg in Schrems did not concern the field of security. Yet 
they now apply to EU and Member States’ external action in the field of 
criminal justice and police cooperation, as the EU legislative bodies have 
recently codified these principles in Directive 2016/680. This directive 
concerns specifically the processing of personal data for the purposes of the 
prevention, investigation, detection or prosecution of criminal offences or 
the execution of criminal penalties, while all the other activities concerning 
                                                     
118 OJ L 215/7, 25.8.2000. 
119 OJ L 281/31, 23.11.1995.  
120 Case C-362/14, Maximillian Schrems v Data Protection Commissioner, Judgment of 6 October 
2015, paras 70–72.  
121 Ibid., para. 73 (emphasis added).  
122 Ibid.  
123 Art. 3(2) of Directive 95/46.  
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the processing of personal data falling within the scope of EU law are 
addressed in the GDPR.  
According to Directive 2016/680, transfer of data to a third country is 
only allowed when some requirements are met.124 These chiefly concern the 
necessity, proportionality and legality of the transfer for law enforcement 
purposes.125 Above all, data can be transferred to a third country only when 
the latter ensures an adequate level of protection of human rights or where 
it provides for appropriate safeguards. 
The transfer of personal data to a third country therefore needs to rely 
on an EU legal basis ensuring that such criteria and standards are 
respected.126 There are two different legal options available to do this. First, 
the Commission may adopt an adequacy decision ascertaining that the third 
country ensures an “adequate level of protection”,127 to be interpreted in 
light of the Schrems principles. Second, in the absence of such a decision, 
“appropriate safeguards” may be “provided for in a legally binding 
instrument”,128 and personal data may be exchanged on this basis. In the 
absence of both an adequacy decision and appropriate safeguards, the 
transfer of personal data may take place in exceptional circumstances and on 
a case-by-case basis.129  
2.3.1 Scope of the adequacy test: Assessing UK national security and 
data protection legislation 
The adequacy decision is adopted by the Commission upon the in-depth 
assessment of the third country’s relevant institutional and legal framework 
and of the conformity of the latter with EU rule of law and fundamental 
rights standards. As recently submitted by the European Commission, the 
adequacy decision “allows the free flow of personal data from the EU 
                                                     
124 See Art. 35(1) of Directive 2016/680.  
125 Art. 35(1)(a) of Directive 2016/680.  
126 Art. 35(1)(d) of Directive 2016/680. 
127 Art. 36(1) of Directive 2016/680.  
128 Art. 37 of Directive 2016/680.  
129 Art. 38 of Directive 2016/680. 
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without the EU data exporter having to implement any additional 
safeguards or being subject to further conditions”.130  
Interviews conducted for this report confirmed that the Commission’s 
scrutiny is not only formal (i.e. limited to analysis of the content of the 
relevant rules), but it also looks at the way in which the third country’s 
legislation is implemented in practice. Among others, the adequacy 
mechanism is designed to assess the third country’s capacity to enforce data 
subject rights through effective judicial and administrative redress 
mechanisms, and the Commission thus evaluates both the existence and the 
effectiveness of independent supervisory authorities for data protection. The 
adequacy assessment is dynamic, as it involves a periodic review of the third 
country’s normative and policy developments in all relevant fields.131 
The adequacy assessment covers the entirety of the third country’s 
national legislation and international commitments, including legislation 
and policies that fall outside the scope of EU law, as the Commission’s 
evaluation extends to legislation on “national security” and “defence”.132 As 
a result, the surveillance practices of UK security services that, in principle, 
remain under the “sole responsibility”133 of national authorities by virtue of 
the distribution of powers between the EU and its Member States, will 
become subject to the Commission’s adequacy evaluation after Brexit.134  
This will most probably lead the Commission to scrutinise the UK’s 
Investigatory Powers Act (IPA) 2016, which has been described as “the most 
significant piece of surveillance legislation to be passed in recent years”.135 
Several stakeholders, including the UK House of Commons136 and the UK 
                                                     
130 European Commission (2018b), p. 1.  
131 Art. 36(3) of Directive 2016/680.  
132 Art. 36(2) of Directive 2016/680.  
133 Art. 4(2) TFEU. 
134 See the oral evidence of L. Woods, Director of Research, School of Law, University of Essex, 
to the House of Commons’ Home Affairs Committee, “Home Office delivery of Brexit: 
Policing and security co-operation”, 5 December 2017, Q75. 
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information commissioner,137 have expressed serious concerns about the 
IPA’s compliance with EU data protection standards. Nicknamed the 
‘Snoopers’ Charter’, the IPA has also recently been challenged before UK 
courts by the National Council for Civil Liberties (Liberty).138 
In this regard, it is worth noting that the CJEU, in Tele2 and Watson,139 
had a chance to scrutinise the IPA’s predecessor, the Data Retention and 
Investigatory Act 2014 (DRIPA). As the latter allowed for the bulk retention 
of telecommunications’ data to be used by UK police and security 
agencies,140 it was found to fall foul of EU law. Building on Digital Rights 
Ireland,141 the CJEU ruled that the EU fundamental rights to privacy and data 
protection preclude national legislation that prescribes general and 
indiscriminate retention of data. The Court admitted that derogations to 
these EU fundamental rights safeguards are only possible in so far as the 
limitations are “strictly necessary” for the purpose of “fighting serious 
crime”.142 In Tele2 and Watson, the CJEU found the DRIPA’s data retention 
scheme to be unlawful precisely because it exceeded the “strict necessity” 
test.  
Compared with the DRIPA, the IPA provides a higher threshold to be 
met for UK authorities to proceed with the retention of communications 
data. Retention should be limited to those data relating to “serious crimes” 
sanctioned with a custodial sentence of six months or more.143 The IPA also 
foresees the creation of a new Office for Communications Data 
                                                     
137 See the oral evidence of E. Denham, Information Commissioner, to the House of Commons’ 
Home Affairs Committee, “EU policing and security issues”, 5 December 2017, Q76. 
138 Further information may be found on Liberty’s website (www.libertyhumanrights.org.uk/ 
campaigning/people-vs-snoopers-charter).  
139 Joined Cases C‑203/15 and C‑698/15, Tele2 Sverige and Tom Watson, Judgment of 21 
December 2016.  
140 Kuşkonmaz (2017a).  
141 Joined Cases C-293/12 and C-594/12, Digital Rights Ireland, Judgment of 8 April 2014. 
142 Joined Cases C‑203/15 and C‑698/15, Tele2 Sverige and Tom Watson, Judgment of 21 
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143 Home Office, “Investigatory Powers Act 2016: Consultation on the Government’s proposed 
response to the ruling of the Court of Justice of the European Union on 21 December 2016 
regarding the retention of communications data”, November 2017 (www.gov.uk/ 
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Authorisations responsible for authorising communications data requests. 
Still, it is far from certain that the mere reference to the seriousness of a crime 
alone can be a lawful justification for the necessity and legitimacy of data 
retention. This is also confirmed by a recent request for a preliminary ruling 
made by a Spanish court in the Ministerio Fiscal case, which is now pending 
before the CJEU.144 The CJEU’s Advocate General has already stressed that 
the circumstances under which law enforcement authorities can have access 
to electronic data remain circumscribed even in the presence of a serious 
crime. In the Advocate General’s view, access to personal data sought as part 
of a criminal investigation cannot be authorised in a general and 
indiscriminate manner, but it must target the persons concerned and be 
limited in duration.145 
In the UK, there is disagreement as to the consistency with EU law of 
the bulk-data acquisition powers granted by the IPA upon UK security 
services (e.g. MI5 and MI6). This emerges clearly from a recent referral for a 
preliminary ruling made to the CJEU by the Investigatory Powers Tribunal. 
The latter asked precisely whether the acquisition and use of bulk 
communications data by the security services falls under EU law.146 A 
positive response by the CJEU may lead to further amendments to the IPA. 
As for the IPA provisions granting the UK secretary of state the power to 
issue “retention notices” to telecommunications operators (section 87(1) part 
4 of the IPA), their incompatibility with EU law (and in particular with the 
EU Charter) has been expressly recognised in the recent case Liberty v 
Secretary of State for the Home Department.147 The High Court of England and 
Wales concluded that the legislation must be amended within a reasonable 
time, and that a reasonable time would be 1 November 2018.148  
                                                     
144 Case C-207/16, Request for a preliminary ruling from the Audiencia provincial de 
Tarragona, Sección cuarta (Spain) lodged on 14 April 2016 – Ministerio Fiscal. 
145 Opinion of Advocate General Saugmandsgaard Øe, Delivered on 3 May 2018, Case 
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Some obstacles standing in the UK’s way towards adequacy may also 
derive from the Data Protection Act 2018, which has implemented EU data 
protection rules into the UK legal system.149 While it has been recognised that 
the Data Protection Act contains “numerous rights for data subjects”, it is 
criticised for not explicitly incorporating Article 8 of the Charter into the UK 
legal system.150 Also problematic are the Act’s proposals to exempt the Home 
Office and other UK security agencies from crucial data protection 
obligations when personal information is collected and processed for 
reasons related to “immigration control” or for the “investigation or 
detection of activities that would undermine the maintenance of effective 
immigration control”.151 These exemptions translate into restrictions of the 
rights of (documented and undocumented) third country nationals as data 
subjects. Such restrictions would affect their right to rectification and 
erasure, as well as their right to know who is processing which data and for 
what purpose.152  
In the view of the UK Government, the Act aims to set “new standards 
for protecting personal data, in accordance with recent EU data protection 
laws, giving people more control over use of their data”.153 From this 
perspective, EU–UK adequacy talks could potentially be rather 
‘straightforward’, for the UK will negotiate from “a very different starting 
point from many of the other adequacy decisions that are effectively looked 
at”.154 This is not just because of the UK’s history “in terms of being a trusted 
party on data inside the EU” but also because of the Data Protection Act, 
which will guarantee that the UK leaves the EU “on a fully aligned basis”.155 
As noted above, however, the full alignment of UK law with the GDPR and 
                                                     
149 See also Gutheil et al. (2018b), pp. 56–57. 
150 House of Lords and House of Commons, Joint Committee on Human Rights (2018), p. 12. 
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Directive 2016/680 on protecting personal data processed for the purpose of 
criminal law enforcement will not necessarily be sufficient to pass the 
adequacy test, as the Commission’s assessment encompasses legislation and 
practices concerning fields that are currently outside the scope of EU law, 
including national security. 
Several UK civil society organisations, some of which were also heard 
in the context of the Task Force, have instead warned that the Data Protection 
Act allows for intrusive monitoring of migrants’ lives, resulting in 
discrimination between UK and third country nationals.156 The EU GDPR 
only permits exemptions to its data protection regime in so far as they do not 
undermine the essence of the fundamental rights and freedoms enshrined in 
the EU Charter (privacy and human dignity), and to the extent that they 
represent a necessary and proportionate measure to protect one of the 
legitimate aims identified in the regulation.157 The exceptions proposed 
under the UK Data Protection Act seem to fall outside these circumstances. 
Not only is immigration control as such not included among the legitimate 
aims that under the GDPR can justify restrictions to EU data protection rules, 
but also the derogations for immigration control purposes foreseen in the 
Data Protection Act appear to challenge the freedom from discrimination 
granted under EU primary law. They expressly target non-UK nationals 
(which in the future will also include EU citizens), and as a result are 
disproportionate in light of the intrusive monitoring of migrants’ lives and 
of the unfettered data sharing between agencies that they enable. Quoting a 
public statement made by the chair of the European Parliament Committee 
on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs (LIBE), a recent report by the 
House of Commons on UK–EU security cooperation after Brexit flagged that 
this aspect of the Act would “flout” EU protections on fundamental rights, 
and consequently reduce the UK’s “chances of obtaining an adequacy 
decision”.158 In July 2018, the House of Commons reiterated its suggestion to 
the Government to “remove the immigration exemption from the Data 
                                                     
156 National Council for Civil Liberties (Liberty) (2017). See also the criticism of J. Ruiz Diaz, 
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Protection Act – both to ensure proper transparency in its immigration 
policy, and to avoid undermining a data adequacy decision”.159 
The adequacy assessment would also cover the UK’s external 
cooperation with key strategic partners. On 23 March 2018, US President 
Donald Trump signed the US government spending bill, which also 
included the “Clarifying Lawful Use of Overseas Data (CLOUD) Act”.160 The 
CLOUD Act allows the US executive to enter into “executive agreements” 
with qualifying foreign governments in order to directly access data held by 
US IT companies and service providers. Foreign governments qualify to 
conclude an executive agreement when the US attorney general certifies that 
they meet the human rights standards set out in the Act. Upon the conclusion 
of such agreements, the parties have the ability to cooperate outside the 
traditional channels of a mutual legal assistance treaty (MLAT) (i.e. without 
the oversight of independent judicial authorities, and “without following 
each other’s privacy laws”).161 
Downing Street announced in February that the UK prime minister 
had spoken to President Donald Trump about data sharing on serious crime 
and terrorism.162 This statement appears as a reference to the new CLOUD 
Act. It follows previous UK–US discussions163 on a bilateral agreement that 
would enable UK-based law enforcement authorities to request stored 
communications and live intercepts directly from US-based providers, 
including content data, as an alternative to the MLAT currently in force 
between the two countries (on a reciprocal basis).164 In substance, by 
foreseeing the possibility to conclude an executive agreement under the 
CLOUD Act, the UK Government reiterated its intention to foster UK–US 
cooperation practices directed at facilitating the cross-border exchange of 
                                                     
159 House of Commons, Home Affairs Committee (2018b), para. 37 (emphasis added).  
160 CLOUD Act, S. 2383, H.R. 4943. 
161 Fischer (2018).  
162 HM Government, Press release, “PM call with President Trump: 6 February 2018” 
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personal data between US and UK authorities, and outside the EU 
framework. 
The UK has been negotiating a bilateral data-sharing agreement with 
the US since 2015, but no such an agreement has been concluded to date. In 
the meantime, the UK has taken initiative at the domestic level in order to 
pave the way for future cooperation with the US under a CLOUD Act 
executive agreement with the US. On 27 June 2018, the UK Government 
introduced in the House of Lords the Crime (Overseas Production Orders) 
Bill.165 If adopted, this piece of legislation would enable UK law enforcement 
agencies and prosecutors to apply through the UK courts for an ‘overseas 
production order’ requiring service providers outside the UK to produce or 
grant access to electronic data for the purposes of investigating and 
prosecuting serious crimes. Applications for an overseas production order 
could only be made if there was an international agreement in place between 
the UK and the territory where the relevant provider was based.166  
As an EU Member State, the UK would be pre-empted from the 
conclusion of an executive agreement with the US on the exchange of 
personal data for law enforcement purposes, at least to the extent that such 
an agreement would undermine EU fundamental rights and rule of law 
standards. The Commission has recently noted that bilateral agreements 
with non-EU countries would lead to “fragmentation”, which might hamper 
international cooperation in the investigation and prosecution of crime.167 
Moreover, an executive agreement concluded by the UK as a third country 
(i.e. after Brexit) would fall within the scope of the Commission’s adequacy 
assessment.  
2.3.2 Ways towards adequacy and viable alternatives  
In addition to the challenges that the above-mentioned pieces of UK 
legislation on surveillance and data protection may raise, the procedure to 
obtain an adequacy decision may also turn out to be quite long. There are 
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ongoing adequacy talks with South Korea and Japan, while adequacy 
decisions have been adopted so far with regard to the following countries 
and jurisdictions: Andorra, Argentina, Canada (commercial organisations), 
Faroe Islands, Guernsey, Israel, Isle of Man, Jersey, New Zealand, 
Switzerland, Uruguay and the US (limited to the Privacy Shield 
framework).168 Still, none of these adequacy decisions cover police and 
judicial cooperation, as this field was excluded from the scope of Directive 
95/46. A senior EU official interviewed in our research noted that the pages 
regarding motivations attached to the already adopted decisions have 
become more numerous over time (over 50 pages for the most recent ones), 
and this is indicative of the progressively more demanding assessment 
carried out by the Commission.  
In the case of Japan, the adequacy assessment started in May 2017 and 
is expected to be concluded after summer 2018. This suggests that adequacy 
talks with third countries, including the post-Brexit UK, may take 
considerable time. Furthermore, the involvement of the European Data 
Protection Board, with which the Commission should consult when 
assessing the level of data protection in third countries,169 may extend the 
length of the adequacy proceedings. The Board should provide the 
Commission with an “opinion for the assessment of the adequacy of the level 
of protection in a third country”;170 to this end, the Commission should 
provide the Board with all necessary documentation, including 
correspondence with the government of the third country.171 Directive 
2016/680 on protecting personal data processed for the purpose of criminal 
law enforcement does not set out an explicit obligation for the Commission 
to stick to the content of the opinion of the Board, yet it is difficult to imagine 
how the Commission would openly depart from it. 
                                                     
168 This information was retrieved from the European Commission’s website 
(https://ec.europa.eu/info/law/law-topic/data-protection/data-transfers-outside-
eu/adequacy-protection-personal-data-non-eu-countries_en). 
169 Recital No. 68 of Directive 2016/680. See the similar wording of Recital No. 105 of the 
GDPR. 
170 Art. 51(1)(g) of Directive 2016/680, which is phrased in a way that is similar to Art. 70(1)(s) 
of the GDPR. 
171 Art. 51(1)(g) of Directive 2016/680, which corresponds to the second part of Art. 70(1)(s) of 
the GDPR. 
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Although the adoption of a Commission adequacy decision would be 
“the obvious way to go”172 to keep data flows after Brexit, it is not the only 
available alternative. As mentioned, Directive 2016/680 allows data 
exchange after Brexit through “legally binding instruments” providing for 
“appropriate safeguards”173 with regard to the protection of personal data. 
This could be represented, for instance, by an international agreement 
concluded by the UK and the EU. The broad wording of Directive 2016/680 
would also cover sectoral agreements, such as those concerning the exchange 
of personal data solely with EU agencies (e.g. Europol and Eurojust). At the 
same time, this approach would be a more cumbersome way forward, 
applying a piecemeal approach to data transfer for the purpose of law 
enforcement and criminal justice cooperation. 
The UK has called for a “new agreement between the EU and UK”,174 
which should “[build] on standard adequacy”175 and will “maintain the free 
unhindered flow of personal data between the EU and UK”.176 According to 
the UK Government, this bespoke agreement would operate in parallel to 
the new internal security treaty.177 However, it is not yet clear what an 
agreement on the exchange of personal data ‘building on the existing 
adequacy model’ would look like. In the White Paper issued in July 2018, the 
Government stated:  
The UK believes that the EU’s adequacy framework provides the 
right starting point for the arrangements the UK and the EU should 
agree on data protection but wants to go beyond the framework in 
two key respects: 
a. on stability and transparency, it would benefit the UK and the EU, 
as well as businesses and individuals, to have a clear, transparent 
framework to facilitate dialogue, minimise the risk of disruption to 
                                                     
172 Oral evidence of L. Woods, Director of Research, School of Law, University of Essex, to the 
House of Commons’ Home Affairs Committee, “Home Office delivery of Brexit: Policing and 
security co-operation”, 5 December 2017, Q75. 
173 Art. 37(1)(a) of Directive 2016/680.  
174 HM Government (2018b), p. 16.  
175 Ibid.  
176 Ibid. (emphasis in the original). 
177 HM Government (2018a), p. 25. 
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data flows and support a stable relationship between the UK and 
the EU to protect the personal data of UK and EU citizens across 
Europe; and 
b. on regulatory cooperation, it would be in the UK’s and the EU’s 
mutual interest to have close cooperation and joined up 
enforcement action between the UK’s Information Commissioner’s 
Office (ICO) and EU Data Protection Authorities.178  
From the EU perspective, the adequacy decision would be the preferred 
approach, as stated by Michel Barnier: “the only possibility for the EU to 
protect personal data is through an adequacy decision”.179  
                                                     
178 HM Government (2018d), p. 74.  
179 Speech by Michel Barnier at the 28th Congress of the International Federation for European 
Law (FIDE), Lisbon, 26 May 2018 (http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-18-
3962_en.htm). See also European Commission (2018c).  
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3 UK PARTICIPATION IN EU 
MUTUAL RECOGNITION 
INSTRUMENTS AND 
FUTURE OPTIONS  
uring its EU presidency in 1998, the UK Government put forward the 
idea of applying the mutual recognition principle in the field of 
criminal law.180 In the 1999 Tampere Conclusions, setting up a five-
year agenda for EU justice and home affairs, the European Council endorsed 
the principle of mutual recognition, which in its view “should become the 
cornerstone of judicial cooperation”181 in criminal matters. The 2004 Hague 
Programme and the 2010 Stockholm Programme reiterated this stance.182 
Eventually, with the Treaty of Lisbon, EU primary law has recognised that 
judicial cooperation in criminal matters in the EU “shall be based on the 
principle of mutual recognition of judgments and judicial decisions” (Article 
82 TFEU).  
The application of the principle of mutual recognition soon became the 
motor of European integration in criminal matters. The adoption in 2002 of 
the EAW Framework Decision – a prime example of mutual recognition in 
criminal matters – constituted a key development for EU criminal law and 
                                                     
180 Mitsilegas (2009), pp. 115ff., upon which this section draws.  
181 European Council (1999), para. 33.  
182 See, respectively, European Council (2004), para. 3.3.1, and European Council (2010), para. 
3.1.  
D 
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was followed by the adoption of a series of further mutual recognition 
measures. The principle of mutual recognition implies a high degree of 
automaticity in the execution of judicial decisions, in the frame of judicial 
procedures in which political authorities do not participate. Cooperation 
among judicial authorities should take place within a limited timeframe, 
under strict deadlines, and on the basis of a pro forma document that is 
usually annexed to the relevant framework decisions or directives.  
Criminal justice cooperation through mutual recognition procedures is 
one of three areas in which the UK Government has expressed its desire to 
remain as close as possible to the Union (together with EU JHA agencies and 
bodies and access to databases/information-sharing mechanisms). At the 
same time, the possibility of maintaining the status quo after Brexit faces a 
set of legal and political challenges. Outside the framework provided by EU 
mutual recognition instruments, there are a number of alternatives to ensure 
that the parties maintain judicial cooperation in criminal matters.  
3.1 Negotiating positions on instruments of mutual 
recognition  
According to the “Framework for the UK–EU Security Partnership”, the UK 
Government aims to have “[a]ccess to streamlined, consistent procedures for 
practical operational cooperation”,183 which include mutual recognition 
procedures. As noted above, the European Parliament is of the opinion that 
future relationships with the EU in the field should be regulated in keeping 
with existing agreements with non-Schengen third countries. It is thus 
largely uncertain whether the UK could manage to continue to have access 
to EU mutual recognition instruments after Brexit. 
It should be noted that mutual recognition creates extraterritoriality:184 
in a borderless AFSJ, the will of an authority in one Member State can be 
enforced beyond its territorial legal borders and across this area. The 
acceptance of such extraterritoriality requires a high level of mutual trust 
between the authorities that take part in the system and is premised upon 
the acceptance that membership of the European Union means that all EU 
                                                     
183 HM Government (2018a), p. 17.  
184 Nicolaidis and Shaffer (2005).  
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Member States fully respect fundamental rights as well as the rule of law,185 
including the independence of the judiciary and the general principle of 
effective judicial protection.  
Because of the inextricable link between mutual trust, mutual 
recognition, respect for fundamental rights and membership of the EU 
(which includes the jurisdiction of the CJEU), no third country has so far 
been allowed to join EU mutual recognition instruments. As the European 
Commission pointed out, “[t]here is no presumption of mutual trust outside 
of the EU institutional framework underpinned by common principles”.186 
Even the EU Agreement with Norway and Iceland on surrender, which 
mostly replicates the EAW Framework Decision, does not allow these 
countries to exchange EAWs with EU Member States but it creates a parallel 
system of extradition between the latter and Norway and Iceland.187 The red 
line of the UK on the Court of Justice and its status as a non-Schengen 
country are likely to raise further obstacles to the continued participation of 
this country in EU mutual recognition instruments. As a consequence, 
“Brexit is likely to have the biggest impact on the operation of mutual 
recognition instruments in proceedings and investigations involving the 
UK”.188 
The following sections examine the three instruments of mutual 
recognition that the UK authorities and our interviewees have identified as 
the most important tools to cooperate with their EU counterparts, namely 
the EAW (3.2), the EIO (3.3), and the mutual recognition of freezing and 
confiscation orders (3.4).  
3.2 European Arrest Warrant 
The EAW Framework Decision is the most emblematic and widely 
implemented EU criminal law instrument. It aims to compensate for the 
freedom of movement enabled by the abolition of internal borders by 
                                                     
185 Mitsilegas (2016a), p. 126. As set out in the sections below, recent case law of the CJEU and 
recent EU legislation show that this presumption is far from irrebuttable.  
186 European Commission (2018d), p. 10.  
187 See more in subsection 3.2.2, part II below. 
188 Alegre et al. (2017), p. 16 (emphasis added).  
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ensuring that Member States’ justice systems can reach extraterritorially to 
bring individuals to face justice should the latter have taken advantage of the 
abolition of borders to flee the jurisdiction. The EAW Framework Decision 
has established a speedy and automatic system that requires the recognition 
of EAWs and the surrender of individuals wanted for prosecution or to serve 
a custodial sentence with a minimum of formality.189 Unlike the traditional 
extradition procedures, the EAW Framework Decision offers the following 
improvements: 
 introduces a surrender procedure where EAWs are exchanged among 
judicial authorities;190 Member States can designate central authorities 
to assist the competent judicial authorities;191 
 abolishes, in principle, the bar on the extradition of own nationals;192 
 exempts the executing authority from assessing double criminality, if 
the offence at issue is punishable in the issuing Member State by a 
custodial sentence or a detention order for a maximum period of at 
least three years and it falls within one of the 32 categories of offences 
listed in Article 2(2) of the EAW Framework Decision; 
 provides for only three mandatory grounds of non-execution 
(amnesty, ne bis in idem and minor age) and lists seven grounds for 
optional non-execution of EAWs;193  
 does not provide for the political offence exception;194 and 
 obliges the executing authorities to take a final decision on the 
execution of the EAW within strict deadlines, with a maximum of 90 
                                                     
189 Mitsilegas (2017), p. 230. 
190 Art. 6 of the EAW Framework Decision.  
191 Art. 7 of the EAW Framework Decision. 
192 See, however, Art. 4(4) of the EAW Framework Decision, which provides that if the EAW 
has been issued for the purposes of execution of a custodial sentence or detention order, the 
executing authority may refuse to execute the EAW “where the requested person is staying 
in, or is a national or a resident of the executing Member State and that State undertakes to 
execute the sentence or detention order in accordance with its domestic law”.  
193 Arts 3 and 4 of the EAW Framework Decision.  
194 See, however, Recital No. 12 of the EAW Framework Decision.  
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days after the arrest of the requested person in the most complex 
cases.195  
In the UK, the EAW Framework Decision has been implemented by 
the Extradition Act 2003. Part 1 of the Extradition Act regulates extradition 
from the UK to EU countries (and Gibraltar) – the so-called category 1 
territories – whereas extradition to the UK is dealt with in Part 3. The 
National Crime Agency is the central authority that receives incoming EAWs 
from other EU countries and transmits to them outgoing EAWs.  
In the implementation of the EAW Framework Decision, the UK has 
introduced some rules that are not included in the EU instrument. For 
instance, section 13 of the Extradition Act (“Extraneous considerations”) is 
worded in a way that allows UK courts to refuse extradition for politically 
motivated offences.196 Furthermore, although the operative provisions of the 
EAW Framework Decision do not include a ground for refusal to execute an 
EAW based on human rights considerations,197 section 21 of the Extradition 
Act imposes on the judge the duty to decide whether the person’s extradition 
would be compatible with the ECHR within the meaning of the Human 
Rights Act 1998.198 If the judge decides the question in the negative, he or she 
must order the person’s discharge.199  
Other EU Member States have likewise ‘gold-plated’ the transposition 
of the EAW Framework Decision by expressly including human rights 
grounds for refusal in national implementing law. Significantly, in the recent 
Aranyosi and Căldăraru ruling, the CJEU has confirmed that execution of 
EAWs may be postponed, and eventually refused, on human rights grounds. 
The Court clarifies the steps to be taken in order for the executing authority 
                                                     
195 Art. 17 of the EAW Framework Decision.  
196 See Baker et al. (2011), p. 377. The Extradition Act 2003 still refers to “extradition” rather 
than to “surrender”. 
197 Art. 1(3) of the EAW Framework Decision simply states that the Framework Decision “shall 
not have the effect of modifying the obligation to respect fundamental rights and fundamental 
legal principles as enshrined in Art. 6 of the Treaty on European Union”. See also Recital No. 
12.  
198 The Human Rights Act 1998 is the piece of UK legislation implementing the European 
Convention of Human Rights.  
199 S. 21(2) Extradition Act 2003.  
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to evaluate whether “there are substantial grounds to believe that the 
individual concerned” by the EAW “will be exposed, because of the 
conditions for his detention in the issuing Member State, to a real risk of 
inhuman or degrading treatment, within the meaning of Article 4 of the 
Charter, in the event of his surrender to that Member State”.200 If “the 
existence of that risk cannot be discounted within a reasonable time”, the 
Court concludes that “the executing judicial authority must decide whether 
the surrender procedure should be brought to an end”.201 The Court’s ruling 
is significant not only in affirming for the first time that execution of an EAW 
may be refused in certain circumstances, but also in negating a system of 
mutual recognition based on automaticity and blind trust: human rights 
compliance must be queried and ascertained on the ground, and on the basis 
of concrete evidence.  
A second avenue that allows the UK to address human rights concerns 
arising from the operation of the EAW system is the scrutiny of the 
compliance of such a system with the principle of proportionality. In the EU, 
the prevailing view has thus far been for proportionality to be dealt with in 
the issuing and not in the executing Member State.202 Nevertheless, since 
2014, the UK has treated non-compliance with proportionality as a ground 
for refusal to execute an EAW.203 Section 21A of the Extradition Act 2003 
provides for an exhaustive list of matters to be considered by the judge when 
ruling on proportionality.  
The UK – which has been pioneering in introducing human rights 
safeguards in the EAW – will therefore leave the system at the very time 
when EU institutions appear to have begun to take these human rights 
considerations seriously.204 The CJEU was recently asked to broaden the 
fundamental rights test set out in Aranyosi towards a wider rule of law test.205 
                                                     
200 Joined Cases C-404/15 and C-659/15 PPU, Aranyosi and Căldăraru, Judgment of 5 April 
2016, para. 104 (emphasis added).  
201 Ibid.  
202 European Commission (2017c), pp. 19 and 49. 
203 See s. 21A(1)(b) Extradition Act 2003, as amended by the Anti-Social Behaviour, Crime and 
Policing Act 2014.  
204 Mitsilegas (2017), pp. 230–33. 
205 Carrera and Mitsilegas (2018).  
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In the Celmer case (Minister for Justice and Equality v LM (Deficiencies in the 
system of justice)),206 the Irish High Court asked the CJEU to rule on whether 
a suspect can be surrendered to a Member State (Poland) where the 
independence of the judiciary is blatantly at stake. In his Opinion, the 
Advocate General stated that it would be for the High Court in Dublin to 
assess whether “a real risk of flagrant denial of justice on account of 
deficiencies in the system of justice”207 exists in Poland. According to the 
Advocate General, if the Irish court finds that the alleged lack of 
independence of the Polish courts is so serious that it would exclude the 
fairness of the trial of the person wanted, extradition could be refused.208 In 
a similar vein, the CJEU has ruled that, when the executing judicial authority 
“has material, such as that set out in a reasoned proposal of the European 
Commission adopted pursuant to Article 7(1) TEU, indicating that there is a 
real risk of breach of the fundamental right to a fair trial …, on account of 
systemic or generalised deficiencies so far as concerns the independence of 
the issuing Member State’s judiciary”, the executing authority “must 
determine, specifically and precisely, whether … there are substantial 
grounds for believing that that person will run such a risk if he is 
surrendered to that State”.209 If the executing authority cannot discount the 
existence of such a real risk, it “must refrain from giving effect to the 
European arrest warrant”.210 
The EAW is highly valued by UK authorities, experts and politicians, 
including the current prime minister, whose appreciation for the EU 
surrender procedure dates to the time when she was secretary of state.211 The 
statistics published by the National Crime Agency are indicative of the 
extreme importance of this instrument in the everyday EU and UK fight 
against crime (see Table 1). 
                                                     
206 Irish High Court, Minister for Justice and Equality v Artur Celmer, 12 March 2018. 
207 Opinion of Advocate General Tanchev, Case C‑216/18 PPU, Minister for Justice and Equality 
v LM (Deficiencies in the system of justice), delivered on 28 June 2018, para. 121. 
208 Ibid., para. 131.  
209 Case C‑216/18 PPU, Minister for Justice and Equality v LM (Deficiencies in the system of 
justice), Judgment of 25 July 2018, para. 79. 
210 Ibid., para. 78.  
211 “Theresa May: Fight Europe by all means, but not over this Arrest Warrant”, The Telegraph, 
9 November 2014 (www.telegraph.co.uk/news/politics/conservative/11216589/Theresa-
May-Fight-Europe-by-all-means-but-not-over-this-Arrest-Warrant.html).  
  
Table 1. EAWs exchanged between and executed in the EU and the UK, 2004–16 
 
Note: On the same webpage of the National Crime Agency, there is also the caveat that the “number of requests received by the UK does not 
represent the number of wanted people in the UK. Some Member States issue requests to numerous Member States when they do not know 
where a subject may be. A large proportion of the requests received by the UK will be for people who are not, and never have bee, in the UK.” 
Source: National Crime Agency (www.nationalcrimeagency.gov.uk/publications/european-arrest-warrant-statistics).  
 
Calendar  
year                          
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 Total 
All requests
Wanted from  
the UK
1,865 5,986 5,020 2,280 3,307 3,826 4,369 6,512 6,290 5,522 13,460 12,613 13,797 84,847
Wanted by the 
UK
96 131 126 198 218 246 252 226 271 219 228 228 349 2,788
Arrests
Wanted from 
the UK
46 154 408 513 661 884 1,307 1,332 1,331 1,775 1,519 2,041 1,843 13,814
Wanted by the 
UK
30 79 91 92 99 130 141 151 148 170 156 150 185 1,622
Surrenders
Wanted from 
the UK
24 77 151 332 515 673 1,038 1,079 1,025 1,126 1,097 1,149 1,431 9,717
Wanted by the 
UK
19 63 76 99 96 99 133 136 136 127 143 121 156 1,404
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In 2016, according to the National Crime Agency, the UK arrested 
more than 1,800 individuals and surrendered more than 1,400 people on the 
basis of an EAW; in the same year, 156 people were extradited to the UK 
from EU Member States. From 2004 to 2016, the UK surrendered almost 
10,000 individuals and more than 1,400 requested people were returned to 
the UK. From a quantitative perspective, and without taking into account a 
qualitative assessment of its effects over defendants’ rights, this confirms 
that the EAW is a successful instrument of judicial cooperation at the EU 
level. 
Hence, for the UK prosecuting authorities, the first priority to be 
addressed in the future EU–UK relationship is the conclusion of an 
agreement – in whatever form – that resembles the current EAW system as 
much as possible. UK prosecutors are also examining potential issues raised 
by the ‘legacy cases’, i.e. those EAW cases that have been initiated under EU 
law but which will not be completed before Brexit takes place (or before a 
new agreement on security or on extradition is concluded by the EU and the 
UK). According to the provision of the current version of Article 58(1)(b) of 
the draft Withdrawal Agreement – on which an agreement has not yet been 
found – the EAW Framework Decision will continue to apply to EAW cases 
where the requested person was arrested before the end of the transition 
period for the purposes of the execution of an EAW. Moreover, during these 
proceedings, Directive 2010/64 on the right to interpretation and translation 
and Directive 2012/13 on the right to information will continue to apply.212 
As noted above, the arguable future inapplicability of the Charter to the UK 
has already raised some concerns about the execution of EAWs issued by UK 
authorities before Brexit.213 
In the cliff-edge scenario where there is no agreement on the transition 
deal or on a future EU–UK arrangement concerning extradition, the EAWs 
that have already been exchanged between UK and EU authorities may not 
be given any practical follow-up, and new extradition requests might have 
to be issued to replace EAWs. Meanwhile, people whose extradition had 
been requested in accordance with the 2002 Framework Decision may be 
released, both in the UK and in the EU. As noted by one interviewee, this 
                                                     
212 Art. 61 of the draft Withdrawal Agreement.  
213 See section 1.2, part I above, with regard to the request for a preliminary ruling in the O’ 
Connor and R O cases.  
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could be avoided if, for instance, the UK passes a law designating EU 
countries as category 2 territories and therefore applies to their extradition 
requests the rules set out in Part 2 of the Extradition Act 2003. As discussed 
further below, category 2 territories include countries that are or were 
Commonwealth countries or that have signed a bilateral or multilateral 
extradition agreement with the UK. 
3.2.1 Extradition after Brexit: Common issues and concerns 
Before discussing in more detail, the future options for extradition, it is 
appropriate to zoom in on some common issues that are likely to arise if the 
UK exits the EAW system: 
i) Any alternative to the EAW is likely to be costlier and less effective.  
Several interviewees claimed that, without the EAW, there are serious 
concerns for the effectiveness of future EU and UK investigations in which 
extradition will have to be sought from and to the UK. Likewise, in her oral 
evidence to the House of Lords, the director of public prosecutions declared 
that, in comparison with the other potential alternatives, “it is three times 
faster to use an EAW and four times less expensive”.214 This was echoed by 
the prime minister in her speech at the Munich Security Conference in 
February 2018. From the prosecution side, there is unanimous agreement 
that the loss of the EAW will have a tremendous – perhaps “catastrophic”215 
– impact on UK cross-border investigations and prosecutions, as none of the 
currently available options would be an effective replacement.  
Independent of which, if any, of the current models of cooperation 
is adopted for the future EU–UK relationship, one of the main concerns of 
UK prosecuting authorities is that UK extradition requests to other EU 
Member States, after Brexit and outside the EAW framework, could fall ‘to 
the bottom of the pile’. Exiting the EAW system means giving away the 
above-mentioned improvements that the EU surrender procedure has 
brought about. Some interviewees pointed out that, whereas an EAW-like 
form may be drafted and used in future EU–UK extradition procedures, 
                                                     
214 Oral evidence of A. Saunders, Director of Public Prosecutions, Crown Prosecution Service, 
to the House of Lords’ European Union Committee, “Brexit: Future UK–EU security and 
police cooperation”, 12 November 2016, Q55.  
215 House of Commons, Home Affairs Committee (2018a), para. 69. 
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what is to be missed is the automaticity and speediness of the surrender 
procedure envisaged by the EAW Framework Decision. A minority of 
experts have been slightly more positive in that regard, claiming that it is 
unlikely that Brexit will have such an impact on the way EU authorities will 
deal with UK extradition requests.  
Another concern that has been voiced in the literature and by our 
interviewees relates to the fact that the UK may lose access to SIS II, which is 
deemed by authorities to be ‘helpful’ when the location of the person whose 
extradition is sought is not known to the investigating authorities.216  
ii) It is unlikely that the UK will introduce a bar on the extradition of UK 
nationals (unless perhaps under reciprocity).  
The UK criminal justice system does not provide for a bar on the extradition 
of UK nationals. However, this may turn out to be a serious obstacle for the 
extradition from some EU Member States to the UK, since a number of EU 
countries do not extradite their own nationals.217 In many of these systems, 
such a prohibition has been lifted with regard to the EAW system only, but 
there are no guarantees that such an exemption will be extended to future 
EU (or Member States’) agreements with the UK. The sensitivity of the issue 
is significantly mirrored in the draft Withdrawal Agreement, where it is 
provided that – already during the transition period – EU Member States 
may decide not to extradite their own nationals to the UK.218 If this is the 
case, according to the same provision the UK may declare that it will not 
extradite its own nationals to those Member States either,219 although one 
interviewee noted that this is unlikely, as previously the UK has not 
generally had a nationality bar.220 
iii) Extradition to the UK might be refused if there is a serious risk that the 
extradited person would be subjected to inhuman or degrading treatment 
or punishment.  
                                                     
216 See section 5.1, part II below.  
217 See also Alegre et al. (2017), pp. 34–35. 
218 Art. 168 of the draft Withdrawal Agreement. At the time of writing, the policy objective of 
this provision has been agreed, yet the text requires drafting changes or clarifications.  
219 Ibid.  
220 See also Baker et al. (2011), pp. 59–60 on the historical reasons behind the lack of a 
nationality bar in UK extradition law. 
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After Brexit, EU Member States may claim that extradited persons may be 
subjected to inhuman or degrading treatment in the UK, and therefore refuse 
extradition to the UK. In Petruhhin, the CJEU has indeed submitted that, 
when a Member State receives a request from a third state seeking the 
extradition of a national of another Member State, that first Member State 
must verify that the extradition will not prejudice the rights referred to in 
Article 19 of the Charter. This provision prohibits the extradition to a state 
where there is a serious risk that the extradited person would be subjected 
to the death penalty, torture or other inhuman or degrading treatment or 
punishment.221  
Petruhhin concerns an extradition request from Russia, i.e. a third 
country with which the EU has not signed an extradition agreement. Thus, 
the Court reached its conclusion by noting that the case came within the 
scope of EU law because Mr Petruhhin had exercised his freedom of 
movement within the EU, given that he was an Estonian national who had 
been arrested in Latvia. Nevertheless, if the UK were to conclude an 
extradition agreement with the EU, there is no doubt that extradition 
proceedings with the UK would a fortiori fall within the scope of EU law – 
even without any issue related to the freedom of movement – because of that 
same agreement;222 as a consequence, Article 19 of the Charter would apply 
to the extradition requests that the UK sends to EU countries.  
It is perhaps unlikely that extradited persons would be subjected to 
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment in the UK. Nonetheless, 
some commentators and interviewees have not entirely ruled out this 
possibility, in light of the current prison conditions in the UK.223 Other 
interviewees rebutted that, as after Aranyosi and Căldăraru there is already an 
avenue to scrutinise prison conditions in the UK, the absence of any 
proceedings concerning such conditions means that, for the time being, the 
issue is more theoretical than practical.  
iv) Extradition to the UK might be refused if EU Member States wish to 
prosecute their own nationals who live in another Member State and 
whose extradition is requested by the UK.  
                                                     
221 Case C-182/15, Petruhhin, Judgment of 6 September 2016, para. 60.  
222 See, to that effect, Case C-191/16, Pisciotti, Judgment of 10 April 2018, paras 31 and 35.  
223 See, for instance, Bárd (2018), pp. 8–9.  
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In the Petruhhin judgment, the CJEU also ruled that, in order to prevent the 
risk of impunity, a Member State is not required to grant every EU citizen 
who has moved within its territory the same protection against extradition 
as that granted to its own nationals. Nevertheless, before extraditing the 
citizen, the Member State concerned must prioritise the exchange of 
information with the Member State of origin and allow that state to request 
the citizen’s surrender for the purpose of prosecution. In Pisciotti, which 
concerned the case of an Italian citizen living in Germany and whose 
extradition had been requested by the US, this principle has been extended 
to third countries having an extradition agreement with the EU. The 
requested Member State should put the competent authorities of the 
Member State of which the citizen is a national in a position to seek the 
surrender of that citizen pursuant to an EAW.224 Therefore, as noted by Peers, 
“the Court’s approach – give a Member State the possibility of prosecuting 
its own nationals first, where it has jurisdiction – will necessarily limit 
extradition to the UK after the end of the transition period”.225  
v) Relinquishing the presumption of mutual trust might have a positive 
impact on the protection of human rights.  
According to some leading experts in the field of extradition interviewed for 
this study, if Brexit leads to a departure from the system of mutual 
recognition and mutual trust, this might have positive effects on the 
protection of human rights of individuals whose extradition is requested by 
EU countries. Presently, the overarching – albeit not absolute – principle of 
mutual trust makes it challenging to engage UK courts in terms of human 
rights and fair trial. A presumption of good faith applies to any extradition 
request,226 and state parties to the ECHR are presumed to be compliant with 
the European Convention’s rights.227 Some interviewees argued that, on 
average, UK courts are more willing to go beyond these presumptions when 
non-EU countries are concerned. Hence, after Brexit, domestic courts could 
even have “greater opportunity to scrutinise human rights issues in relation 
                                                     
224 Case C-191/16, Pisciotti, Judgment of 10 April 2018, para. 56.  
225 Peers (2018b).  
226 Baker et al. (2011), pp. 123–24. 
227 See also Blackstone’s Criminal Practice (2017), p. 2184.  
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to EU extradition requests than was previously the case”.228 Other 
interviewees and experts are instead more sceptical about this alleged 
improvement in the protection of human rights, as UK courts have long been 
considering human rights issues, and especially prison conditions of other 
EU Member States (e.g. Romania and Bulgaria), as potential obstacles to 
surrender. As a consequence, “Brexit will have little impact, at least on this 
very specific point”.229 There nonetheless seems to be agreement that in 
principle the defence will have far more opportunities to raise human rights 
issues that the UK courts will have to deal with. This could substantially 
prolong the duration of future extradition proceedings.  
vi) Future extradition requests to the UK might concern only the most 
serious cases.  
According to some of our interviewees, the UK – without the EAW – could 
receive fewer extradition requests, and those requests would realistically 
concern the most serious cases. In that regard, some have also noted that the 
current extradition requests received from outside the EU usually do not 
concern trivial cases. If this prediction turns out to be true, UK courts would 
no longer be engulfed by extradition requests for petty offences. Other 
interviewees, however, did not share this view, for two main reasons. First, 
those countries – like Poland – that adopt the principle of legality 
(mandatory prosecution) are likely to continue to send extradition requests 
to the UK even for minor cases. Second, the increasing familiarity that EU 
judicial authorities have acquired with the extradition process over the years, 
thanks to the EAW and its success, may represent a further reason why the 
number of future extradition requests to the UK might not substantially 
decrease. 
                                                     
228 Davidson et al. (2016), p. 762.  
229 Niblock and Oehmichen (2017), p. 126. 
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3.2.2 Options for extradition after Brexit 
The UK Government has been vocal about concluding a security treaty that 
would allow the UK to continue to have access to the EAW after Brexit.230 In 
the White Paper of July 2018, the Government posited that, in its view, “the 
arrangements for the EAW during the implementation period, which will 
take account of constitutional barriers in some Member States, should be the 
basis for the future relationship on extradition”.231 EU institutions have 
instead ruled out such a possibility,232 with the EU’s chief negotiator 
declaring that “the UK cannot take part in the European Arrest Warrant”.233 
In the absence of further clarity on future EU–UK cooperation on 
criminal justice, future EU–UK extradition procedures may be regulated by 
other arrangements: 
 an EU–UK extradition agreement similar to the agreement that the EU 
has signed with Iceland and Norway; 
 the 1957 Council of Europe Convention on Extradition and its 
Protocols; and 
 bilateral agreements between the UK and EU Member States; in this 
case, the EU and the UK may conclude an agreement that complements 
those bilateral agreements, as is currently the case with the EU–US 
extradition agreement.234 
Extradition to the countries that have signed a bilateral or multilateral 
extradition agreement with the UK, i.e. category 2 territories, is regulated in 
Part 2 of the Extradition Act 2003. Extradition from these territories to the 
                                                     
230 HM Government (2018a), pp. 17–18. See also uncorrected oral evidence of S. Fernandes to 
the Justice Sub-Committee of the House of Lords’ Select Committee on the European Union, 
“Brexit: Enforcement and dispute settlement”, 27 March 2018, Q51.  
231 HM Government (2018d), p. 60. The “constitutional barriers” at hand concern the ban on 
the extradition of own nationals, which is enshrined in the constitutions of some Member 
States, as discussed in the previous section.  
232 European Commission (2018d), pp. 4ff; European Parliament, Resolution of 14 March 2018 
on the framework of the future EU–UK relationship, para. 27.  
233 Speech by Michel Barnier at the European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights, Vienna, 
19 June 2018 (http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-18-4213_en.htm).  
234 On these options see, among many others, Mortera-Martinez (2017); Parry (2017).  
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UK is not addressed in the Extradition Act, as the extradition requests are 
issued under the royal prerogative and are sent to the third countries by the 
Home Office through the diplomatic route.235  
First option: Norway/Iceland model 
The Agreement between the EU and Iceland and Norway on the surrender 
procedure between the latter and the EU236 (‘EU–Norway and Iceland 
Agreement on surrender’) introduces a system of surrender with the two 
countries that is largely similar to the EAW. Most of the provisions of this 
Agreement, regulating the ‘arrest warrant’ to be used in the surrender 
procedures, are copy-pasted from the EAW Framework Decision. The 
following differences between the two instruments are the most important: 
 double criminality, which is not required for the usual list of 32 
categories of offences only if the EU, Norway and Iceland so declare; 
otherwise, double criminality remains the rule, so that extradition may 
take place only when “the acts for which the arrest warrant has been 
issued constitute an offence under the law of the executing State, 
whatever the constituent elements or however it is described” (Article 
3(2));  
 the political offence exception, which EU Member States, Norway and 
Iceland may reintroduce, except for terrorist crimes (Article 6);  
 the bar on extradition of own nationals, which EU Member States, 
Norway and Iceland may reintroduce (Article 7); 
 the option for EU Member States, Iceland and Norway to designate the 
Minister of Justice as the competent authority for the execution of an 
arrest warrant, “whether or not the Minister of Justice is a judicial 
authority under the domestic law of that State” (Article 9(2)); and  
 the rules on time limits for the decision to execute the arrest; although 
these rules replicate the provisions of the EAW Framework Decision 
(60 or 90 days), they also allow EU Member States, Norway and Iceland 
                                                     
235 See more on the UK Government webpage dedicated to extradition (www.gov.uk/ 
guidance/extradition-processes-and-review#extradition-to-the-uk).  
236 OJ L 292/2, 21.10.2006.  
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to indicate the cases in which these time limits will not apply (Article 
20(5)). 
Further differences follow from the different institutional settings in 
which the EAW Framework Decision and the EU–Norway and EU-Iceland 
Agreement on surrender have been adopted. The latter includes the 
following rules: 
 dispute settlement, providing that any dispute may be referred “to a 
meeting of representatives of the governments of the Member States of 
the European Union and of Iceland and Norway, with a view to its 
settlement within six months” (Article 36); 
 case law of the CJEU and of the competent courts of Iceland and 
Norway – the EU, Norway and Iceland “shall keep under constant 
review the development of the case law of the Court of Justice of the 
European [Union], as well as the development of the case law of the 
competent courts of Iceland and Norway relating to these provisions 
and to those of similar surrender instruments. To this end a mechanism 
shall be set up to ensure regular mutual transmission of such case law” 
(Article 37); and  
 common review of the Agreement within five years (Article 40) and 
termination of the Agreement, which may be decided by any of the 
contracting parties (Article 41). 
The negotiations of the EU–Norway and Iceland Agreement on 
surrender began in July 2001 and the Agreement was signed in 2006. As 
Iceland eventually notified the completion of the relevant internal 
procedures in April 2018, the Agreement should enter into force soon. 
Norway had already made its notification in May 2013,237 while the Council 
of the European Union approved the text at the end of 2014.238 The lengthy 
procedures to conclude this Agreement represent a source of serious concern 
                                                     
237 This information has been retrieved from the webpage of the Council of the European 
Union dedicated to the EU–Norway and Iceland Agreement on surrender 
(www.consilium.europa.eu/en/documents-publications/treaties-agreements/agreement/ 
?id=2006056).  
238 OJ L 343/1, 28.11.2014.  
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for future EU–UK extradition relationships.239 That being said, it has been 
suggested that “the length of time taken to conclude the [EU–Norway and 
Iceland Agreement on surrender] may reflect the relative political 
importance placed by the EU on extradition to and from those countries”.240 
In this view, the high number of extraditions between the UK and EU “might 
provide impetus for both parties to conclude an agreement more speedily”.241  
Others have also argued that future EU–UK negotiations may not 
necessarily suffer from the same delays, which – as Peers notes –were “due 
to Iceland’s non-ratification, rather than problems with EU Member 
States”.242 In a similar vein, Suominen points out that the EU–Norway and 
Iceland Agreement on surrender was negotiated before the Treaty of Lisbon, 
when “previous decision-making was time-consuming and especially the 
unanimity requirement resulted in the agreement process being stalled by 
the Hungarian Constitutional Court, when it declared the agreement 
contrary to the Hungarian Constitution”.243 It is worth noting that, after 
Lisbon, EU international agreements are now approved by the Council with 
a qualified majority voting decision.244  
It is still debatable whether the UK may conclude a similar agreement 
with the EU, because Norway and Iceland – unlike the UK – participate in 
the Schengen measures concerning the abolition of checks at internal borders 
and the movement of persons. As mentioned, the EAW Framework Decision 
aims to compensate for the freedom of movement enabled by the abolition 
of internal borders, and the same rationale seems to underpin the Agreement 
on surrender with Norway and Iceland. The Commission’s proposal for a 
Council Decision on the conclusion of the Agreement at issue stated that 
“[d]espite the decision not to link the European arrest warrant to Schengen, 
                                                     
239 See, among many others, House Lords, European Union Committee (2016), para. 141. 
240 Deane and Menon (2017), p. 42.  
241 Ibid. (emphasis added). See also the uncorrected oral evidence of J. Spencer, Professor 
Emeritus of Law at the University of Cambridge, and N. Vamos, previously head of 
extradition for the Crown Prosecution Service and Partner, Peters & Peters, to the Home 
Affairs Sub-Committee of the House of Lords’ Select Committee on the European Union, 
“Brexit: The proposed UK–EU security treaty”, 18 April 2018, Q36. 
242 Quoted in Deane and Menon (2017), p. 42.  
243 Suominen (2017), p. 259.  
244 Art. 218(8) TFEU. See section 2.2, part I above. 
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the Council agreed that it would be useful to apply the surrender procedure 
model to the Schengen countries, given their privileged partnership with the 
EU Member States”.245  
Hence, it seems that the privileged partnership of Norway and Iceland 
with the EU has played an important role in the decision to strike the 
Agreement on surrender, yet it does not look like a (legal) precondition for 
the conclusion of that Agreement. Likewise, the Council decisions on the 
signing and conclusion of the EU–Norway and Iceland Agreement on 
surrender are not considered to be measures of the Schengen acquis in the 
field of police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters.246 Nonetheless, 
the European Parliament and the Commission seem of the opposite view, as 
they have stated that future cooperation as regards internal security “can be 
developed on the basis of non-Schengen third-country arrangements”.247 
Similarly, the European Council highlighted the importance of EU–UK 
cooperation in criminal matters after Brexit, yet “taking into account that the 
UK will be a third country outside Schengen”.248 
Since the EU–Norway and Iceland Agreement on surrender has not yet 
entered into force, it is impossible to assess whether, in practice, it is a valid 
alternative to the EAW. As it mostly replicates the EAW Framework 
Decision, it may represent – at least on paper – a plausible course of action 
for future EU–UK arrangements in the field of extradition.249 Some of our 
interviewees suggested that EU Member States may even remain category 1 
territories for the purposes of applying the Extradition Act 2003, which 
                                                     
245 COM(2009) 705 final, 17 December 2009, p. 2. 
246 List of Union acts adopted before the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty in the field of 
police cooperation and judicial cooperation in criminal matters which cease to apply to the 
United Kingdom as from 1 December 2014 pursuant to Art. 10(4), second sentence, of Protocol 
(No. 36) on transitional provisions (2014/C 430/04), OJ C 430/17, 1.12.2014. 
247 European Parliament, Resolution of 14 March 2018 on the framework of the future EU–UK 
relationship, para. 28 (emphasis added). See also European Commission (2018c). Gutheil et al. 
(2018b) argue that “the status of the UK as a non-Schengen third country is generally 
considered as a challenge in terms of the political considerations of achieving the highest 
degree of cooperation” (p. 54). 
248 European Council, Guidelines (Art. 50), 23 March 2018, para. 10(i).  
249 For a similar, albeit slightly more cautious, conclusion, see House of Lords, European 
Union Committee (2017), para. 141. 
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would thus only have to be amended to a minor extent to accommodate an 
agreement like the EU–Norway and Iceland one on surrender.250  
The degree of effectiveness of the EU–Norway and Iceland Agreement 
is likely to depend on the declarations of the parties. Most of the rules that 
have sped up the surrender procedure in the EU feature in the EU–Norway 
and Iceland Agreement as well, yet their application is optional and depends 
on whether the two Schengen countries and the EU Member States decide to 
apply them. At the time of writing, Norway, Iceland and 26 Member States 
have made their declarations.251  
Unlike the UK and some EU countries (11 Member States), Norway 
and Iceland will not require double criminality for the 32 categories of 
offences listed in the Agreement, if they meet the threshold of penalty set out 
in the Agreement.252 In addition, six Member States have declared that they 
will not extradite their own nationals under any circumstance, although a 
larger number of Member States (around ten), as well as Norway and 
Iceland, have declared that the surrender may or shall be subject to the 
condition that the person concerned is returned to the state of his or her 
nationality to serve the sentence passed against him or her in the issuing 
state. Unlike Norway and the UK, Iceland and nine EU Member States will 
apply the political offence exception (except for terrorist crimes), while the 
Ministries of Justice have been notified as the competent authorities to decide 
on the execution of arrest warrants by Norway (in limited cases, though) and 
the Slovak Republic. The UK has instead notified the Home Office as the 
competent executing authority. Hungary and the Slovak Republic will not 
apply the rules on the time limits for the decision to execute the arrest 
warrant in limited cases, while the UK stands out as the only country 
availing itself of the option not to apply those strict limits to “any arrest 
warrant”253 that it receives.  
Table 2 summarises these positions, which do not take into account the 
declarations of Finland and Sweden, as these declarations relate only to 
                                                     
250 See also Davidson et al. (2016), p. 759. 
251 Council of the European Union (2018d).  
252 Poland is among these countries but it does not waive the dual criminality rule if the 
requested person is a Polish national.  
253 Council of the European Union (2018d), p. 86.  
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surrender cases also concerning a third EU country (e.g. in case of transit). 
These two countries, as well as Denmark,254 will continue to apply the rules 
of the Nordic Arrest Warrant to the extradition proceedings between them 
and Norway and Iceland. The table includes information concerning Ireland, 
although the Irish position is still “provisional”.255  
Table 2. Declarations pertaining to the EU–Norway and Iceland Agreement on the 
surrender procedure as of 10 April 2018 
* Poland applies double criminality when the requested persons are Polish nationals. 
** As set out in Council of the European Union (2018d), the “submission by Portugal of a declaration 
waiving verification of double criminality ... is a policy option for decision at a higher level. If the option 
of such a declaration is taken up, its content could be as follows: ... ‘Portugal waives the right to verify 
double criminality in the circumstances set out in Article 3(4) of the Agreement’” (p. 62). 
*** In Estonia, the Ministry of Justice is only competent to receive arrest warrants.  
                                                     
254 Denmark does not take part in the EU–Norway and Iceland Agreement on surrender (see 
Council Decision 2014/835/EU on the conclusion of the Agreement, OJ L 343/1, 28.11.2014).  
255 Council of the European Union (2018d), p. 21.  
 23 EU Member States 
(EU-28 without DK, FI, IT, SE, UK) 
UK Norway Iceland 
Declaration that dual 
criminality does not apply 
to 32 categories of offences 
– Art. 3(4) 
11 
(AT, CY, EL, ES, HU, 
LT, NL, PL,* PT,** RO, SI) 
X ✔ ✔
Application of the political 
offence exception 
(excluding terrorism) – Art. 
6(2)) 
9 
(BE, EL, ES, FR, HR,  
IE, LU, MT, PL) 
X X ✔ 
Absolute ban on the 
extradition of own 
nationals – Art. 7(2) 
6 
(CZ, DE, FR, IE, SI, SK) 
X X X 
Minister of justice or other 
minister as the competent 
executing 
authority – Art. 9(2) 
1 
(SK) 
✔ 
(Home 
Office) 
✔ 
(limited 
cases) 
X 
Minister of justice as 
competent authority to 
receive and transmit arrest 
warrants – Art. 10(2)  
4 
(EE,*** EL, LU, SK) 
X X X 
Declaration that the strict 
time limits for the decision 
to execute the arrest 
warrant do not apply – Art. 
20(5) 
2 
(HU, SK –  
limited cases****) 
✔ X X 
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**** The Slovak Republic will not apply the time limits in the cases of postponed or conditional surrender 
(Article 27 of the Agreement). The declaration of Hungary concerns cases in which the requested person 
seeks asylum or temporary protection. 
Sources: Authors’ elaboration based on Council of the European Union (2018d). 
The table shows that, on the one hand, Norway and Iceland have 
limited their declarations with the aim of setting up an extradition system 
that is as similar as possible to the EAW. Having the same goal, the UK could 
take the same path, although its declaration on the general non-applicability 
of time limits does not bode well. On the other hand, EU Member States have 
taken a cautious approach to extradition outside the context of the EAW, as 
shown by their declarations concerning the extradition of own nationals and 
by the fact that several EU Member States will require double criminality. 
Outside the context of EU law, Member States have shown on average that 
they are inclined to introduce a number of rules and exceptions that can slow 
down extradition proceedings, if compared with EAW proceedings, and one 
may wonder whether the relationship  
The similarity of the EU–Norway and Iceland model to the EAW 
system may be appealing to the UK Government, even more so because the 
Agreement lays down rules on dispute settlement and mutual transmission 
of case law that would be compatible with the UK’s position on the 
jurisdiction of the CJEU. The choice of leaving any potential dispute between 
the EU and the UK in the hands of a meeting of representatives of the 
governments fits the stance of the UK Government. In addition, if the 
Norway/Iceland model is adopted, UK courts would not be obliged – at least 
formally – to abide by the case law of the CJEU, since the Agreement on 
surrender only provides that the parties to the Agreement keep ‘under 
constant review’ the case law of the other parties’ courts.  
Although this is “a very basic form of co-ordination”256 and some 
would prefer a clearer rule requiring UK courts to align with the case law of 
the CJEU, a number of other experts we interviewed praised the 
Norway/Iceland model on dispute settlement and mutual transmission of 
case law. In fact, in international (extradition) treaties, it is not usual to have 
a court, and more precisely the court of one party only, to solve potential 
disputes and interpret the agreement. On the contrary, solutions such as the 
                                                     
256 Oral evidence of F. Jacobs to the Home Affairs Sub-Committee of the House of Lords’ Select 
Committee on the European Union, “Brexit: The European Arrest Warrant”, 29 March 2017, 
Q7.  
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ones endorsed in the EU–Norway and Iceland Agreement on surrender are 
much more common and sensible. In practice, the courts of the parties to the 
agreements are encouraged to look at each other to allow the extradition 
procedures to continue smoothly. When issues arise, they are discussed – 
and usually solved – at the diplomatic level. Nevertheless, these valid 
arguments cannot overshadow the fact that, as argued above, the case law of 
the CJEU will in any case have an extremely relevant impact on the UK after 
Brexit. 
Second option: 1957 Council of Europe Convention on Extradition 
In the absence of any EU–UK arrangement on extradition, extradition 
procedures between the UK and EU Member States are likely to fall back on 
the 1957 European Convention on Extradition, signed under the aegis of the 
Council of Europe (‘1957 Convention’). Later supplemented by four 
Protocols, the 1957 Convention follows the traditional path of international 
extradition agreements, as it does not provide for any time limit for the 
execution of extradition requests and it includes, inter alia, rules providing 
for the following aspects: 
 double criminality;257 
 political offence exception;258 
 prohibition of the extradition of own nationals, if state parties so 
declare;259 and 
 communication through diplomatic channels, although it is provided 
that “[o]ther means of communication may be arranged by direct 
agreement between two or more Parties”;260 the fourth Protocol to the 
Convention, signed in 2012, amended this provision, by providing that 
the extradition request “shall be in writing. It shall be submitted by the 
                                                     
257 Art. 2(1) of the 1957 Convention.  
258 Art. 3 of the 1957 Convention. In accordance with Art. 1 of the first Protocol to the 1957 
Convention, the most serious crimes (e.g. crimes against humanity and war crimes) shall not 
be covered by this exception.  
259 Art. 6 of the 1957 Convention, which is based on the aut dedere aut iudicare principle. 
260 Art. 12 of the 1957 Convention. The third Protocol to the 1957 Convention, which was 
signed in 2010 and entered into force in 2012, introduced a simplified procedure to be applied 
in some cases.  
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Ministry of Justice or other competent authority of the requesting Party 
to the Ministry of Justice or other competent authority of the requested 
Party”.261  
Furthermore, as for dispute settlement, it is for the European 
Committee on Crime Problems of the Council of Europe to do “whatever is 
necessary to facilitate a friendly settlement of any difficulty which may arise 
out of [the] interpretation and application”262 of the Convention and its 
Protocols. To this end, the Committee – which is formed by delegates of each 
Council of Europe Member State, representatives of the EU and other 
observers263 – has to be kept informed of the application of the Convention 
and its Protocols. 
As the extradition to the state parties to the 1957 Convention is 
regulated in the UK by Part 2 of the Extradition Act 2003, falling back on the 
1957 Convention could simply imply ‘transferring’ EU Member States from 
the list of category 1 territories to the list of category 2 territories. However, 
our interviewees warned that further practical details will to have to be 
sorted out as well.  
Unlike Part 1, Part 2 of the Extradition Act does not include any rule 
on the proportionality check. Moreover, Part 2 provides for the intervention 
of the secretary of state in extradition proceedings. The secretary of state 
must issue a certificate when he or she receives extradition requests sent to 
the UK, if they comply with the requirements set out in the Extradition Act.264 
The request is then transmitted to the competent judicial authorities that will 
evaluate whether there are any bars to extradition. If there is no obstacle to 
the extradition, the case is then sent to the secretary of state to make the final 
decision on extradition.265 According to some of our interviewees, these two 
issues would not be stumbling blocks for the UK’s post-Brexit extradition 
proceedings with EU countries. On the one hand, the secretary of state has 
hardly any discretionary power, as the law lists the grounds to be followed 
                                                     
261 Art. 2 of the fourth Protocol to the 1957 Convention.  
262 See Art. 8 of the fourth Protocol to the 1957 Convention.  
263 See more on the website of the European Committee on Crime Problems of the Council of 
Europe (www.coe.int/en/web/cdpc/european-committee-on-crime-problems).  
264 S. 70 Extradition Act 2003.  
265 S. 93 Extradition Act 2003.  
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in making the decisions.266 On the other hand, as Part 2 of the Extradition Act 
provides for a human rights bar that is identical to that of Part 1,267 issues of 
proportionality may be (and are) raised before the competent UK courts 
claiming that the extradition would be a disproportionate interference with 
the individual’s right to respect for private and family life, in violation of 
Article 8 ECHR.  
Furthermore, extradition to category 2 territories is based on dual 
criminality,268 which may represent a concern to address in the extradition 
proceedings and may cause further delays. Even so, most of our interviewees 
were rather positive in that regard, noting that it is rare that UK courts find 
that this condition is not met.269  
Part 2 of the Extradition Act also requires that (some) third countries 
provide a prima facie evidential case. If the person whose extradition is 
sought has not been convicted in the third country, UK courts “must decide 
whether there is evidence which would be sufficient to make a case requiring 
an answer by the person if the proceedings were the summary trial of an 
information against him”.270 Still, it is worth noting that the prima facie 
requirement does not apply to extradition requests issued by state parties to 
the 1957 Convention.271 As all EU Member States are parties to the 
Convention, there is no reason to believe that – after Brexit – the prima facie 
requirement would be reintroduced with regard to extradition requests 
coming from the EU. 
Some of the concerns that sometimes come up in the debates on post-
Brexit extradition do not seem well-founded. In spite of this, there is almost 
unanimous agreement that the extradition procedures pursuant to the 1957 
Convention would be far less effective than those based on the EAW 
                                                     
266 See Baker et al. (2011), p. 25: “The Secretary of State has no general discretion to decline to 
order extradition.” 
267 S. 87 of the Extradition Act 2003, which is phrased in the same way as s. 21 of the Extradition 
Act 2003.  
268 Ss 137 and 138 of the Extradition Act 2003.  
269 See also Davidson et al. (2016), p. 760.  
270 S. 84(1) of the Extradition Act 2003.  
271 S. 84(7) of the Extradition Act 2003. Nor does it apply to extradition requests from the US, 
Australia, Canada or New Zealand.  
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Framework Decision.272 Regardless of whether the provision on dispute 
settlement finds favour, all the other main rules of the 1957 Convention do 
not bode well for the effectiveness of extradition proceedings. Currently, 
extradition proceedings under Part 2 are much longer than procedures 
under Part 1. There are no deadlines and, albeit limited, the involvement of 
the secretary of state represents an additional layer.273 As submitted by the 
Defence Extradition Lawyers Forum, under Part 2  
there is an in-built delay of up to two months from a District Judge’s 
decision to the making of an order for extradition signed by a Home 
Office Minister. A return to the [1957 Convention] for every state 
currently operating the EAW will be subject to additional delays 
caused by the Home Office’s consideration of each case unless 
legislative change removes this burden.274 
What is more, as stressed by one of our interviewees, the police can 
only arrest the requested person and thus begin extradition proceedings on 
the basis of a domestic warrant, which the competent court will have to issue 
if there are no bars to extradition. By contrast, when extradition is sought by 
means of an EAW, the police can arrest the requested person on the basis of 
the EAW alone, without any further domestic warrants.275  
As a consequence, some interviewees noted that these cumbersome 
extradition proceedings are likely to be more expensive than current EAW 
procedures for the UK, as more authorities will be involved, more steps will 
be necessary to extradite individuals, and so on. In 2014, in reply to a written 
question of an MP, the then minister for security and immigration at the 
Home Office declared that “[o]n average it costs £13,000 to extradite 
                                                     
272 All our interviewees agreed on the point. See also, among many others, House of Lords, 
European Union Committee (2016), para. 141; House of Commons, Home Affairs Committee 
(2018a), para. 69.  
273 As one of our interviewees added, once the judicial procedure is over, individuals may also 
flag new human rights issues to the secretary of state; if they seem founded and have not been 
raised before, the secretary of state should send the case back to court for a new assessment. 
274 Written evidence of the Defence Extradition Lawyers Forum to the Home Affairs Sub-
Committee of the House of Lords’ Select Committee on the European Union, “Brexit: The 
proposed UK–EU security treaty”, PST003, 25 May 2018, para. 7.2.3. 
275 The same goes when national judicial authorities call on Interpol to transmit an EAW (the 
‘Art. 26’ alerts). 
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someone using the EAW, and £62,000 using the [1957 Convention]”.276 
Likewise, as argued by the Defence Extradition Lawyers Forum, “[m]ore 
delays mean increased cost for all parties, but perhaps are felt most keenly 
by the defendant detained without a clear end point”.277 
Be that as it may, the number of people extradited to the UK may 
decrease.278 At least ten EU Member States, for instance, have declared that 
they will not extradite their own nationals under the umbrella of the 1957 
Convention, and at least four others will extradite their citizens only in 
specific circumstances.279 In addition, the fourth Protocol to the Convention, 
introducing some rules to streamline the exchange of extradition requests, 
has entered into force in only four EU Member States so far, including the 
UK.280 According to some interviewees, further problems in reverting to the 
1957 Convention could relate to the fact that some EU Member States – such 
as Ireland – have repealed their legislation implementing the Convention, 
which therefore will need to be revived to extradite people from and to the 
UK.281  
At the time of writing, the Commission seems to be looking at this 
option to regulate future extradition proceedings with the EU, although it is 
ready to introduce some ad hoc rules aimed at “streamlining the procedure, 
                                                     
276 Written question asked by Lady Hermon answered by James Brokenshire, European Arrest 
Warrants: Written question – 214393 (www.parliament.uk/business/publications/written-
questions-answers-statements/written-question/Commons/2014-11-11/214393). Still, our 
interviewee from the Crown Prosecution Service noted that there are some limitations in 
comparing the costs of current extradition to third countries under the 1957 Convention with 
what extradition might be like with EU countries under the same Convention after Brexit. 
277 Written evidence of the Defence Extradition Lawyers Forum to the Home Affairs Sub-
Committee of the House of Lords’ Select Committee on the European Union, “Brexit: The 
proposed UK–EU security treaty”, PST003, 25 May 2018, para. 7.2.3. 
278 Ibid., para. 7.7.1.  
279 Declarations to the 1957 Council of Europe Convention on Extradition can be found on the 
Council of Europe’s website (www.coe.int/en/web/conventions/full-list/-/conventions/ 
treaty/024/declarations?p_auth=ymYp9WQM).  
280 The list of countries that ratified the Fourth Protocol to the 1957 Council of Europe 
Convention on Extradition can be found on the Council of Europe’s website 
(www.coe.int/en/web/conventions/full-list/-/conventions/treaty/212/signatures?p_ 
auth=ymYp9WQM).  
281 See also Alegre et al. (2017), p. 34; Campbell (2017), p. 10.  
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facilitating processes, introducing time-limits”.282 This could help to 
overcome (some of) the difficulties that UK and EU authorities may meet 
when resorting to the 1957 Convention.  
Third option: Bilateral agreement (with or without a ‘framework 
agreement’) 
The third path that the UK may take after Brexit is the conclusion of bilateral 
extradition agreements. This seems to be the least attractive option for EU–
UK extradition arrangements after Brexit, even though, from the EU’s 
perspective, this could be a “pragmatic solution”, as noted by one of the 
experts we interviewed.283 The extradition to EU Member States would fall 
within Part 2 of the Extradition Act 2003 and the UK would need a 
considerable amount of time to conclude 27 different bilateral agreements 
with EU Member States, although some existing models may be used to 
streamline the negotiations.284  
The UK has signed a number of extradition agreements with third 
countries, such as the US.285 Although broadly similar, each of these 
agreements has its own peculiarities and raises different issues concerning 
their interpretation and application.286 The replication of such a fragmented 
scenario with regard to EU Member States would undoubtedly lead to a far 
worse situation than the current system. The conclusion of bilateral 
agreements might be rather straightforward with some EU countries that 
have a strong interest in keeping a close relationship with the UK in the field, 
such as Poland and Ireland. The extradition between the UK and Ireland was 
regulated, up to 2004, by the Backing of Warrants (Republic of Ireland) Act 
                                                     
282 Speech by Michel Barnier at the European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights, Vienna, 
19 June 2018 (http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-18-4213_en.htm). 
283 See also Deane and Menon (2017), p. 43.  
284 See, for instance, the 1990 United Nations Model Treaty on Extradition.  
285 Extradition Treaty between the United States of America and the United Kingdom of Great 
Britain and Northern Ireland, 31 March 2003 (‘UK–US Extradition Treaty’).  
286 See the uncorrected oral evidence of N. Vamos, previously head of extradition for the 
Crown Prosecution Service and Partner, Peters & Peters, to the Home Affairs Sub-Committee 
of the House of Lords’ Select Committee on the European Union, “Brexit: The proposed UK–
EU security treaty”, 18 April 2018, Q37. 
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1965. Although this Act was thought to “provide a simple and expeditious 
procedure between neighbouring countries”,287 it may represent a model to 
follow in striking future agreements with other EU Member States, since it 
introduced a system that was similar to the EAW.288  
In the case of bilateral agreements, it is likely that the UK and the EU 
will decide to conclude at least some sort of ‘framework agreement’, which 
could complete rather than replace the bilateral agreements signed by the 
UK and EU Member States. The Agreement on extradition between the 
European Union and the United States (‘EU–US Extradition Agreement’) 
would represent a precedent in that regard.289 Among others, Article 5 of the 
EU–US Extradition Agreement provides that requests for extradition and 
supporting documents shall be exchanged via the diplomatic channel, and 
this rule also applies in the UK–US relationship.290 It additionally requires 
extradition to take place on the basis of dual criminality291 and it includes a 
generic rule on dispute settlement, the resolution of which should be 
facilitated by consultations between the EU and the US.292 An even lighter 
wording may be found in the UK–US Extradition Treaty, which states that 
“[t]he Parties may consult with each other in connection with the processing 
of individual cases and in furtherance of efficient implementation of [the] 
Treaty”.293 Finally, although both the EU–US and the UK–US extradition 
agreements are silent on whether the courts of each party should take into 
account the case law of foreign courts, the UK practice of extradition with 
the US has shown that courts usually look at the case law of their 
counterparts, to enable the extradition procedures to run as smoothly as 
possible.  
                                                     
287 Baker et al. (2011), p. 48.  
288 Ibid., pp. 46ff. 
289 OJ L 181/27, 19.7.2003.  
290 See Art. 8 of the UK–US Extradition Treaty.  
291 Art. 4 of the EU–US Extradition Agreement.  
292 Art. 15 of the EU–US Extradition Agreement.  
293 Art. 21 of the UK–US Extradition Treaty. 
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3.3 European Investigation Order 
Being much younger than the 16-year-old EAW, the EIO has understandably 
received limited attention during Brexit debates. The EIO is a judicial 
decision issued (or validated) by national judicial authorities of a Member 
State to have one or more specific investigative measure(s) carried out in 
another Member State, with the aim of obtaining evidence.294 Like the EAW, 
in practical terms the EIO is a form to be completed by a national competent 
authority, which will send it to the executing state where the needed 
evidence can be found. Once the EIO is executed, the executing authority has 
to transfer, without undue delay, the evidence obtained or already in its 
possession to the issuing state.  
The EIO Directive thus applies the principle of mutual recognition in 
the field of evidence and, for the Member States bound by it,295 it has replaced 
the corresponding provisions of the 1959 Council of Europe Convention on 
Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters and its Protocols (‘1959 MLA 
Convention’), the Convention Implementing the Schengen Agreement, and 
the 2000 Convention on Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters 
between the Member States (‘2000 EU MLA Convention’) and its Protocol. 
The EIO Directive has also replaced the Framework Decision on the 
European Evidence Warrant and the provisions of the Framework Decision 
on the mutual recognition of freezing orders, as regards freezing of evidence. 
In this manner, the EIO Directive has become the sole instrument regulating 
the exchange of evidence and mutual legal assistance (MLA) between EU 
Member States.296  
The EIO has brought about several improvements in the field of 
judicial cooperation in criminal matters: 
 EIOs are exchanged among competent national authorities, without 
any involvement of political bodies,297 but Member States can 
designate central authorities;298 in addition to courts, competent 
                                                     
294 Art. 1 of the EIO Directive.  
295 That is, all EU Member States except for Ireland and Denmark.  
296 Mitsilegas (2017), pp. 233–34. 
297 Art. 7 of the EIO Directive.  
298 Art. 7(3) of the EIO Directive. 
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authorities may also be public prosecutors or any other authority 
“acting in its capacity as an investigating authority in criminal 
proceedings with competence to order the gathering of evidence in 
accordance with national law”;299 
 the EIO Directive exempts the executing authority from assessing 
double criminality, if the EIO relates to an offence that is punishable in 
the issuing Member State by a custodial sentence or a detention order 
for a maximum period of at least three years and falls within one of the 
32 categories of offences listed in Annex D to the Directive;300  
 there is no express political offence exception;301 and 
 executing authorities should take a final decision on the execution of 
the EIO and carry out the required investigative measure(s) with the 
“same celerity and priority as for a similar domestic case”302 and, in 
any case, within the strict time limits provided in the Directive.303 
Moreover, following on from ongoing concerns regarding the potential 
adverse human rights implications of automatic mutual recognition, the EIO 
Directive has introduced some provisions seeking to protect human rights 
and to prevent arbitrary and unlawful use of the system: 
 non-compliance with fundamental rights as a ground for refusal to 
recognise and execute an EIO (Article 11(1)(f)), with the Preamble also 
stating that the presumption of compliance of Member States with 
human rights is rebuttable (Recital No. 19); 
 a proportionality check in the issuing state, providing that the issuing 
authority may only issue an EIO where this is “necessary and 
proportionate” (Article 6(1)(a)) and where the investigative measures 
indicated in the EIO could have been ordered under the same 
conditions in a similar domestic case (Article 6(1)(b)); and 
                                                     
299 Art. 2(c)(ii) of the EIO Directive.  
300 Art. 11(1)(g) of the EIO Directive. This list replicates Art. 2(2) of the EAW Framework 
Decision.  
301 See, however, Recital No. 39.  
302 Art. 12(1) of the EIO Directive.  
303 These are 30 days from receipt of the EIO for the decision on the execution (extendable by 
another 30 days in specific cases) and 90 days from the taking of the previous decision for the 
adoption of the required investigative measure(s) (Art. 12(3)–(5) of the EIO Directive).  
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 recourse by the executing authority to an investigative measure other 
than that indicated in the EIO, “where the investigative measure 
selected by the executing authority would achieve the same result by 
less intrusive means than the investigative measure indicated in the 
EIO” (Article 10(3)). 
Recognising its evident added value, the UK opted into the EIO 
Directive, which has been implemented via the Criminal Justice (European 
Investigation Order) Regulations of 2017 (‘EIO Regulations’). Incoming EIOs 
should be sent – with limited exceptions – to the UK central authority, the 
Home Office.304 Outgoing EIOs may be sent by, among others, the director 
of the Serious Fraud Office, the director of public prosecutions and any 
crown prosecutor.305  
Although the EIO Regulations entered into force only a year ago (31 
July 2017), our interviewees submitted that the EIO has already shown its 
potential to substantially improve judicial cooperation throughout the EU. 
According to the last publicly available data, the Crown Prosecution Service 
(CPS) issued 129 EIOs in the period 31 July 2017–31 March 2018.306 Given that 
over the same time span the UK sent out about 140 requests for mutual legal 
assistance, it has been commented that “the EIO is already catching up and 
will soon overtake MLA requests”.307 In terms of incoming EIOs, the number 
is believed to be – for that same period – between 400 and 500.308 
The CPS regards the EIO as a very valuable instrument of cooperation, 
while noting the estimate that it is marginally more expensive for UK 
prosecutors to draft an EIO than a traditional MLA request. According to the 
CPS, however, it is likely that once UK prosecutors will have become 
acquainted with the EIO, administrative costs connected with EIO 
procedures will decrease. From the defence side, the EIO Regulations 
replicate the norms of the Extradition Act on the protection of human rights. 
                                                     
304 Regulation 2(2)(a).  
305 See Schedule 1 of the Criminal Justice (European Investigation Order) Regulations 2017.  
306 Uncorrected oral evidence of D. Price, Head of International Justice, Crown Prosecution 
Service, to the Home Affairs Sub-Committee of the House of Lords’ Select Committee on the 
European Union, “Brexit: The proposed UK–EU security treaty”, 15 May 2018, Q104.  
307 Ibid.  
308 Ibid.  
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Therefore, EIOs cannot be executed in the UK if there are substantial grounds 
for believing that either such an execution would be incompatible with any 
of the ECHR rights309 or the EIO was issued for the purpose of investigating 
or prosecuting a person “on account of that person’s sex, racial or ethnic 
origin, religion, sexual orientation, nationality, language or political 
opinions”.310  
Furthermore, the EIO Directive provides that the suspected or accused 
person, or the lawyer on his or her behalf, may require the issuing of an EIO, 
“within the framework of applicable defence rights in conformity with 
national criminal procedure”.311 In the UK, this provision has been 
implemented in Regulation 6(3)(c), which allows a party to the proceedings 
to make an application for the issuing of an EIO, after the proceedings have 
been instituted. Our interviewees pointed out that, even before the EIO, the 
defendant had the right to ask the court, again after being charged, to issue 
an MLA request on his or her behalf.312 Although the decision of the court is 
still discretionary, the EIO Regulations list the issues that the court has to 
take into account in the evaluation of the defendant’s application.313 
Furthermore, the defendant can be confident that, once foreign authorities 
have received the EIO, they will be under a considerable pressure to execute 
it, as it is indeed an order coming from another EU judicial authority rather 
than an ordinary MLA request.  
Finally, as for the EIOs exchanged during the transition period, the EIO 
Directive should apply in respect of EIOs that have been “received before the 
end of the transition period by the central authority or the executing 
authority”.314 Still, no agreement on this provision has been found. Our 
interviewees noted that, compared with the EAW, a more limited number of 
EIOs will be circulating in the UK (and the EU) on Brexit day, so it could be 
comparatively less difficult to handle these pending cases. In the worst-case 
scenario, where no agreement was reached on the Withdrawal Agreement 
and on EU–UK arrangements for future cooperation in the field of criminal 
                                                     
309 Schedule 4, para. 6 of the EIO Regulations.  
310 Schedule 4, para. 7(a) of the EIO Regulations. 
311 Art. 1(3) of the EIO Directive.  
312 See s. 7(3)(c) of the Crime (International Co-operation) Act 2003.  
313 See Regulation 6(4).  
314 Art. 58(1)(k) of the draft Withdrawal Agreement (emphasis added).  
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justice, it cannot be excluded that the requests of EU and UK judicial 
authorities submitted via the EIO will need to be made again via the 
traditional MLA channels. 
3.3.1 Options for judicial cooperation in criminal matters after 
Brexit  
At the time of writing, the position of the parties on judicial cooperation in 
criminal matters after Brexit mirrors that on extradition: the UK would like 
to continue to use EIOs,315 while the EU has ruled out this option, although 
it is “ready to facilitate cooperation on mutual legal assistance and find 
solutions for effective assistance in judicial cases and evidence sharing 
between the EU27 and the UK”.316  
In the absence of any EU–UK arrangement on the cross-border 
exchange of evidence, cooperation between UK and EU judicial authorities 
could fall back on some existing non-EU instruments, namely:  
 the 1959 MLA Convention and its Protocols; 
 the 2001 Council of Europe Convention on Cybercrime (‘Budapest 
Convention’); 
 United Nations conventions, such as the 1988 UN Convention against 
Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances (‘Vienna 
Convention’), the 2000 UN Convention against Transnational 
Organized Crime (UNTOC), and the 2003 UN Convention against 
Corruption (UNCAC); and 
 bilateral agreements between the UK and third countries. 
None of the above-mentioned instruments provides for judicial 
cooperation procedures that may be comparable with a system based on the 
principle of mutual recognition. As the EIO has been used in the UK only 
since July 2017, the fall-back options do not look as suboptimal as the 
alternatives to the EAW in the field of extradition. Exiting the EIO system is 
perceived as a loss of a potential benefit rather than as a profound change 
for the worse in cross-border judicial cooperation. Nonetheless, interviewees 
                                                     
315 HM Government (2018a), p. 17.  
316 Speech by Michel Barnier at the European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights, Vienna, 
19 June 2018 (http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-18-4213_en.htm).  
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agreed that the risk that future UK MLA requests may, on average, fall to the 
bottom of the pile is rather serious, as one could expect that the competent 
authorities in the EU – obliged to execute EIOs from other EU countries 
within strict time limits – would give priority to EIOs rather than to UK MLA 
requests. That is precisely the reason why, in 2017, the UK Government 
decided to opt into the EIO Directive. This does not bode well for the 
effectiveness of cross-border investigations, which are notoriously affected 
by the lengthy procedures to obtain evidence via Letters of Request.  
As for the above-mentioned options, the 1959 MLA Convention – 
which has been implemented by all EU Member States including the UK – is 
severely outdated, although some provisions were improved by the Second 
Additional Protocol of 2001. Among others, the Protocol introduces some 
rules on hearings by video conference, a relevant and problematic issue in 
judicial cooperation procedures with Spain. It is therefore to be welcomed 
that, in March 2018, Spain eventually implemented this Protocol. Among EU 
countries, the Second Additional Protocol is still not in force – at the time of 
writing – in Italy, Greece or Luxembourg.317 Akin to the field of extradition, 
however, EU Member States may have amended their legislation in a way 
that makes it difficult to fall back on the Convention and its Protocol.318 
The Budapest Convention lays down some rules on mutual legal 
assistance in the field of cybercrime, although they only apply in the absence 
of other agreements or treaties between the concerned parties.319 Likewise, 
the provisions on judicial cooperation of the UN conventions, which apply 
only with regard to the crimes they deal with (illicit drug trafficking, 
transnational organised crime and corruption), come into consideration 
when no other agreements are in place.320  
Finally, the UK has signed a number of bilateral agreements on mutual 
legal assistance with third countries. The UK may explore the avenue of 
bilateral agreements to enhance judicial cooperation with some EU countries 
                                                     
317 The list of countries that signed and ratified the Protocol can be found on the Council of 
Europe’s website (www.coe.int/en/web/conventions/full-list/-/conventions/treaty/182/ 
signatures?p_auth=qh6Zrw6j).  
318 Alegre et al. (2017), p. 34.  
319 See the Explanatory Report to the Convention on Cybercrime, Budapest, 23 November 
2001, p. 46. 
320 See Art. 18(7) UNTOC, Art. 46(7) UNCAC and Art. 7(7) of the Vienna Convention.  
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that are key partners in the fight against cross-border crime, such as Spain, 
Italy and France. The length of negotiations in that regard can only be a 
matter of speculation, although our interviewees noted that each of the 
existing UK bilateral agreements – despite broad similarity with one another 
– has its own peculiarities and raises slightly different issues. Bilateral 
negotiations might thus be delayed by extenuating bargaining on matters 
that each EU Member State considers sensitive or problematic according to 
its own (constitutional) traditions. Still, as is the case with extradition, the 
bilateral agreements may be supplemented by a ‘framework agreement’ 
setting the standards to be followed in future EU–UK MLA agreements.  
The EU has signed MLA agreements with some third countries:  
 the 2003 Agreement with Iceland and Norway on the application of 
certain provisions of the 2000 EU MLA Convention and its Protocol 
(‘EU–Norway and Iceland MLA Agreement’); 
 the 2003 Agreement on mutual legal assistance between the European 
Union and the US (‘EU–US MLA Agreement’), which was signed 
together with the EU–US Extradition Agreement; and  
 the 2011 Agreement between the European Union and Japan on 
mutual legal assistance in criminal matters (‘EU–Japan MLA 
Agreement’). 
The three agreements are different in nature. The EU–Norway and 
Iceland MLA Agreement mostly provides that several rules of the 2000 EU 
MLA Convention and its 2001 Protocol apply to Iceland and Norway as well. 
Unlike the Agreement on surrender, the MLA Agreement is clearly 
connected with the Schengen acquis,321 and this link was already enshrined 
in the 2000 EU MLA Convention.322 As a consequence, and again unlike the 
Agreement on surrender, the EU–Norway and Iceland MLA Agreement 
“shall” be terminated in the event of termination of the Schengen Association 
Agreement with Norway and Iceland.323 Due to its inextricable links with the 
                                                     
321 See the Preamble to the EU–Norway and Iceland MLA Agreement. 
322 See Art. 29(1) (“Entry into force for Iceland and Norway”) of the 2000 EU MLA Convention, 
which sets out the rules on when the provisions referred to in Art. 2(1) of that Convention 
would enter into force for Iceland and Norway. 
323 Art. 8(3) of the EU–Norway and Iceland MLA Agreement. Cf. Art. 41 of the EU–Norway 
and Iceland Agreement on surrender.  
84 | UK PARTICIPATION IN EU MUTUAL RECOGNITION INSTRUMENTS & FUTURE OPTIONS 
Schengen acquis, the EU–Norway and Iceland MLA Agreement may not be 
an appropriate model for future EU–UK arrangements on mutual legal 
assistance.  
Akin to the EU–US Extradition Agreement, the EU–US MLA 
Agreement complements existing bilateral treaties and amends some of their 
provisions, if they provide for less effective avenues of cooperation between 
EU Member States and the US.324 As submitted by the European 
Commission, the Agreement “largely relies on existing and future bilateral 
agreements with particular [Member States]”.325 Nonetheless, for Member 
States that do not yet have an agreement with the US, the EU–US MLA 
Agreement may provide a suitable legal basis for cooperation.326 Although 
the UK and the EU may conclude a similar ‘framework agreement’ after 
Brexit, in addition to bilateral treaties, the content of the EU–US Agreement 
is quite limited if compared with the existing instruments of judicial 
cooperation to which UK and EU authorities may resort. The EU–US 
Agreement lays down some rules on the identification of bank accounts, 
video conferencing, expedited transmission of requests and mutual legal 
assistance to administrative authorities.327 As is usually the case in 
traditional procedures of judicial cooperation, one of the major issues that 
the EU–US MLA Agreement does not solve lies in the delays that have been 
experienced in the execution of MLA requests.328 In other words, if a post-
Brexit EU–UK framework agreement were to complement UK bilateral 
agreements on judicial cooperation, that framework agreement could hardly 
build on the EU–US MLA Agreement, as it should include much more far-
reaching and ambitious provisions. In addition, it is questionable whether 
the provisions of the EU–US MLA Agreement on the exchange of data are 
compatible with EU law, and this should represent a further issue to consider 
in future EU–UK negotiations.329  
                                                     
324 See Art. 3(2)(a) of the EU–US MLA Agreement.  
325 European Commission (2018a), p. 23.  
326 Art. 3(3)(a) of the EU–US MLA Agreement.  
327 Respectively, Arts 4, 6, 7 and 8 of the EU–US MLA Agreement.  
328 European Commission (2016), pp. 17–18. 
329 See more in Mitsilegas (2016b), pp. 41–44. 
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Finally, the EU–Japan MLA Agreement is different from the EU–US 
MLA Agreement because it is the “first ‘self-standing’ mutual legal assistance 
agreement between the EU and a third country, making up for the absence 
of bilateral agreements with Member States”.330 Among others, it includes 
detailed rules on several investigative measures and activities,331 it provides 
that MLA requests should be exchanged between the central authorities 
rather than via the diplomatic channel332 and it allows the spontaneous 
exchange of information.333 However, the EU–Japan MLA Agreement does 
not cover a number of issues, such as the transfer of proceedings, 
enforcement of sentences other than confiscation,334 wiretapping, controlled 
deliveries or JITs.335 On average, the time it takes to execute requests in Japan 
is eight months, while it is five/six months in the EU.336 Although the 
Agreement seems to be working rather well,337 a new EU–UK agreement on 
mutual legal assistance should go beyond this model, which falls short of the 
panoply of instruments of judicial cooperation that are currently available to 
UK authorities.338  
In sum, none of the three existing EU MLA agreements is likely to be a 
palatable option for future EU–UK cooperation in the field. Nevertheless, as 
is the case with extradition, their rules on dispute settlements and on the 
status of the case law of the CJEU may be in keeping with the UK 
Government’s red lines. The MLA agreements with the US and Japan only 
                                                     
330 “EU–Japan Day on 14 July 2016 – Final report”, Council doc. 9003/17, 11 May 2017, p. 2 
(emphasis added).  
331 For instance, the taking of testimony or statements (Art. 15), hearing by videoconference 
(Art. 16), obtaining of items (Art. 17), information on bank accounts (Art. 18), and examination 
of persons, items or places (Art. 19).  
332 Arts 4 and 5 of the EU–Japan MLA Agreement.  
333 Art. 26 of the EU–Japan MLA Agreement.  
334 Art. 1(2) of the EU–Japan MLA Agreement. Nor does the Agreement cover extradition.  
335 “EU–Japan Day on 14 July 2016 – Final report”, Council doc. 9003/17, 11 May 2017, p. 9.  
336 Ibid., pp. 5–6.  
337 Ibid., p. 21.  
338 It might be for this reason that, in a Commission internal document of January 2018 on the 
future of police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters, the EU–Japan MLA Agreement 
is not mentioned when the “models for MLA cooperation with third countries” are discussed 
in more detail (European Commission (2018a), p. 23).  
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include a similar, short provision on dispute settlement, simply stating that 
any issue concerning the application or the interpretation of the Agreement 
has to be addressed by means of consultations between the parties.339 
The rules of the EU–Norway and Iceland MLA Agreement are similar 
to those of the EU–Norway and Iceland Agreement on surrender, as they 
provide that any dispute concerning the interpretation or the application of 
the Agreement may be referred to “a meeting of representatives of the 
governments” of EU Member States and of Iceland and Norway, “with a 
view to its settlement within six months”.340 The parties to the Agreement 
should keep under constant review the development of the case law of both 
the CJEU and the competent courts of Iceland and Norway relating to the 
provisions of the Agreement.341 Norwegian and Icelandic courts are not 
allowed to request a preliminary ruling from the CJEU, but Iceland and 
Norway should at least be entitled to submit statements of case or written 
observations to the CJEU, if the referred question concerns the interpretation 
of provisions of the EU 2000 MLA Convention that apply to Norway and 
Iceland.342 Should similar rules be included in future EU–UK arrangements, 
they would be consistent with the UK’s ‘red line’ on the CJEU.  
3.4 Mutual recognition of freezing and confiscation orders  
In addition to the EAW and the EIO, UK prosecuting authorities highly value 
mutual recognition of confiscation and freezing orders. This is regulated by 
Framework Decision 2003/577/JHA on the execution in the EU of orders 
freezing property or evidence343 and Framework Decision 2006/783/JHA on 
the application of the principle of mutual recognition to confiscation 
                                                     
339 Art. 11 of the EU–US MLA Agreement and Art. 28(2) of the EU–Japan MLA Agreement. 
The latter also requires the competent central authorities to hold consultations to resolve “any 
difficulties with regard to the execution of a request, and facilitating speedy and effective 
assistance under [the] Agreement” (Art. 28(1) of the EU–Japan MLA Agreement).  
340 Art. 4 of the EU–Norway and Iceland MLA Agreement.  
341 Art. 2(1) of the EU–Norway and Iceland MLA Agreement, which also provides for the 
setting-up of a mechanism to ensure regular mutual transmission of such case law. 
342 Art. 2(2) of the EU–Norway and Iceland MLA Agreement. 
343 OJ L 196/45, 2.8.2003. 
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orders.344 The provisions of Council Framework Decision 2003/577/JHA as 
regards freezing orders issued for purposes of securing evidence have been 
replaced by the EIO Directive, for those Member States that are bound by 
this Directive. Thus, the rules of the 2003 Framework Decision only apply to 
freezing orders issued for the purpose of subsequent confiscation of 
property.345  
In accordance with the two framework decisions, freezing and 
confiscation orders issued in a Member State should be speedily executed in 
other Member States, on the basis of a pro forma certificate annexed to the 
two framework decisions. The latter sets up a swift judge-to-judge 
procedure,346 with limited grounds for refusal or postponement.347 There is 
no dual criminality for the known 32 categories of crime, if the usual 
threshold of penalties is met.348 Yet, the implementation of the two 
framework decisions has not been satisfactory throughout the EU. As a 
consequence, the European Parliament and the Council are in the process of 
adopting a regulation on mutual recognition of freezing and confiscation 
orders,349 which will repeal the two framework decisions and will improve 
cross-border cooperation in this field. It will be the first EU regulation dealing 
with mutual recognition, and the choice of this instrument – rather than a 
directive – is indeed justified by the wish to iron out the discrepancies and 
inconsistencies that have emerged in the last decade. The regulation will also 
cover criminal non-conviction-based confiscation and will introduce strict 
time limits for the execution of freezing and confiscation orders.  
                                                     
344 OJ L 328/59, 24.11.2006.  
345 Art. 3(1)(b) of Framework Decision 2003/577/JHA.  
346 Arts 4 and 5 of Framework Decision 2003/577/JHA and Arts 4, 5 and 7 of Framework 
Decision 2006/783/JHA.  
347 Arts 7 and 8 of Framework Decision 2003/577/JHA and Arts 8 and 10 of Framework 
Decision 2006/783/JHA.  
348 Art. 3(2) of Framework Decision 2003/577/JHA and Art. 6(1) of Framework Decision 
2006/783/JHA. 
349 European Commission, Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the 
Council on the mutual recognition of freezing and confiscation orders, COM(2016) 819 final, 
21 December 2016.  
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The UK transposed the two framework decisions on freezing and 
confiscation orders in 2014.350 The UK also opted into the draft regulation on 
mutual recognition of confiscation and freezing orders in July 2017, i.e. a year 
after the Brexit referendum, and this is “a sign that the UK would like to 
continue to cooperate with the EU in this area”.351 As declared by the 
minister of state for security, “[o]pting in at this point shows our continued 
positive engagement with this measure, and demonstrates our commitment 
to work together with our European partners to fight crime and prevent 
terrorism now and after we leave the European Union”.352 
The CPS is the competent central authority, except for complex fraud, 
bribery and corruption cases, in which the Serious Fraud Office takes over 
the case. Senior officials at CPS interviewed for this study have praised the 
direct access of prosecutors to these instruments and explained that, since 
most of the challenges against the orders have to take place in the issuing 
state, the procedure of execution is often straightforward. In addition, when 
freezing and confiscation orders for sums above £10,000 are successfully 
executed in the UK, the money recovered is equally split between the UK 
and the requesting EU Member State. This represents a further incentive for 
UK authorities to make the system of mutual recognition work.353 According 
to the CPS, to date the UK has “restrained about £80 million on behalf of 
other EU countries” and has requested “about £4.5 million to be restrained 
on its behalf by other EU Member States”.354 
According to the draft Withdrawal Agreement, the two framework 
decisions should continue to apply in respect of orders received before the 
end of the transition period by the central or the competent authority in the 
                                                     
350 See the written statement of Ben Wallace (Minister of State for Security), 20 July 2017.  
351 Alegre et al. (2017), p. 31.  
352 Written statement of Ben Wallace (Minister of State for Security), 20 July 2017.  
353 See the oral evidence of A. Saunders, Director of Public Prosecutions, Crown Prosecution 
Service, to the EU Home Affairs Sub-Committee of the House of Lords, “Brexit: Future UK–
EU security and police cooperation inquiry”, 2 November 2016, Q58.  
354 Uncorrected oral evidence of D. Price, Head of International Justice, Crown Prosecution 
Service, to the Home Affairs Sub-Committee of the House of Lords’ Select Committee on the 
European Union, “Brexit: The proposed UK–EU security treaty”, 15 May 2018, Q104. She 
added, however, that there is “the big caveat there as to how much is actually realised” (ibid.).  
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executing state.355 There is not yet an agreement on this provision. Once the 
UK will have definitely left the EU, and in the absence of other arrangements, 
assistance in freezing and confiscation of assets could be obtained via the 
MLA procedures addressed in the previous section, namely:  
 the Council of Europe conventions, such as the 1959 MLA Convention 
and its Protocols, and especially the 1990 Convention on Laundering, 
Search, Seizure and Confiscation of the Proceeds from Crime and the 
2005 Convention on Laundering, Search, Seizure and Confiscation of 
the Proceeds from Crime and on the Financing of Terrorism,356 which, 
however, include very general and broad rules on international 
cooperation in the field at issue;  
 United Nations conventions, such as the Vienna Convention, UNTOC 
and UNCAC; and  
 bilateral agreements between the UK and third countries. In addition, 
some interviewees suggested that the avenue of civil actions in EU 
Member States, according to their own laws and procedures, may be 
explored on a case-by-case basis, as this was the traditional way to 
carry out seizures and confiscations abroad in the absence of any 
convention or agreement. 
From the EU side, the three MLA agreements (Norway/Iceland, the 
US and Japan) are sometimes used to seek assistance in this field. Only the 
EU–Japan MLA Agreement includes a provision in that regard (Article 25), 
although practitioners have argued that it “is much quicker to use Interpol 
to freeze a bank account in Japan”.357 Some obstacles have arisen in the 
relationship with the US as well.358  
Against this backdrop, and building on the above considerations, none 
of these texts provides for a system of cooperation that is comparable with 
the existing EU instruments. Although the number of freezing and 
confiscation orders is relatively limited, post-Brexit procedures are expected 
                                                     
355 Art. 58(1)(c) and (e) of the draft Withdrawal Agreement.  
356 The 2005 Convention has not yet been implemented by seven EU Member States 
(www.coe.int/en/web/conventions/full-list/-/conventions/treaty/198/signatures? 
p_auth=xhopTs5M). 
357 “EU–Japan Day on 14 July 2016 – Final report”, Council doc. 9003/17, 11 May 2017, p. 11.  
358 European Commission (2016), pp. 15 and 17.  
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to be longer and costlier, requests could have to be sent to and from the 
Home Office rather than to the CPS or the Serious Fraud Office, and so on. 
As the minister of state for security explained, the UK’s decision to opt into 
the draft regulation on mutual recognition of freezing and confiscation was 
necessary as “[a]sset recovery in some EU states has traditionally been 
difficult through mutual legal assistance routes, which are lengthy and 
cumbersome”.359 By the same token, our interviewees mentioned that EU 
prosecuting authorities sometimes become frustrated when they seek UK 
assistance beyond the scheme of mutual recognition, as UK legislation 
requires high standards to be met, such as the risk of dissipation of assets. 
Therefore, one of the current top priorities for the UK prosecuting 
authorities is the conclusion of an EU–UK agreement that may replicate, to 
the largest extent possible, the existing rules on mutual recognition of 
freezing and confiscation orders.360 
 
                                                     
359 Written statement of Ben Wallace (Minister of State for Security), 20 July 2017.  
360 See House of Lords, European Union Committee (2016), paras 147–50.  
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4 EU AGENCIES AND BODIES 
rexit raises a number of questions as to the future relationship that the 
UK will entertain with Europol and Eurojust, especially given that the 
‘Lisbonisation’ of the legal framework of these two agencies has had 
far-reaching consequences concerning the way in which they carry out and 
frame their activities vis-à-vis both EU Member States and third countries.  
4.1 Europol and Eurojust 
Since their inception, Europol and Eurojust have progressively affirmed 
themselves as key actors in EU internal security. Despite relying on different 
sets of structures, financial and human resources, expertise and tools for the 
discharge of their tasks, these EU agencies361 are similarly mandated to 
“support and strengthen”362 EU Member States’ authorities in the fight 
against cross-border crime.  
Europol’s activity is aimed at supporting police officers and law 
enforcement services coping with “serious crime affecting two or more 
Member States, terrorism and forms of crime which affect a common interest 
covered by a Union policy”.363 The chief added value of Europol lies in its 
                                                     
361 Albeit commonly referred to as an ‘agency’, Eurojust is in fact a ‘body’ of the EU. It will 
formally become an ‘agency’ with the entry into force of the new Eurojust Regulation. A 
provisional agreement on the final text of the Eurojust Regulation was reached by the 
European Parliament and the EU Member States on 19 June 2018.  
362 Art. 85(1) TFEU (Eurojust) and Art. 88(1) TFEU (Europol).  
363 Art. 88(1) TFEU. 
B 
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large-scale processing of personal data and information: Europol analyses 
the information sent by national authorities and shares the results with them, 
contributing to their investigations.364  
Eurojust’s mission is to enhance the cooperation among investigating 
and prosecuting authorities dealing with “serious crime affecting two or 
more Member States or requiring a prosecution on common bases”.365 In 
most of its cases, Eurojust organises coordination meetings among 
prosecutors involved in the investigation of cross-border crime. During these 
meetings, Eurojust provides the competent national authorities with the 
necessary expertise and support to address issues such as the choice of 
forum, the collection of cross-border evidence, the opportunity to issue 
EAWs, and so on. Eurojust may also help them in organising joint action 
days, where seizures, arrests, searches and the like take place at the same 
time in the different Member States.366 
Both based in The Hague, Europol and Eurojust are entrusted with 
largely complementary powers that, as argued by some of our interviewees, 
may sometimes be considered (to some extent) overlapping.367 Overall, 
Europol and Eurojust provide platforms through which law enforcement 
actors and prosecutors can access strategic and operational information, as 
well as communicate, collaborate and establish formal and informal relations 
and networks with their colleagues from within and outside the EU. The 
liaison officers in Europol are a significant example in this respect, as they 
constitute an important channel through which individual EU countries can 
have access to liaison officers posted from other EU Member States and third 
countries. The two agencies are therefore valuable “service providers”368 and 
supranational venues for practitioners working in a wide range of EU 
Member States and non-EU countries.  
                                                     
364 For more details on Europol’s activities and tasks, see Mitsilegas and Giuffrida (2017), pp. 
73–77. 
365 Art. 85(1) TFEU.  
366 For an overview of the role of Eurojust in supporting national authorities dealing with 
cross-border crime, see Mitsilegas and Giuffrida (2017), pp. 64–71. 
367 Weyembergh et al. (2014), p. 14. 
368 Wade (2014), p. 57. 
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Europol and Eurojust membership depends on participation in the EU 
secondary law measures that currently regulate the functioning and 
activities of the two agencies. The three Council decisions providing the legal 
basis for Eurojust were among the 35 pre-Lisbon measures that the UK re-
joined in December 2014.369 The UK has not yet opted into the draft 
regulation concerning Eurojust but it may decide to do so at any time after 
its adoption and until the end of the transition period.370 This would be 
consistent with the ‘wait-and-see’ approach of the UK, which opted into the 
Europol Regulation after its adoption (November 2016).371 The choice of fully 
participating in Europol after the Brexit referendum had a very clear political 
meaning: as the House of Lords put it, “there is now an additional, strategic 
value in remaining a full member of Europol and its Management Board 
during a period when the modalities of the UK’s future partnership with the 
EU on police and security matters are under negotiation”.372 
Full membership of these agencies is highly valued by UK authorities, 
first of all from a strategic perspective.373 Presence with full voting rights on 
Europol’s Management Board and in the College of Eurojust allows the UK 
to steer the strategic priorities and direction of the agencies. The UK 
Metropolitan Police highlighted that “one of the key priorities in the strategic 
assessment this year [2018] in Europol was firearms. It was not going to be 
                                                     
369 Council Decision 2002/187/JHA, OJ L 63/1, 6.3.2002, as amended by Council Decision 
2003/659/JHA, OJ L 245/44, 29.9.2003, and by Council Decision 2009/426/JHA, OJ L 138/14, 
4.6.2009. 
370 See Art. 122(5) of the draft Withdrawal Agreement, which provides for the application 
during the transition period – mutatis mutandis – of Art. 4(a) of Protocol No. 21 to the Treaties. 
The latter provision allows the UK to opt into measures proposed or adopted pursuant to 
Title V of the TFEU on the AFSJ and that amend an existing measure by which the UK is 
bound.  
371 OJ L 135/53, 24.5.2016. The European Parliament and the Council had agreed on the text 
in May 2016. 
372 House of Lords, European Union Committee (2016), para. 50.  
373 Oral evidence of D. Armond, Deputy Director General, National Crime Agency, to the 
Home Affairs Sub-Committee of the House of Lords’ European Union Committee, “Brexit: 
Future UK–EU security and police cooperation”, 12 October 2016, Q50.  
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in there until we influenced that and said, ‘It is very, very important to the 
UK’.”374 
Full membership also grants the UK the possibility to have its own 
nationals posted at the top of the agencies’ hierarchies (i.e. the directorate of 
Europol and the presidency of Eurojust), and to play an important role in the 
development of their current business models, as happened with the 
‘exportation’ to the EU of the UK ‘intelligence-led’ approach to policing. 
Furthermore, the practical and operational reasons supporting the 
UK’s choice to participate as a full member in Europol chiefly relate to the 
wish to retain direct access to “law enforcement information” from other EU 
Member States entered into the Europol Information System (EIS).375 The 
possibility to lead Europol’s operational analysis projects, and to make full 
use of Europol’s analysis and expertise in cross-border cases, have also been 
mentioned by senior Europol officials as key driving forces behind the choice 
to opt into the Europol Regulation. These operational advantages are in fact 
only granted to EU countries that are full members of Europol.  
At present, the UK Government seems much keener on maintaining 
strong relationships with Europol than it is with Eurojust. In her Munich 
speech, the UK prime minister mentioned Europol three times, but Eurojust 
not even once.376 As some of our interviewees noted, the added value of 
Europol – and primarily of its information and data analysis – seems in a 
way more evident and ‘quantifiable’ than that of Eurojust. Nonetheless, 
Eurojust is an important partner of UK prosecutors dealing with cross-
border crime, especially for the opportunity it offers to UK national 
prosecuting authorities to work multilaterally (mainly via coordination 
meetings) rather than bilaterally (e.g. via liaison prosecutors posted in each 
                                                     
374 Uncorrected oral evidence of R. Martin, Deputy Assistant Commissioner, Metropolitan 
Police, to the Home Affairs Sub-Committee of the House of Lords’ Select Committee on the 
European Union, “Brexit: The proposed UK–EU security treaty”, 2 May 2018, Q63. 
375 House of Lords, European Union Committee (2016), para. 56. 
376 Theresa May, “PM speech at Munich Security Conference: 17 February 2018” 
(www.gov.uk/government/speeches/pm-speech-at-munich-security-conference-17-
february-2018). 
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EU Member State in accordance with bilateral agreements).377 Some of the 
experts we interviewed declared that they are in contact with the UK 
National Desk at Eurojust on a weekly basis.  
In addition, our interviews revealed how UK and EU authorities value 
Eurojust for its role in supporting JITs. In the context of investigations on 
cross-border crime, JITs offer a platform where the members of the team can 
exchange evidence without the need to rely on MLA requests. Furthermore, 
“if investigative action is required in a state that is party to the JIT, a team 
member from that country can instigate such an action directly, exactly as 
they would have done in their home country”.378 Eurojust provides financial 
support to JITs, covering the expenses connected with the travel, 
accommodation and interpretation costs met by members of the team.379 It 
also provides the necessary logistic support and plays a valuable role in 
coordinating the investigative activities of the competent national authorities 
involved in the case. 
Europol’s JIT-founding capabilities have also been progressively 
enhanced. This happened, in the first place, through the conclusion in 2014 
of a “Delegation Agreement” between Europol and the Commission (DG 
Home),380 and second with the adoption of the new Europol Regulation, 
which expressly entrusts the agency with the competence to directly finance 
JITs.381 While the overall increase of funding channels may lead to an overall 
increase in the use of JITs, the new financing role attributed to Europol might 
also change the way in which JITs are currently used. Europol can in fact 
count on JIT-funding capabilities that are presently stronger than Eurojust’s 
                                                     
377 Oral evidence of A. Saunders, Director of Public Prosecutions, Crown Prosecution Service, 
to the House of Lords’ European Union Committee, “Brexit: Future UK–EU security and 
police cooperation”, 12 November 2016, Q51. 
378 Spapens (2011), p. 249.  
379 Eurojust (2018b), p. 2.  
380 This agreement empowered Europol to finance operational actions (including JITs) falling 
within the priorities of the European Multidisciplinary Platform Against Criminal Threats 
(EMPACT), the funding of which derives from the EU Internal Security Fund (Police). See 
Weyembergh et al. (2014). 
381 See Art. 61 of Regulation (EU) 2016/794, which provides the new legal basis for Europol. 
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and this might lead Eurojust (and consequently judicial authorities) to 
become “marginalized” in JITs.382 
To avoid double-funding and facilitate applications for funding, on 1 
June 2018, the two agencies signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) 
establishing the rules and conditions on JIT founding.383 While it is too early 
to assess how this MoU will be implemented in practice, it remains clear that 
JITs continue to be valuable instruments for the investigation and 
prosecution of crime, especially when the crimes under investigation call for 
structured and comprehensive cooperation among competent authorities 
from the very beginning of investigative activities, such as in the field of 
international human trafficking and slavery. 
UK authorities seem to value their current participation in JITs from 
both a qualitative and a quantitative point of view. In an interview for our 
research, a former senior official of the UK Serious Fraud Office described 
the role of Eurojust with regard to JITs as “magic”. The deputy director of 
the National Crime Agency recognised that JITs are “immensely important 
and successful”384 and senior officials from the CPS interviewed for this 
study fully agreed. Overall, the UK participates in the highest number of JITs 
supported by Eurojust, as the last annual report of the agency confirms (see 
Table 3).  
                                                     
382 See Weyembergh et al. (2014). A similar view was also expressed by a Eurojust national 
member interviewed in the context of this research. 
383 Eurojust, “Eurojust and Europol sign Memorandum of Understanding on JIT funding”, 
News and announcements, 4 June 2018 (http://www.eurojust.europa.eu/press/News/ 
News/Pages/2018/2018-06-04_EJ-EP-MoU-on-JIT-funding.aspx).  
384 Oral evidence of D. Armond to the Home Affairs Sub-Committee of the House of Lords’ 
European Union Committee, “Brexit: Future UK–EU security and police cooperation”, 12 
October 2016, Q53. 
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Table 3. Number of JITs supported by Eurojust, top 10 countries, 2017 
 
Sources: Authors’ elaboration based on data from Eurojust (2018c), p. 21. 
Given the increasingly important role played by Eurojust and Europol 
in the context of day-to-day cooperation between criminal justice and police 
authorities within and outside the EU (e.g. in the framework of JITs), and the 
UK’s interest in participating in the agencies’ activities after Brexit, the 
question arises at to what models exist for these EU bodies to cooperate with 
third countries. 
4.2 Europol and Eurojust’s agreements and relationships 
with third countries  
Maintaining the status quo within Europol and Eurojust is a priority for 
future UK cooperation with the EU in security matters. The UK 
Government’s “Framework for the UK–EU Security Partnership” states that 
a “new internal security treaty should facilitate multilateral cooperation 
through EU agencies and protect the capabilities that underpin this”.385 
                                                     
385 HM Government (2018a), p. 19. As for Europol, this stance of the UK Government is based 
on the oft-repeated argument that the UK “is one of the biggest contributors of data, 
JITs signed in 
2017
JITs ongoing from 
previous years
Total
United Kingdom 24 41 65
Romania 25 21 46
France 17 18 35
Czech Republic 11 18 29
Germany 7 21 28
Belgium 16 10 26
The Netherlands 6 16 22
Slovakia 10 11 21
Sweden 9 8 17
Spain 9 7 16
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However, no third country currently enjoys the same benefits that EU 
Member States reap from their participation in EU agencies. In addition, as 
the UK will no longer be involved in the governance of EU agencies during 
the transition period,386 it will lose access to both Europol and Eurojust’s 
managerial structures as of Brexit day (29 March 2019).387  
An agreement with the agencies thus seems needed to redefine the 
terms and conditions of the UK’s participation in both Europol and Eurojust. 
Europol and Eurojust can exchange (personal and strategic) data with third 
countries only in so far as the latter have an agreement in place with the 
agencies, and the exchange of personal data is subject to further strict 
requirements that are discussed below. If originally Europol and Eurojust 
were able to negotiate and strike agreements directly with third countries, in 
the aftermath of the Lisbon Treaty the power to conclude international 
agreements now lies with the Council. 
Both the Europol and Eurojust Regulations subject the conclusion of 
cooperation agreements with third countries to the standard procedure 
established under Article 218 TFEU, which grants a new role to the 
Commission and the European Parliament. Until the new Eurojust 
Regulation enters into force, Eurojust is still able to conclude international 
agreements with third states, pursuant to Article 26(a) of the Eurojust 
Council Decision. That being stated, on 19 June 2018 a provisional agreement 
was reached by the European Parliament and the EU Member States on the 
final text of the Eurojust Regulation, which now only needs formal approval 
by the European Parliament and the Council of the EU in order to enter into 
force.388 Once the Eurojust Regulation enters into force, the agency will no 
                                                     
information and expertise to Europol” (ibid., emphasis in the original). The House of Lords has 
recently expressed some concerns over the “transactional approach to negotiations on 
Europol: the UK is indeed a major contributor of data, but the Government should not for that 
reason underestimate the impact that UK withdrawal will have upon its role and influence in 
Europol, as in other EU institutions” (House of Lords, European Union Committee (2018), 
para. 95). 
386 European Commission (2018a). 
387 Speech by Michel Barnier at the Berlin Security Conference, Berlin, 29 November 2017 
(http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-17-5021_en.htm). See also Art. 6 of the draft 
Withdrawal Agreement. 
388 Council of the European Union (2018a).  
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longer have the power to negotiate any cooperation agreement with third 
countries, including the UK after Brexit. 
Eurojust and Europol are nevertheless still empowered to conclude 
working arrangements with third countries. However, according to EU law 
these agreements (which are ‘technical’ in nature and therefore concluded 
outside any form of democratic control at the EU or national level) can only 
provide for basic and mostly strategic cooperation, and as such do not allow 
for the (lawful) exchange of personal data.389 The international agreements 
allowing the exchange of personal data between the UK and the two agencies 
– which is crucial for the purposes of investigation and prosecution – will be 
negotiated by the Commission and concluded by the Council in accordance 
with Article 218 TFEU, and the procedures may be longer than in the past. 
Different types of agreements or models of cooperation govern 
Europol and Eurojust’s relationships with third countries. Europol has so far 
signed both strategic and operational cooperation agreements with its 
partners. Both types of agreements enable third countries to post their law 
enforcement authorities at the premises of the agency, as well as the 
reciprocal appointment of contact points. A difference exists as to the types 
of data that can be exchanged. Strategic cooperation agreements – such as 
the ones concluded by Europol with China and Russia – only allow for 
limited data exchange, which is restricted to information of a strategic and 
technical nature. By contrast, Europol’s operational agreements concluded 
with countries such as Australia, Canada, Norway, Switzerland and the US 
provide for the establishment of a more comprehensive information-
exchange framework, which also covers personal and classified data. 
Overall, third countries’ participation in Europol activities is 
significantly limited when compared with that to which full members of the 
agency are entitled. Law enforcement authorities of third countries with an 
operational agreement with Europol are allowed to input data but also to 
make inquiries for information stored in the EIS, yet their access to the 
agency’s databases is indirect. This means that incoming third countries’ 
requests to search the EIS are channelled through the liaison officer(s) posted 
                                                     
389 See Art. 23(1) and (4) of the Europol Regulation. As for Eurojust, see Art. 38(1) and (2a) of 
the last version publicly available of the draft Eurojust Regulation (Council doc. 6643/15, 27 
February 2015).  
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at the agency’s headquarters, and they are then forwarded to the competent 
Europol Unit. Also, third parties are not granted the same “from the field” 
access to the EIS currently granted to UK and EU police authorities.390 
Third countries’ participation in Europol’s operational projects is only 
allowed upon unanimous agreement of all EU Member States that are full 
members of the agency. Operational partners of Europol cannot act as 
“project leaders” or “co-leaders” of projects implemented in the priority 
areas (smuggling, human trafficking, cybercrime, etc.) identified as part of 
the EU policy cycle.391 Europol operational partners can, however, exchange 
messages (also via multiple access points) through the agency’s Secure 
Information Exchange Network Application (SIENA). Operational 
agreements may also facilitate the establishment of JITs and may allow a 
third country to attend meetings of Europol’s analysis groups and to be 
informed of the groups’ work on the analysis work files.392  
In other words, leaving Europol would mean losing the support of this 
agency in the fight against cross-border crime, especially as regards analysis 
and exchange of personal data. This is the reason why not even Interpol, 
which may represent a good forum of cooperation between UK law 
enforcement authorities and their EU counterparts in the short term, can be 
considered an effective substitute for Europol.393 In the words of Rob 
Wainwright,  
Europol and Interpol are 90% different, if not more so, in terms of 
what they do. Interpol is also an important platform for co-
operation. Both organisations provide complementary strengths. 
Interpol would not be able to substitute for Europol’s ability to do 
high-end analysis work in intelligence co-operation, and it does not have 
anything like the databases that we have.394 
                                                     
390 Oral evidence of R. Wainwright, former Director of Europol, to the Home Affairs 
Committee of the House of Commons, “EU policing and security issues”, 7 March 2017, Q141. 
391 Ibid., Q168.  
392 Brière (2018), p. 15.  
393 For further remarks on the reasons why, albeit useful, Interpol cannot be a substitute for 
Europol, see Hufnagel (2016b), pp. 77–78. 
394 Oral evidence of R. Wainwright, former Director of Europol, to the Home Affairs 
Committee of the House of Commons, “EU policing and security issues”, 7 March 2017, Q168 
(emphasis added).  
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Albeit aware of these limitations,395 the UK Government is allegedly 
evaluating whether it should resort to I-24/7, the Interpol database, which is 
“suboptimal compared to what we have now” and “would slow us down 
fundamentally”,396 not least because some EU Member States do not use it.397  
With respect to Eurojust, the agreements concluded by the agency with 
third countries grant access to services that are similar to those offered to full 
members. Agreements concluded by Eurojust with countries including 
Iceland, Liechtenstein, Moldova, Montenegro, the former Yugoslav Republic 
of Macedonia, Norway, Switzerland, the US and Ukraine allow for the 
exchange of information including personal data. In the case of Norway, 
Switzerland and the US, they also foresee the secondment of liaison 
prosecutors to Eurojust. When third countries post their authorities at 
Eurojust, they can benefit from the support of the agency almost as if they 
were EU Member States. As seen above, this is hardly applicable to Europol. 
As the House of Lords’ European Union Committee noted, a “third-country 
agreement with Eurojust involving a Liaison Prosecutor ... may come closer 
to meeting the UK’s needs than the equivalent precedents for third country-
agreements with Europol” [sic].398 Likewise, the UK Government has 
acknowledged that resorting to the precedents of third countries cooperating 
with Europol would lead to a “significant capability gap”, while the 
precedents with Eurojust would be characterised by a “smaller capability 
gap”.399 A significant gap will nonetheless become apparent at the strategic 
and managerial level given that after Brexit day the UK will no longer be 
entitled to have a seat in the agency’s College.  
Interviews have revealed how the conclusion of Eurojust’s agreements 
with third countries has often been conditional upon extensive scrutiny by 
Eurojust of the third country’s national legislation, in particular as regards 
its consistency with EU data protection standards. A senior Eurojust official 
                                                     
395 See the oral evidence of B. Lewis, Minister for Policing, to the EU Home Affairs Sub-
Committee of the House of Lords’ European Union Committee, “Brexit: Future UK–EU 
security and police cooperation”, 12 October 2016, Q29.  
396 Uncorrected oral evidence of R. Martin, Deputy Assistant Commissioner, Metropolitan 
Police, to the Home Affairs Sub-Committee of the House of Lords’ Select Committee on the 
European Union, “Brexit: The proposed UK–EU security treaty”, 2 May 2018, Qs 62–63. 
397 Ibid.  
398 House of Lords, European Union Committee (2016), para. 83.  
399 HM Government (2018a), p. 14.  
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interviewed in the context of this report mentioned some cases where, in 
order to conclude an agreement with Eurojust, third countries were required 
to amend national legislation to ensure the adequate protection of personal 
data required under EU law. This included legislative amendments aimed at 
establishing and regulating independent national data-protection 
authorities. The ex ante scrutiny of a third country’s national legislation, and 
the ex post monitoring of its implementation conducted by Eurojust, were 
described by our interviewees as a lengthy and ‘time-consuming’ process. It 
may be added that requests for amendment of the data protection laws of 
third countries are made by Eurojust after an assessment conducted by the 
Data Protection Officer of the agency. The latter, pursuant to Article 17(1) of 
the Eurojust Council Decision, “shall act independently” in the performance 
of its duties. Article 26a(2) of the Eurojust Council Decision also provides 
that agreements with third countries may only be concluded after the 
approval by the Council and after consultation by Eurojust with the 
independent Joint Supervisory Body concerning the provisions on data 
protection. Upon the entry into force of the new Eurojust Regulation, the 
exchange of data between the agency and third countries will be possible – 
among the others – upon the adoption of an adequacy decision by the 
Commission or on the basis of an international agreement concluded by the 
Council with the previous consent of the European Parliament, in 
accordance with Article 218 TFEU. Besides, the new Eurojust Regulation 
provides for the involvement of the European Parliament and of national 
parliaments in the evaluation of Eurojust’s activities, pursuant to Article 85 
TFEU. Eurojust also cooperates with third countries that do not have a 
cooperation agreement in place, in particular through the appointment of 
contact points that can assist on prosecutions and investigations on an ad hoc 
basis.400 Likewise, the competent authorities of third countries may be 
invited to take part in the agency’s coordination meetings, on a case-by-case 
basis and without the need for a cooperation agreement.401  
Agreements concluded by the agencies in the past, and now by the 
Council, are flexible cooperation tools allowing third countries to engage in 
particular activities on a case-by-case basis, and in a way that can adapt to 
different national priorities. The intensity of cooperation is also determined 
                                                     
400 Further details on Eurojust’s cooperation with third countries can be found at 
http://www.eurojust.europa.eu/about/Partners/Pages/third-states.aspx. 
401 See Eurojust’s “Annual Report 2016” (2017), p. 15. 
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by (and reflected in) the number of third countries’ officials stationed within 
the agencies. The considerable presence of the US within Europol, for 
instance, is indicative of the extent to which this country uses the agency as 
a cooperation platform. Yet, in the case of Eurojust, the personnel and 
financial resources currently available to provide support to large third 
country desks are limited. As Eurojust offers its services to third parties free 
of charge, interviews conducted with Eurojust officials revealed that 
supporting the UK as a non-paying third country could have a significant 
impact on the agency’s financial and human resources.  
Several factors influence and determine the ‘model of cooperation’ that 
different countries have with Europol and Eurojust. The agencies have 
focused on the development of closer cooperation with European Economic 
Association Member States, with countries that are part of the EU 
Stabilisation and Association Process,402 and with strategic partners of the 
EU such as the US, Canada and Australia. The status of these countries vis-
à-vis the agencies is linked with the wider relationships they have with the 
EU and its Member States (e.g. in the framework of the Schengen system).403 
Factors like geographical proximity to the EU’s external border might also 
influence the type and intensity of cooperation established by the EU 
agencies with third countries, as confirmed by the Commission’s recent 
Communications recommending the opening of negotiations for agreements 
allowing for the transfer of personal data between Europol and southern 
Mediterranean countries, including Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, 
Morocco, Tunisia and Turkey.404 
An example of how the agencies’ relationships with third parties are 
tailored to each country’s specific status is the sui generis agreement between 
Europol and Denmark,405 which was concluded following the decision of this 
                                                     
402 Brière (2018), p. 7. 
403 Curtin (2017a), pp. 189ff. 
404 European Commission, “Security Union: Commission presents new measures to better 
protect EU citizens”, Press release, Brussels, 18 October 2017 (europa.eu/rapid/press-
release_IP-17-3947_en.htm).  
405 Agreement on Operational and Strategic Cooperation between the Kingdom of Denmark 
and the European Police Office (2017) (‘Europol–Denmark Agreement’) 
(www.europol.europa.eu/publications-documents/agreement-operational-and-strategic-
cooperation-between-kingdom-of-denmark-and-europol). 
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EU Member State not to take part in the adoption of the new Europol 
Regulation.406  
Denmark negotiated this agreement as an EU Member State, although 
it was regarded as a “third country with respect to Europol”.407 As the 
agreement was discussed and concluded before the entry into force of the new 
Europol Regulation, Denmark entered into discussions with Europol rather 
than with the Council, in accordance with the procedures set out in the 
previous Europol Council Decision.408 These circumstances appear to have 
facilitated the conclusion of the agreement, which entered into force in April 
2017 upon the approval of the Council, while other EU institutions – and in 
particular the Commission and the European Parliament – were not 
involved in the process. This might explain why the agreement was finalised 
in “a matter of months”.409  
Denmark has been granted an observer’s place within the agency’s 
Management Board, and it is thus entitled to attend meetings where strategic 
decisions are discussed and adopted. Danish participation in this forum is 
not equivalent to that of the other EU Member States, however, as it is upon 
invitation only, and it does not include voting rights. The operational 
agreement with Denmark also establishes a special model for indirect access 
to data held by Europol. Although access “from the field” is not granted to 
Danish authorities,410 the latter can now access Europol operational data 
through a 24/7 contact point. Indirect access to data stored in Europol 
databases is ensured by the appointment of some Danish-speaking officers 
                                                     
406 Denmark enjoys a permanent opt-out with regard to the AFSJ measures (Protocol No. 22 
to the Treaties). 
407 Council Implementing Decision (EU) 2017/290 amending Decision 2009/935/JHA as 
regards the list of third States and organisations with which Europol shall conclude 
agreements, OJ L 42/17, 18.2.2017.  
408 Council Decision 2009/371/JHA of 6 April 2009 establishing the European Police Office 
(Europol), OJ L 121/37, 15.5.2009, which has been repealed by the Europol Regulation.  
409 Oral evidence of R. Wainwright, former Director of Europol, to the Home Affairs 
Committee of the House of Commons, “EU policing and security issues”, 7 March 2017, Q143. 
410 Apparently, Denmark had asked to keep such direct access, together with its voting rights 
in the Management Board, but both requests were rejected: see Deane and Menon (2017), p. 
34.  
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at Europol, who are called upon to handle Danish requests, namely to input 
and retrieve data provided by Danish authorities.  
The agreement between Denmark and Europol is the most advanced 
form of operational cooperation so far established by the agency with a ‘third 
country’. This level of cooperation was deemed necessary to avoid delays in 
information exchange between Europol and Denmark. Even so, the Danish 
model falls short of providing access to Europol’s full membership package 
to which other EU Member States are entitled. This limited form of 
cooperation also affects Europol and Denmark’s relationships with third 
countries, as for instance the onward transfer of data received by one party 
“must be consented to” by the other party.411 
Denmark was able enter into an agreement with Europol upon a 
number of conditions. First, Denmark agreed to ensure its continued 
membership of the EU and the Schengen area, as the agreement 
unequivocally states: “if Denmark was no longer bound by the Schengen 
acquis, the ... Agreement would as a consequence be terminated”.412 Second, 
Danish authorities must comply with the provisions included in Directive 
2016/680 on protecting personal data processed for the purpose of criminal 
law enforcement. Incidentally, it is worth noting that at the time of 
concluding the agreement with Europol, the European Commission 
recognised that the status of Denmark as an EU Member State allowed for 
the agreement to be concluded without the need for a preliminary 
assessment of the existence of an adequate level of data protection.413  
Third, Denmark had to accept that the implementation of the 
agreement is subject to the oversight of the European Data Protection 
Supervisor (EDPS). Under the Europol Regulation, the latter has the power 
to supervise Europol’s compliance with the obligation to conduct the 
necessary checks on the lawfulness of data processing when data are 
provided to the agency by other EU bodies, third countries and international 
                                                     
411 Art. 13 of the Europol–Denmark Agreement.  
412 Recital No. 12 of the Europol–Denmark Agreement.  
413 European Commission, “Commission welcomes Europol’s new mandate and cooperation 
agreement with Denmark”, Statement, Brussels, 29 April 2017 (http://europa.eu/rapid/ 
press-release_STATEMENT-17-1169_en.htm).  
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organisations. The EDPS is also able to receive complaints from data subjects 
claiming a violation of the agency’s data processing rules.414  
Fourth, Denmark had to explicitly recognise the jurisdiction of the 
CJEU on all matters related to the validity and implementation of the 
agreement. The jurisdiction of the Court over the agreement is not limited to 
contractual litigation, but also entails the right for data subjects to bring 
actions before the CJEU if they consider that they have suffered damage from 
unlawful data processing by the agency, as well as to obtain judicial review 
of the decisions of the EDPS. Fifth, Denmark contributes to the Europol 
budget.415  
In sum, the position of Denmark is not comparable with the status that 
the UK will have after Brexit, as admitted by the UK minister of state for 
policing416 and by the EU commissioner for security,417 and it seems unlikely 
that the EU could guarantee the UK rights and conditions analogous to the 
Danish ones. In the White Paper of July 2018, the UK Government 
acknowledged that participation in EU bodies and agencies after Brexit 
would involve some commitments:  
First, it may be appropriate for the UK to make a financial 
contribution, the form and structure of which would depend on the 
type of working relationship agreed. Second, the UK would respect 
the rules under which those bodies or agencies operated. Third, 
the UK would respect the remit of the CJEU such that if there was a 
challenge to a decision made by an agency that affected the UK, this 
could be resolved by the CJEU, noting that this would not involve 
giving the CJEU jurisdiction over the UK.418 
                                                     
414 Art. 47 of the Europol Regulation.  
415 Oral evidence of R. Wainwright, former Director of Europol, to the Home Affairs Sub-
Committee of the House of Lords’ Select Committee on the European Union, “Brexit: The 
proposed UK–EU Security Treaty”, 7 March 2018, Q6.  
416 Oral evidence of B. Lewis, Minister for Policing, to the EU Home Affairs Sub-Committee 
of the House of Lords’ European Union Committee, “Brexit: Future UK–EU security and 
police cooperation”, 12 October 2016, Q28.  
417 Oral evidence of J. King, Security Commissioner, to the House of Commons’ Home Affairs 
Committee, “EU Policing and Security Issues”, 28 February 2017, Q82.  
418 HM Government (2018d), p. 92 (emphasis added).  
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4.2.1 Joint investigation teams and alternative legal bases 
If the draft Withdrawal Agreement is approved in its current version, the 
UK’s competent authorities will continue to participate in JITs that have been 
set up before the end of the transition period.419 With regard to future cases, 
it is worth noting that third countries can participate in JITs supported and 
financed by Eurojust, which may also reimburse the expenses incurred by 
third countries’ authorities.420 The number of JITs with third countries has 
increased in the last few years,421 although they are still much less common 
than JITs solely among EU Member States.422 According to Eurojust’s recent 
Second JIT Evaluation Report, two elements usually facilitate the setting-up 
of JITs with third countries, namely the involvement of these countries in 
Eurojust’s coordination meetings and, with regard to Switzerland and 
Norway, their presence at Eurojust by means of liaison prosecutors.423  
Even though this bodes well for the future participation of the UK in 
EU-funded JITs, at least three disadvantages could follow from exiting the 
EU. First, the UK could not take the lead in the establishment of JITs via 
Eurojust, but could only be invited by other EU Member States to join them. 
Bearing in mind that, for instance, the UK has instigated all the JITs (more 
than 20) in which it currently participates in the field of international human 
trafficking and slavery, our interviewees expressed concerns about this 
potential consequence of Brexit. The UK may set up JITs at its own expense 
and then invite the competent authorities of EU Member States to join, 
although this seems a suboptimal solution in comparison with the current 
situation.  
Second, the involvement of a third country may require “specific issues 
to be addressed”,424 including data protection and specific confidentiality 
requirements, and in some instances “the JIT may be required to adapt the 
                                                     
419 Art. 58(2) of the draft Withdrawal Agreement. This provision has not been agreed yet.  
420 Eurojust (2018b), p. 1.  
421 Eurojust (2018a), p. 33.  
422 According to Eurojust’s “Annual Report 2017” (2018c), 11 new JITs involving third 
countries were set up with the support of Eurojust in 2017. In the same year, more than 160 
JITs were set up among EU Member States (p. 21).  
423 Eurojust (2018a), p. 33. 
424 Ibid.  
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‘EU approach’ and adjust to the specific legal requirements in the countries 
concerned”.425 Therefore, the participation of the UK in EU-funded JITs 
might become more complicated than it is today.  
Finally, concerns about the legal basis for the establishment of JITs may 
arise. Currently, Member States set up JITs in accordance with Article 13 of 
the 2000 EU MLA Convention and with the 2002 Framework Decision on 
JITs.426 After Brexit, EU and UK national authorities will have to rely on other 
legal bases. Some options are already available, such as Article 20 of the 
Second Additional Protocol to the 1959 MLA Convention.427 As seen above, 
however, the Protocol is not in force in Italy, Greece or Luxembourg. The 
above-mentioned United Nations conventions do not represent a legal basis 
to set up JITs, as they only encourage state parties to “consider concluding 
bilateral or multilateral agreements or arrangements whereby ... the 
competent authorities concerned may establish joint investigative bodies”.428 
Where there are no such agreements or arrangements, joint investigations 
may be undertaken by agreement on a case-by-case basis.429 As for EU 
agreements on mutual legal assistance, the EU–Norway and Iceland MLA 
Agreement provides for the applicability of Article 13 of the 2000 EU MLA 
Convention to these countries as well. The MLA Agreement with Japan does 
not cover JITs, unlike Article 5 of the EU–US Agreement, which is notably 
worded in a way recalling the UN conventions. The EU and the US are 
required, to the extent they have not already done so, to take such measures 
as may be necessary to enable JITs to be established and operated in their 
respective territories. The Commission’s review of the EU–US MLA 
Agreement, carried out in 2016, reveals that this provision has raised some 
practical and legal problems and that only one JIT agreement has been 
concluded so far.430  
                                                     
425 Ibid., p. 34.  
426 OJ L 162/1, 20.6.2002.  
427 See also Hufnagel (2016a), p. 173; Campbell (2017), p. 8. 
428 Art. 19 UNTOC and Art. 49 UNCAC (emphasis added). Although phrased in a slightly 
different way, Art. 9(1)(c) of the Vienna Convention conveys the same meaning.  
429 Art. 19(3) UNTOC and Art. 49 UNCAC.  
430 European Commission (2016), pp. 6 and 10–11.  
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From the UK side, however, the only option available for the time 
being would be the Second Protocol to the 1959 MLA Convention. Section 
88(7) of the Police Act 1996 recognises three main legal bases for the UK’s 
participation in JITs. In addition to the 2002 Framework Decision on JITs and 
the 2000 EU MLA Convention and its Protocol, the third legal basis is 
represented by “any international agreement to which the United Kingdom 
is a party and which is specified for the purposes of this section in an order 
made by the Secretary of State”.431 Pursuant to the home secretary’s 
International Joint Investigation Teams (International Agreement) Order 
2009, the Second Protocol to the 1959 MLA Convention has been recognised 
as a legal basis to set up JITs with the participation of UK authorities.  
It is worth noting that Eurojust has already “supported several JITs 
that were set up in accordance with a combination of international 
instruments (not all the States involved had implemented the same legal 
basis allowing the participation of the third State)”.432 In other words, 
Eurojust seems well equipped to assist Member States and third countries, 
including in the future the UK, in the choice of the appropriate legal 
basis/bases for JITs. At least with regard to JITs, Brexit should not have any 
dramatic consequence, as there are already other legal instruments 
facilitating the establishment of JITs between the UK and EU Member States, 
or at least the majority of them. Nonetheless, the UK could lose its leading 
role in the field and this may have negative repercussions for common 
security in Europe.  
4.3 The European Public Prosecutor’s Office  
Pursuant to Article 86 TFEU, the Council adopted the Regulation 
establishing the EPPO in October 2017, by means of enhanced cooperation.433 
At the time of writing, 22 Member States are participating in the enhanced 
cooperation. The EPPO is in the process of being set up and it will be 
operational between the end of 2020 and the beginning of 2021. The EPPO is 
the first EU body that will be competent to adopt decisions vis-à-vis 
                                                     
431 S. 88(7)(c) of the Police Act 1996.  
432 Eurojust (2018a), p. 33.  
433 OJ L 283/1, 31.10.2017 (‘EPPO Regulation’).  
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individuals in the sensitive field of criminal law, as it will be empowered to 
investigate and prosecute crimes affecting the financial interests of the EU.434 
In accordance with Article 86(4) TFEU, the European Council may 
unanimously decide to broaden the mandate of the EPPO to include other 
forms of serious crime having a cross-border dimension. Terrorism seems an 
ideal candidate for this expansion: in the 2017 State of the Union address, the 
president of the European Commission forecast that the Commission would 
table a Communication on the matter in September 2018.435  
The EPPO is to be organised at a central level and a decentralised level. 
As for the latter, the EPPO will have at least two European delegated 
prosecutors (EDPs) in each Member State. The EDPs are to be national 
prosecutors who simultaneously may be members of the EPPO.436 This status 
is usually referred to as wearing a ‘double hat’, meaning that when the EDPs 
wear the national hat they may continue to be national prosecutors for all 
intents and purposes, whereas when they wear the European hat they will 
have to follow instructions from the central Office.437 The EDPs will play a 
major role in the EPPO: they will carry out investigations under the direction 
of the central Office and put into practice in their Member State the decisions 
taken by the central Office. The central Office is to be composed of different 
bodies, namely the College, the Permanent Chambers, the European 
prosecutors, and the European chief prosecutor and his or her deputies. For 
the purposes of this report, suffice to note that each Member State will 
appoint one European prosecutor to the central Office and that the European 
prosecutors will be assigned to some three-member Permanent Chambers. 
The Permanent Chambers will adopt the most relevant operational decisions 
of the Office, which subsequently will need to be enacted by the EDPs.438  
                                                     
434 Giuffrida (2017), p. 1, upon which this section draws. 
435 European Commission, “State of the Union 2017: Roadmap for a more united, stronger and 
more democratic Union”, 13 September 2017. 
436 See Arts 8 and 13 of the EPPO Regulation.  
437 Ligeti (2016), p. 489. 
438 In accordance with the detailed rules set out in the EPPO Regulation, the Permanent 
Chambers decide, inter alia, on whether a case should be brought to judgment or dismissed, 
on whether the competent EDP should initiate an investigation, and on the Member State(s) 
where investigation and prosecution should be carried out. See Art. 10 of the EPPO 
Regulation.  
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The UK has a longstanding antipathy towards the EPPO and it has not 
opted into the EPPO Regulation. Even so, the UK Government “has been 
fully engaged in this negotiation, and [has been] constantly reviewing the 
proposal”.439 Due to the non-participation of the UK in the Regulation, 
coupled with its traditional dislike of this body and with the fact that the 
EPPO does not exist yet, Brexit negotiations and debates have rarely, if ever, 
mentioned the EPPO as an issue to address. As the UK has not expressed any 
strong desire to be closely associated with the Office, its future relationship 
with the EPPO will realistically follow the rules concerning the arrangements 
between the EPPO and third countries.  
For a start, the transfer of personal data to the UK should be based on 
the usual EU requirements for the transfer of personal data to third countries, 
including a previous adequacy decision adopted by the Commission or the 
existence of appropriate safeguards provided for by the UK.440 In addition, 
the EPPO may conclude working arrangements with the UK, which aim “to 
facilitate cooperation and the exchange of information between the 
parties”.441 These agreements can never form the basis for allowing the 
exchange of personal data, as the exchanged information may only be of a 
strategic nature.442 Finally, such working arrangements can concern the 
secondment of liaison officers to the EPPO, as well as the designation of the 
EPPO’s contact points in the UK.443 These rules replicate the existing 
situation at Eurojust, where some third countries have posted liaison officers 
and which has contact points in more than 40 countries. In fact, the EPPO 
may also rely on Eurojust when it has to deal with third countries – including 
the UK – as the EPPO may invite Eurojust “to provide support in the 
transmission of its decisions or requests for mutual legal assistance to, and 
execution in, ... third countries”.444 
                                                     
439 T. May, “Response to the House of Lords’ European Union Committee’s Report on ‘The 
impact of the European Public Prosecutor’s Office on the United Kingdom’”, 2015.  
440 Arts 80-83 of the EPPO Regulation. See section 2.3, part I above.  
441 Art. 99(1) of the EPPO Regulation.  
442 Art. 99(3) of the EPPO Regulation.  
443 Art. 104(1) and (2) of the EPPO Regulation. 
444 Art. 100(2)(b) of the EPPO Regulation.  
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Unlike Eurojust, however, the EPPO will be a prosecuting authority to 
all intents and purposes. This raises a further question: Should the EPPO be 
allowed to issue and receive requests for mutual legal assistance or 
extradition in its capacity of European prosecutor or should it instead rely 
on the existing treaties and laws of each Member State?445 These two 
alternatives mirror two different understandings of the EPPO.  
On the one hand, the “logic of succession”446 calls for the “succession 
of the EPPO to competencies of ... national prosecution services” 447 in the 
field of extradition and mutual legal assistance. In other words, the EPPO 
would become the competent authority to issue and receive requests from 
third countries, replacing national prosecutors. On the other hand, according 
to the opposite “‘double hat’ principle”,448 the competence to interface with 
third countries’ authorities remains in the hands of the EDPs who will act, 
albeit on behalf of the EPPO, as national prosecutors in accordance with their 
own national laws and/or with the international agreements to which their 
Member States are signatories.449 In the double-hat scenario, Member States 
will keep the EPPO as close as possible to their national systems, while the 
logic of succession favours the European dimension of the EPPO. The current 
text of the EPPO Regulation strikes a balance between these two logics.  
First, the EPPO will not have any power in its ‘European capacity’ in 
the field of extradition and it will act in accordance with the double hat 
model. When the competent EDP has to seek extradition from a third 
country, that EDP “may request the competent authority of his/her Member 
State to issue an extradition request in accordance with applicable treaties 
and/or national law”.450 The EPPO will not be a competent authority to issue 
and receive extradition requests and the competence to deal with such 
requests will rest with the national judicial and prosecuting authorities.  
                                                     
445 The issue arises also in respect of the EPPO’s relationships with EU Member States that do 
not participate in the EPPO (see Art. 105 of the EPPO Regulation), but it is not addressed in 
this report. 
446 Council doc. 12340/16, 20 September 2016, p. 5.  
447 Ibid., p. 2.  
448 Ibid., p. 10 (emphasis added).  
449 Ibid., pp. 10–11.  
450 Art. 104(7) of the EPPO Regulation.  
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Second, as for the other matters of mutual legal assistance, the EPPO 
Regulation provides several alternatives for the future relationships between 
the EPPO and third countries and it partially endorses the principle of 
succession. The most comprehensive way to regulate these relationships 
would be the conclusion of an international agreement pursuant to Article 
218 TFEU,451 by which the Union would recognise the EPPO as a competent 
authority for the purposes of MLA procedures. The EU may also designate 
the EPPO as a competent authority in accordance with the rules of those 
international agreements concerning mutual legal assistance in criminal 
matters to which the EU has already acceded or may accede as a regional 
organisation.452 
In the absence of such international agreements, Member States “shall” 
recognise the EPPO as a “competent authority for the purpose of the 
implementation of multilateral international agreements on legal assistance 
in criminal matters concluded by them”.453 This rule, which may for instance 
cover notifications of the EPPO as a competent authority pursuant to the 
1959 MLA Convention,454 embodies the principle of succession but it 
requires two further conditions to be met. The recognition of the EPPO as a 
competent authority should be “permitted under the relevant multilateral 
international agreement” and it has to be “subject to the third country’s 
acceptance”.455 In other words, EU Member States cannot unilaterally decide 
to let the EPPO deal with MLA requests to and from third countries if the 
latter have not consented.  
The issue is not merely theoretical. In 2016, the House of Lords’ 
European Union Committee, when scrutinising the impact of the EPPO on 
the UK, expressed concerns about some statements made by Theresa May, 
                                                     
451 Art. 104(3) of the EPPO Regulation. Building on this provision to regulate the relationship 
of the EPPO with third countries has been described as “ideal” by Z. Stofova (Managing 
Director at the Ministry of Justice of the Slovak Republic) in her presentation at the 
International Conference on “The Enhanced Cooperation for the Establishment of the EPPO”, 
organised by the Basso Foundation (24–25 May 2018).  
452 Art. 104(3) of the EPPO Regulation. For instance, in addition to EU Member States, the 
European Union participates in UNTOC and UNCAC as a regional organisation.  
453 Art. 104(4) of the EPPO Regulation.  
454 Council doc. 12340/16, 20 September 2016, p. 6.  
455 Art. 104(4) of the EPPO Regulation. 
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at the time home secretary, who had declared that “the UK might not be 
legally obliged to respond to requests for assistance from the EPPO”.456 As 
the Committee noted, this stance could risk making the UK a “safe haven for 
illegally obtained EU funds”.457 The response of the then home secretary to 
these remarks was rather vague: “[W]hile we do not intend to undertake a 
specific consultation on the subject, I can reassure the Committee that we 
will continue to scrutinise the proposal as it develops and will continue to 
analyse it against our existing legal framework, which we keep under 
constant review.”458  
Eventually, if cooperation is not possible on the basis of international 
agreements, two final options will be available to the EPPO. On the one 
hand, the EPPO may request legal assistance “in a particular case and within 
the limits of its material competence”,459 and it must comply with the 
conditions those authorities may set on the use of the information they 
provide. This is a case-by-case solution that will entirely depend on the 
goodwill of the foreign authorities.  
On the other hand, the double hat model may again come to the rescue. 
The competent EDP may have recourse to the powers of a national 
prosecutor of his or her Member State to request legal assistance in criminal 
matters from authorities of third countries, on the basis of international 
agreements concluded by that Member State or applicable national law and, 
where required, through the competent national authorities.460  
The EDP will have to inform third countries’ authorities that the final 
recipient of the reply to the request is the EPPO and that the evidence he or 
she collects will be used by the EPPO. As seen above, however, the 
recognition of the EPPO as a prosecuting authority by some EU Member 
States does not automatically bind third countries. Hence, the competent 
EDP should, where necessary, “endeavour to obtain consent”461 from those 
authorities to use the requested evidence in the EPPO’s investigations.  
                                                     
456 House of Lords, European Union Committee (2014), para. 55.  
457 Ibid.  
458 T. May, “Response to the House of Lords’ European Union Committee’s Report on ‘The 
impact of the European Public Prosecutor’s Office on the United Kingdom’”, 2015. 
459 Art. 104(5) of the EPPO Regulation. 
460 Ibid.  
461 Ibid.  
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Predictions are difficult when it comes to Brexit, and even more so 
when the future relationship with a contentious body, which does not exist 
yet, is at issue. The wording of the EPPO Regulation shows a clear 
preference, from the EU side, for the conclusion of international agreements 
with third countries in accordance with Article 218 TFEU. Thanks to such 
agreements, the EPPO’s relationships with third countries would not depend 
on the different legislation of each Member State and/or on the consent of 
third countries to cooperate with the Office; on the contrary, they would rely 
on a binding piece of legislation that provides clarity and legal certainty.  
In this instance, therefore, it will be mostly in the EU’s interest to push 
for a relationship that is as effective as possible. Nonetheless, once the EPPO 
is up and running, there may be cases where UK authorities will need 
information or evidence that is already in possession of the Office and will 
ask for it. The competent EDP will decide on the matter, after consulting the 
Permanent Chamber and “in accordance with the national law of his/her 
Member State and this Regulation”.462 Therefore, it is also in the UK’s interest 
to agree on some rules providing for a smooth and cooperative relationship 
between the EPPO and the UK’s competent authorities – even more so 
should the EPPO be given further powers to investigate and prosecute 
terrorist offences. 
                                                     
462 Art. 104(6) of the EPPO Regulation. The reference to the regulation in this provision should 
be understood as referring to the above-mentioned rules on the transfer of personal data to 
third countries. 
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5 EU DATABASES AND 
INFORMATION-SHARING TOOLS 
he UK Government463 and law enforcement authorities464 have listed 
access to EU databases and participation in EU information-sharing 
mechanisms as a priority objective to achieve in the future security and 
justice partnership with the EU. The following section (5.1) focuses on SIS 
II,465 ECRIS466 and the mechanism established with the Prüm Decisions,467 
which have been identified as particularly valuable sources of data and 
information in criminal matters. Once the system is fully-fledged, the same 
                                                     
463 Oral evidence of N. Hurd, Minister for Policing, to the House of Commons’ Home Affairs 
Committee, “Home Office delivery of Brexit: Policing and security co-operation”, 23 January 
2018, Q117.  
464 Oral evidence of D. Armond, Deputy Director General of the National Crime Agency, to 
the House of Commons’ Home Affairs Committee, “EU Policing and Security Issues”, 6 
December 2016, Q73. 
465 Council Decision 2007/533/JHA on the establishment, operation and use of the second 
generation Schengen Information System (SIS II), OJ L 205/63, 7.8.2007. 
466 Council Framework Decision 2009/315/JHA on the organisation and content of the 
exchange of information extracted from the criminal record between Member States, OJ L 
93/23, 7.4.2009; Council Decision 2009/316/JHA on the establishment of the European 
Criminal Records Information System (ECRIS) in application of Art. 11 of Framework 
Decision 2009/315/JHA, OJ L 93/33, 7.4.2009. 
467 Council Decision 2008/615/JHA on the stepping up of cross-border cooperation, 
particularly in combating terrorism and cross-border crime, OJ L 210/1, 6.8.2008; Council 
Decision 2008/616/JHA of 23 June 2008 on the implementation of Decision 2008/615/JHA, 
OJ L 210/12, 6.8.2008.  
T 
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is expected from the exchange of PNR data, which is addressed in section 
5.2. In line with the previous analysis, the options for future EU–UK 
arrangements in this field are explored. Section 5.3 concludes with a few 
remarks on the need for both the EU and the UK to foster mutual trust ‘on 
the ground’ among practitioners, while at the same time ensuring that this 
form of cooperation does not end up in the exchange of personal data outside 
clear legal frameworks. 
5.1 SIS II, ECRIS and Prüm: State of play  
As an EU Member State, the UK has invested considerable political and 
financial efforts in the development and roll-out of the above-mentioned 
instruments. The UK minister for policing stated before the House of 
Commons’ Home Affairs Committee that “[t]here is a very good level of 
mutual interest protecting the capabilities that we have worked very hard to 
create over a number of years. They work. They’re valued by us all. We’re a 
very big player in them.”468 The strong interest expressed by UK executive 
and law enforcement authority representatives in maintaining participation 
in SIS II, ECRIS and Prüm can be explained in light of the ways and extent to 
which the country makes use of these information-sharing tools. These 
databases have been instrumental in fostering the data-led approach to 
police and criminal justice cooperation that the UK has promoted at the EU 
level.  
This is particularly evident in the case of SIS II, which is used to share 
real-time law enforcement alerts. The UK, which uses SIS II only for law 
enforcement purposes, has been connected to this database since 13 April 
2015. National authorities can enter an EAW into SIS II and the competent 
authorities of the other Member States are instantly informed that the given 
person is wanted for surrender. 469 Despite only three years having passed 
since the UK began using SIS II, the latest data made available by the 
                                                     
468 Oral evidence of N. Hurd, Minister for Policing, to the House of Commons’ Home Affairs 
Committee, “EU policing and security issues”, 23 January 2018, Q133. 
469 See, for instance, the uncorrected oral evidence of N. Vamos, previously head of extradition 
for the Crown Prosecution Service and Partner, Peters & Peters, to the Home Affairs Sub-
Committee of the House of Lords’ Select Committee on the European Union, “Brexit: The 
proposed UK–EU security treaty”, 18 April 2018, Q30.  
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European Agency for the operational management of large-scale IT systems 
in the AFSJ (eu-LISA) show that the UK heavily relies on SIS II (see Table 4). 
Table 4. Statistics on SIS II (eu-LISA), top 8 countries, 2017 
 
Note: CUDs = Create/update/delete/change expiry date transactions. 
Sources: Authors’ elaboration, based on data from eu-LISA 
(www.eulisa.europa.eu/Publications/Reports/2017%20SIS%20II%20Statistics.pdf, p. 7). 
The UK is among the top three EU Member States accessing SIS II, 
accounting for 10% of the total number of accesses to this database in 2017.470 
The volume of UK accesses is certainly significant, but alone it does not show 
the actual effectiveness of this tool in countering crime or terrorism. What it 
reflects is the interest that the UK will arguably have in being able to connect 
to SIS II even after Brexit. However, concerns have already arisen as regards 
the UK’s current use of this system. British authorities have allegedly copied 
the data contained in SIS and handed it over not only to the UK border police 
force and other government offices, but also to private contractors (including 
US companies) hired to run information systems (e.g. the “Warning Index”) 
                                                     
470 Data provided by the UK instead account for 1.6% of the total number of alerts issued. See 
eu-LISA, SIS II – 2017 Statistics, February 2018 (https://www.eulisa.europa.eu/Publications/ 
Reports/2017%20SIS%20II%20Statistics.pdf), p. 8. 
Member 
State 
Total 
queries
(manual + 
automated)
CUDs
Total 
number of 
accesses 
(queries + 
CUDs)
France 987,281,773 2,764,891 661,210 520,902 347,110 4,294,113 991,575,886
Spain 581,794,881 1,038,064 639,408 143,152 1,219,088 3,039,712 584,834,593
United 
Kingdom
539,382,244 1,436,916 79,023 356,691 3,140 1,875,770 541,258,014
Germany 493,623,435 1,809,041 600,943 929,767 137,759 3,477,510 497,100,945
Poland 350,340,215 550,932 190,682 104,536 8,567 854,717 351,194,932
Italy 337,505,714 3,267,981 118,056 377,214 588,033 4,351,284 341,856,998
Romania 331,432,261 240,213 4,354 14,786 1,384 260,737 331,692,298
Croatia 168,422,951 56,917 245 6,745 14 63,921 168,486,872
CUDs
Create Update Delete
Change of 
expiry date
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on behalf of the Home Office at different UK airports.471 These reported data 
breaches amount to serious violations of EU legal standards on data 
protection and police cooperation as enshrined inter alia under the SIS II 
Regulation, and are likely to undermine the legitimacy of UK requests to 
maintain access to this database post-Brexit. 
The Interpol red alert system may provide an alternative,472 although 
it is commonly regarded as less effective than SIS II,473 also because Interpol 
Red Notices “are not as case ready as European arrest warrants are”;474 in 
other words, UK law enforcement authorities cannot arrest the requested 
person upon receiving Interpol Red Notices as they have to obtain a 
domestic arrest warrant first. Moreover, the CPS clarified that the UK has 
not made extensive use of Red Notices, either before or after the entry into 
force of the EAW Framework Decision. 
The UK’s participation in ECRIS is likewise crucial. ECRIS is an 
information-sharing mechanism relying on information stored in national 
databases but which is shared upon the request of other Member States’ 
authorities. It allows national authorities to exchange and obtain information 
on the criminal records of persons who are citizens of other EU Member 
States. Member States are also under the obligation to mutually share the 
information of any EU national convicted in their courts. The UK Home 
Office admitted that before ECRIS it knew “virtually nothing” about the 
offending histories of EU nationals being prosecuted in the UK.475  
The importance of ECRIS has been confirmed by UK law enforcement 
practitioners, who have emphasised the role of the system – among others – 
in “assisting custody sergeants with pre-court bail decisions, based on 
                                                     
471 Nielsen (2018).  
472 Already within the EAW system, the issuing authorities may call on Interpol to transmit 
EAWs (see Art. 10(3) of the EAW Framework Decision).  
473 See also Weyembergh (2017), p. 295.  
474 Uncorrected oral evidence of R. Martin, Deputy Assistant Commissioner, Metropolitan 
Police, to the Home Affairs Sub-Committee of the House of Lords’ Select Committee on the 
European Union, “Brexit: The proposed UK–EU security treaty”, 2 May 2018, Q63.  
475 “Leaked document: The Home Office assessment of post-Brexit terror and crime risks”, The 
Times, 23 August 2017.  
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previous convictions handed down by EU courts”.476 According to the latest 
statistics made available by the Commission, which are related to 2016, the 
UK is among the most active users of ECRIS as regards notifications on new 
convictions and requests for information of previous convictions (Table 5). 
The UK is in the top quarter for operations interconnections.477 Still, post-
Brexit access to this database cannot be justified purely on the basis of 
quantitative accounts. ECRIS contains sensitive information pertaining to 
EU citizens and no third country is allowed direct access to it.  
Table 5. Statistics on the most active users of ECRIS, top 5 countries, 2016 
 
Sources: Authors’ elaboration based on data from the European Commission (2017d), p. 9. 
With regard to Prüm (which allows access to information on DNA, 
fingerprints and vehicle registration stored in Member States’ databases), the 
UK opted into the relevant Council decisions in November 2016. The added 
value of the UK’s participation in Prüm cannot yet be quantified, mainly 
because the Government has planned to establish “a full connection by 
2020”.478 
                                                     
476 House of Commons, Home Affairs Committee (2018a), para. 77.  
477 European Commission (2017d), p. 7.  
478 House of Lords, European Union Committee (2016), para. 107.  
Notifications 
on new 
convictions
Requests 
sent
Replies 
sent
Total Share of total 
volume (%)
Germany 83,588 140,669 21,849 246,106 24.9
United 
Kingdom
32,889 97,425 13,000 143,314 13.7
Italy 62,971 34 17,851 80,856 7.7
Poland 2,334 6,311 60,929 69,574 6.6
Romania 232 892 56,836 57,960 5.5
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That notwithstanding, other EU Member States have already 
expressed concerns with regard to the way in which the UK is implementing 
its national DNA data-retention policies in order to re-join the Prüm data 
exchange system. These concerns were raised during discussions in the 
Council’s Working Party on Information Exchange and Data Protection 
(DAPIX). They related specifically to the UK’s decision to create separate 
databases containing the DNA profiles of different categories of individuals 
(distinguished between those convicted and suspected), and to limit the 
exchange of DNA profiles through the Prüm system to data contained in 
databases pertaining to convicted individuals.479 The UK delegation 
proposed that, as a temporary alternative to the Prüm information-sharing 
system, other Member States could use ‘Interpol channels’ in order to seek 
access to the data of suspected (not convicted) individuals in the UK.  
The UK decision to limit DNA data exchange under the Prüm system 
to profiles of convicted individuals has been justified by the UK in light of 
the 2012 Protection of Freedoms Act (PFA). Adopted in response to the 
decision by the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) in the S. & Marper 
case,480 this piece of UK legislation established legal limits to the retention of 
DNA data pertaining to non-convicted individuals in the UK. At the same 
time, it has been calculated that around 3% of the total DNA profiles 
contained in the UK’s national DNA databases pertains to non-convicted 
people (i.e. approximately 150,000 individuals).481 In fact, the grounds on 
which the PFA allows the (temporary or indefinite) retention of DNA data 
of non-convicted individuals are defined quite broadly. For instance, 
indefinite data retention is allowed when the suspect individual has a 
previous conviction for a “recordable offence”. The PFA’s definition of the 
latter is “one for which the police are required to keep a record”, and 
                                                     
479 See Council of the European Union (2018b).  
480 ECtHR, S. and Marper v United Kingdom, Application nos 30562/04 and 30566/04 1581. The 
ECtHR established that blanket retention of DNA samples and profiles of non-convicted 
individuals in order to enhance public protection cannot justify the indiscriminate expansion 
of databases. The ECtHR stressed that the indefinite retention of data of non-convicted people 
is stigmatising and interferes with the individual right to privacy. 
481 Statewatch, “UK to build new computer to hold DNA records on convicted people only 
and exclude the innocent in bid to rejoin the Prüm data exchange system”, 18 June 2018 
(www.statewatch.org/news/2018/jun/uk-eu-prum-problem-letter.htm).  
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encompasses a wide range of offences including, inter alia, begging, taxi 
touting or any behaviour leading to an arrest while participating in a 
demonstration that did not receive the approval of the authorities.482 
The satisfactory implementation of the Prüm Council Decisions not 
only depends on the inclusion of DNA profiles of ‘suspects’ (i.e. those who 
are not convicted of a criminal offence in the UK) in the Prüm information-
exchange system, but also – and foremost – on the compatibility of the UK 
data-retention regime with the fundamental rights benchmarks developed 
under EU and international law with regard to privacy and data protection. 
In the Marper case cited above, the ECtHR has already established that the 
indefinite retention of fingerprints, DNA profiles and biological samples of 
persons suspected but not convicted of offences constitutes a 
disproportionate interference with the right to respect for private life and 
cannot be regarded as necessary in a democratic society.  
5.1.1 Challenges after Brexit 
In the “Framework for the UK–EU Security Partnership”, the UK 
Government calls for the new EU–UK security treaty to facilitate “data-
driven law enforcement as real time information sharing has proved to be 
invaluable in recent years”.483 The UK Government mentions a number of 
EU databases and information-sharing mechanisms (SIS II, ECRIS and 
exchange of PNR data) to which it would like to continue to have access after 
Brexit, and it points out that “[i]n some cases, for example ECRIS, there are 
no viable existing 3rd country alternatives. ... The UK/EU partnership 
should ensure that these capabilities are maintained.”484  
At the end of the transition period, the UK will no longer participate in 
the EU legislative instruments underpinning these information tools. This 
should imply that – unless the parties agree on the bespoke agreement that 
the UK Government is calling for – the UK could not remain ‘plugged in’ to 
EU databases or participate in EU information-exchange mechanisms as if it 
were an EU Member State. At the same time, there are no precedents of non-
                                                     
482 See National Police Chief’s Council and Home Office, “National DNA Database Strategy 
Board: Annual Report 2015/2016”, 23 February 2017, p. 38. 
483 HM Government (2018a), p. 21.  
484 Ibid. 
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Schengen third countries, or third countries altogether in some cases, having 
concluded similar agreements. 
Only EU Member States are allowed access to ECRIS. The only third 
countries that have thus far been provided access to SIS II, namely Iceland, 
Liechtenstein, Norway and Switzerland, are members of the Schengen area 
as well.485 Similarly, participation in the Prüm mechanism has so far been 
restricted to Iceland and Norway as they are Schengen countries. Yet, unlike 
SIS II, the Prüm Decisions are not Schengen-related measures. As already 
mentioned, the two Prüm Decisions have brought the previous (non-EU) 
Prüm Convention within the EU framework. The EU–Norway and Iceland 
Agreement on the participation of these countries in Prüm486 acknowledges 
that the relationships between the parties, including Norway and Iceland’s 
association with the Schengen acquis, “demonstrate close cooperation in the 
fight against crime”487 – which would be arguably demonstrated by any kind 
of EU–UK partnership in the field of security after Brexit. Third countries’ 
participation in the Prüm Decisions raises the same question concerning the 
EU–Norway and Iceland Agreement on surrender, namely to what extent 
such participation is conditional upon the third country being part of the 
Schengen area.488  
A further set of issues emerges with regard to the UK’s participation 
in EU interoperability legislation. Published in December 2017, the 
Commission’s proposals for two regulations on establishing a framework for 
interoperability between EU information systems aim at tackling the 
‘fragmentary’ and ‘isolated’ nature of a number of existing and proposed 
JHA databases.489 These include SIS II and other databases, such as the 
European Asylum Dactyloscopy Database (Eurodac), in which the UK is 
                                                     
485 Niblock (2017).  
486 OJ L 353/3, 31.12.2009. 
487 Ibid., Preamble.  
488 Alegre et al. (2017), pp. 68–69.  
489 European Commission, Proposal for a Regulation on establishing a framework for 
interoperability between EU information systems (border and visa), COM(2017) 793 final, 12 
December 2017; Proposal for a Regulation on establishing a framework for interoperability 
between EU information systems (police and judicial cooperation, asylum and migration) and 
COM(2017) 794 final, 12 December 2017. 
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currently participating,490 the Visa Information System (VIS),491 the 
Entry/Exit System,492 the European Travel Information and Authorisation 
System (ETIAS),493 and ECRIS for Third-Country Nationals (ECRIS-TCN).494 
While Eurodac, VIS and the Entry/Exit System have already been 
established under EU law, proposals for ETIAS and ECRIS-TCN have been 
tabled by the Commission and are currently under negotiation. The 
interoperability proposals seek to interconnect all these EU databases for 
security, border and migration management by 2020. 
The goal of the interoperability proposals is to reduce the lack of 
communication that, in the words of an official heard in the context of this 
research, leads to the risk of “pieces of information slipping through the net 
and terrorists and criminals escaping detection by using multiple or 
fraudulent identities”.495 The proposals foresee the creation of new tools (a 
total of three new EU databases) to allow competent authorities to 
simultaneously query different databases (a ‘one-stop shop’). The main 
mechanisms envisaged include a European search portal, a multiple identity 
detector, a biometric matching service and a common identity repository.496 
The very necessity and proportionality of the interoperability proposal 
                                                     
490 Regulation (EU) No. 603/2013 on the establishment of ‘Eurodac’ for the comparison of 
fingerprints, OJ L 180/1, 29.6.2013.  
491 Council Decision 2004/512/EC establishing the Visa Information System (VIS), OJ L 213/5, 
15.6.2004.  
492 Regulation (EU) 2017/2226 establishing an Entry/Exit System (EES) to register entry and 
exit data and refusal of entry data of third-country nationals crossing the external borders of 
the Member States and determining the conditions for access to the EES for law enforcement 
purposes, OJ L 327/20, 9.12.2017.  
493 European Commission, Proposal for a Regulation establishing a European Travel 
Information and Authorisation System (ETIAS) and amending Regulations (EU) No. 
515/2014, (EU) 2016/399, (EU) 2016/794 and (EU) 2016/1624, COM(2016) 731 final, 16 
November 2016.  
494 European Commission, Proposal for a Regulation establishing a centralised system for the 
identification of Member States holding conviction information on third country nationals 
and stateless persons (TCN) to supplement and support the European Criminal Records 
Information System (ECRIS-TCN system) and amending Regulation (EU) No. 1077/2011, 
COM(2017) 334, 29 June 2017.  
495 Statement by a participant in a panel discussion that formed part of this research, which 
was held at the CEPS Ideas Lab, 23–24 February 2018, Brussels. 
496 For an in-depth analysis of these ‘solutions’, see Gutheil et al. (2018a), pp. 57–68.  
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remain largely contested and have been challenged by the EDPS,497 the 
Article 29 Working Party498 and the Fundamental Rights Agency.499  
By contrast, the UK Government has been supportive of EU work on 
interoperability, and recognised the need to make the exchange of data 
within the EU “more efficient”.500 Work on interoperability has been one of 
the main priorities of the Security Union Commissioner, Sir Julian King, a 
British national himself.501 On 18 March 2018, the head of the UK 
Representation to the EU in Brussels sent a letter to the Council presidency 
saying that the UK wants to opt into the proposed regulations establishing a 
framework for interoperability between EU information systems (on police 
and judicial cooperation, asylum and migration).502 
While the UK is still entitled to opt into new EU instruments as a 
Member State, after Brexit day and during the transition period, this 
possibility will be limited and will depend on whether the opt-in builds on 
existing EU measures. Until recently, Brexit talks between the EU and the 
UK have not addressed interoperability. Nevertheless, in the Withdrawal 
Agreement the parties have already agreed that by the end of the transitional 
period the UK “shall cease to be entitled to access any network, any 
                                                     
497 EDPS, Opinion 4/2018 on the Proposals for two Regulations establishing a framework for 
interoperability between EU large-scale information systems, 16 April 2018.  
498 Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, Opinion on Commission proposals on 
establishing a framework for interoperability between EU information systems in the field of 
borders and visa as well as police and judicial cooperation, asylum and migration, WP266, 11 
April 2018.  
499 Fundamental Rights Agency, “Interoperability and fundamental rights implications”, 19 
April 2018. 
500 The UK minister for policing mentioned the “likely level of usage” by UK law enforcement 
and immigration officials and “the high costs” involved in the implementation of the 
Commission proposals as factors to be evaluated before any opt-in decision. See Documents 
considered by the House of Commons’ Select Committee on 28 February 2018, “Interoperable 
EU information systems for security, border control and migration management”, para. 9.7. 
501 See the documents considered by the House of Commons’ Select Committee on 10 January 
2018, “Developing interoperable EU information systems to enhance border management and 
security” (https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201719/cmselect/cmeuleg/301-ix/ 
30115.htm#footnote-009-backlink). 
502 Council of the European Union (2018c). 
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information system, and any database established on the basis of Union 
law”.503 
To date, no in-depth analysis has been provided as to whether or how 
the Commission’s interoperability proposals are likely to make it more or 
less difficult for the UK to negotiate its future access as a third country to 
databases such as SIS II. Still, it is significant that days after the UK’s 
notification of its intention to opt into the interoperability proposals, the EU’s 
chief negotiator warned that as a third country the UK would not have access 
to EU databases.504 
The main problem with regard to the UK joining the interoperability 
legislation is that the latter questions the principle of purpose limitation. 
Once approved, these measures will have far-reaching impacts on the way 
in which EU law enforcement and security actors cooperate with each other. 
By enabling the cross-checking of databases, and introducing streamlined 
access conditions and similar data-retention periods, interoperability serves 
many purposes, which seem to go well beyond the objective of increasing 
the EU’s border and migration management capabilities.505 In fact, it allows 
Europol and EU Member States’ law enforcement authorities to access data 
(including biometrics) stored in EU border-management databases for the 
‘ancillary purpose’ of preventing, investigating and prosecuting serious 
crime. 
The UK’s participation in this legal framework could allow a third 
country (after Brexit) to have access to biometric data stored in EU databases 
established for different purposes and with different links to Schengen. At 
the same time, and as we see in the analysis above, each EU database is 
closely tied to a specific EU policy area and legal framework. As a 
consequence, the databases are subject to their own standards/benchmarks 
demarcating third country cooperation. Also, one of these new EU databases 
would contain a copy of all the information stored in each of the other 
databases – and this could lead third countries like the UK to have access 
without limits to all the data stored, without any reasonable purpose. 
Through opting into the Commission’s new interoperability proposal, the 
                                                     
503 Art. 7 of the draft Withdrawal Agreement.  
504 M. Barnier, Speech at the European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights, Vienna, 19 June 
2018 (http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-18-4213_en.htm).  
505 See Curtin (2017b). 
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UK would not only be able to gain access to large troves of sensitive data 
(including, inter alia, EU citizens’ biometrics) during the transitional period, 
but it might also be in a position to retain them once it becomes a third 
country, i.e. after the completion of its withdrawal from the bloc. 
As the interoperability package allows for the creation of very detailed 
profiles and opens up new venues of surveillance, the Commission 
proposals raise some concerns from a fundamental rights perspective. The 
package seems instrumental to a model of border control and mobility 
surveillance that sits uneasily with the prohibition of discrimination of third 
country nationals.506 As pointed out in one of our meetings, the risk is that 
by allowing security agencies and bodies to access sensitive data stored in IT 
systems originally established for migration and border-management 
purposes, interoperability will serve a “super purpose of identifying third-
country nationals”. 
This will have a significant impact on British citizens once the UK 
leaves the EU and becomes a third country. After Brexit, UK nationals will 
be subject to the proposed EU border control and travel authorisation laws, 
similar to other non-EU citizens (including those who are not subject to EU 
visa rules).507 This means that their personal data may be stored in EU JHA 
databases (e.g. the proposed ETIAS) and automatically checked against data 
contained in databases including SIS II, VIS and the planned Entry/Exit 
System, Eurodac, and Europol and Interpol databases.508 
UK nationals might also be included in a “watchlist” which, on the 
basis of information entered by Europol or EU Member States’ authorities, 
profiles third country nationals “who are suspected of having committed or 
taken part in a terrorist offence or other serious criminal offence” or who 
may commit such offences in future, where there are “factual indications or 
reasonable grounds, based on an overall assessment of a person”, to believe 
that.509  
                                                     
506 Vavoula (2017).  
507 Carrera et al. (2016).  
508 Peers (2018a).  
509 See “Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing 
a European Travel Information and Authorisation System (ETIAS) and amending Regulations 
(EU) No. 515/2014, (EU) 2016/399, (EU) 2016/794 and (EU) 2016/1624 – Analysis of the final 
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5.2 Exchange of passenger name record data  
In April 2016, together with the GDPR and Directive 2016/680 on protecting 
personal data processed for the purpose of criminal law enforcement, the 
European Parliament and the Council adopted Directive 2016/681 on the use 
of PNR data for the prevention, detection, investigation and prosecution of 
terrorist offences and serious crime (‘EU PNR Directive’).510 This directive 
concerns the PNR data of passengers on extra-EU flights.511 Even so, all 
Member States participating in the EU PNR Directive have decided to apply 
it to intra-EU flights as well,512 in accordance with its Article 2.  
Each Member State should establish or designate a passenger 
information unit (PIU), which will be competent to collect, process and 
exchange PNR data.513 Such data – encompassing 19 categories of 
information listed in Annex I to the EU PNR Directive514 – may be collected 
and processed only for the purposes of preventing, detecting, investigating 
and prosecuting terrorist offences and serious crime,515 within the further 
limits set out in the directive.516  
The UK strongly advocated for, and thus opted into, the EU PNR 
Directive. As the Government claimed in 2017, “the UK was the first EU 
country to have a fully functioning Passenger Information Unit”.517 The 
National Crime Agency has listed access to PNR data among its priorities for 
the post-Brexit scenario, as it is “absolutely essential in terms of the profiling 
                                                     
compromise text with a view to agreement”, Council doc. 7986/2018, 24 April 2018 
(www.statewatch.org/news/2018/apr/eu-council-ESTA-final-compromise-7986-18.pdf). 
510 OJ L 119/132, 4.5.2016.  
511 Art. 1(1)(a) of the EU PNR Directive. 
512 Vavoula (2016). Only Denmark does not take part in the EU PNR Directive. 
513 Art. 4 of the EU PNR Directive.  
514 Among others, address and contact information, all forms of payment information, 
including billing address, complete travel itinerary, frequent flyer information, seat number 
and all baggage information.  
515 Art. 1(2) of the EU PNR Directive.  
516 See Art. 6(2) of the EU PNR Directive.  
517 HM Government (2017a), p. 4 (emphasis added).  
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that we do to protect the UK”.518 Likewise, the EU is likely to seek the 
maximum cooperation possible with the UK, not least because Heathrow 
Airport is the biggest airport in Europe in terms of passenger traffic.519 
At the time of writing, Article 59(g) of the draft Withdrawal Agreement 
– which has not yet been agreed – states that the EU PNR Directive will 
continue to apply to requests received before the end of the transition period 
by PIUs in accordance with Articles 9 and 10 of the EU PNR Directive. These 
provisions regulate the requests for access to PNR data from other PIUs or 
from Europol.  
After Brexit, the UK – as any third country – will be bound neither by 
the EU PNR Directive, which is currently being implemented,520 nor by the 
existing PNR agreements that the EU has concluded with other third 
countries. The UK Government is nonetheless committed to concluding a 
security treaty that, inter alia, should allow UK authorities to exchange PNR 
data with EU partners as they currently do, since the existing alternatives are 
“sub-optimal, resulting in capability loss”.521 By contrast, the Commission 
has been adamant in stating that “as of the withdrawal date, the EU rules for 
transfer of personal data to third countries apply”.522 In this light, the UK 
should ensure an adequate level of protection for the processing of data 
shared with the EU. As noted in section 2.3, part I above, some UK pieces of 
legislation and practices may represent an obstacle to finding that the UK 
offers equivalent data protection standards to those of the EU.523 
In principle, the UK Parliament might pass domestic law requiring all 
airlines flying into the UK, from all over the world, to transfer PNR data to 
British authorities. This would be possible without any international 
agreement, yet the UK could not – by means of domestic law – access PNR 
                                                     
518 Oral evidence of D. Armond, Deputy Director General of the National Crime Agency, to 
the House of Commons’ Home Affairs Committee, “EU Policing and Security Issues”, 6 
December 2016, Q36.  
519 See the statistic available on the website of the Airports Council International – Europe 
(www.aci-europe.org/policy/position-papers.html?view=group&group=1&id=11).  
520 The deadline for transposition of the EU PNR Directive was 25 May 2018. 
521 HM Government (2018), p. 21.  
522 European Commission (2018b), p. 1.  
523 For a detailed analysis of these potential obstacles, see also Alegre et al. (2017), pp. 62ff. 
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data related to flights to and from other countries, such as PNR data 
pertaining to intra-EU flights. The Commission has listed cooperation on the 
exchange of PNR data among the issues to address in future EU–UK 
arrangements in the field of security.524 Pending further details on the legal 
and political feasibility of an EU–UK arrangement that may replicate the 
current EU legislation on PNR data, there are two main alternatives for 
sharing PNR data with EU Member States after Brexit, in addition to bilateral 
agreements between the UK and EU Member States.  
In the absence of any ad hoc agreement, PNR data may be transferred 
to the UK on a case-by-case basis, in accordance with Article 11 of the EU 
PNR Directive. This solution would represent a marked departure from the 
highly interconnected EU PNR system and the UK would be able to access 
very limited information, and only after providing several safeguards on the 
use of that information.  
It thus seems likely that the parties would prefer a second and more 
structured avenue of cooperation in the long term, such as the conclusion of 
an EU–UK PNR agreement. The EU has already signed two PNR agreements 
with third countries, namely the US and Australia.525 According to the UK 
Government, however, EU cooperation with third countries is unavoidably 
less intense than cooperation within the EU, even though the PNR 
agreements have some advantages: 
These agreements provide legal certainty for airlines required to 
disclose PNR data to third countries accessing PNR data from EU 
carriers, and provide clarity on how the PNR data may be used. 
Existing agreements do not allow third countries to work together 
on using PNR to identify travel patterns in the same way that EU 
countries can under the EU Directive.526  
                                                     
524 European Commission (2018d), p. 6.  
525 Agreement between the United States of America and the European Union on the use and 
transfer of passenger name records to the United States Department of Homeland Security, 
OJ L 215/5, 11.8.2012 (‘EU–US PNR Agreement’); Agreement between the European Union 
and Australia on the processing and transfer of Passenger Name Record (PNR) data by air 
carriers to the Australian Customs and Border Protection Service, OJ L 186/4, 14.7.2012 (‘EU–
Australia PNR Agreement’).  
526 HM Government (2017a), p. 13.  
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This was echoed by Lord Timothy Kirkhope of Harrogate, the 
European Parliament’s rapporteur on the EU PNR Directive, in his oral 
evidence to the House of Lords’ European Union Committee, as he claimed 
that “it may not be possible in future to access all the data, including 
specifically the intra-EU data for PNR”.527 The Committee commented that 
“losing access to intra-EU PNR data would be a serious handicap”.528 
In addition to the US and Australia, the EU concluded a PNR 
Agreement with Canada,529 which the CJEU declared incompatible with EU 
law in Opinion 1/15.530 The negotiations with Canada are expected to 
resume soon to address the shortcomings that the CJEU flagged. A few 
remarks below on Opinion 1/15, as well as on the EU–US PNR Agreement, 
may help to shed light on the challenges that the UK will have to face should 
it aim to strike a PNR agreement with the EU. 
5.2.1 Challenges for a future EU–UK PNR agreement 
An earlier EU–US PNR Agreement was annulled in 2004 by the Court of 
Justice on procedural grounds and a new EU–US PNR Agreement was 
concluded in 2007.531 Despite some resistance by the European Parliament 
and some scepticism in the US, the European Parliament approved the text 
in early 2012. The EU–US PNR Agreement raises serious questions about the 
extent to which individuals should expect a high level of protection under it, 
especially after Opinion 1/15 of the CJEU.532 
The EU–US PNR Agreement contains a purpose limitation provision, 
allowing the collection, use and processing of PNR data by US authorities 
strictly for the purposes of preventing, detecting, investigating and 
prosecuting terrorist offences (defined by EU law) and other transnational 
crimes that are punishable by a sentence of imprisonment of three years or 
                                                     
527 Oral evidence of Lord T. Kirkhope of Harrogate to the House of Lords’ European Union 
Committee, “Brexit: Future UK–EU security and police cooperation”, 12 October 2016, Q22.  
528 House of Lords, European Union Committee (2016), para. 123.  
529 Agreement between Canada and the European Union on the transfer and processing of 
Passenger Name Record, Council doc. 12657/5/13, 23.6.2014 (‘EU–Canada PNR Agreement’).  
530 Opinion 1/15 of the CJEU, 26 July 2017.  
531 Mitsilegas (2016b), p. 25ff., upon which the following remarks draw. 
532 See Kuşkonmaz (2017b), pp. 150ff. 
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more.533 However, these purpose limitation safeguards are substantially 
watered down, as the agreement allows the use and processing of PNR data: 
i) on a case-by-case basis, “where necessary in view of a serious threat and 
for the protection of vital interests of any individual or if ordered by a court”; 
534 and ii) to identify persons who would be subject to “closer questioning or 
examination upon arrival to or departure from the United States or who may 
require further examination”.535  
In addition, it is true that the EU–US PNR Agreement contains some 
specific data protection provisions,536 that it describes the US data protection 
framework as adequate,537 and that it operates on the basis of presumptions 
of equivalence to allow the onward transfer of PNR data after their 
transmission to the US Department of Homeland Security. Nonetheless, the 
credibility of these provisions and assurances of the EU–US PNR Agreement 
may be called into question by the case law of the CJEU, according to which 
legislation permitting public authorities to have access on a generalised basis 
to the content of electronic communications compromises “the essence of the 
fundamental right to respect for private life, as guaranteed by Article 7 of the 
Charter”.538 Albeit laid down in a different context, these findings of the 
Court may be applicable to surveillance permitted under the EU–US PNR 
Agreement, and are likely to represent a benchmark for any future EU–UK 
PNR agreement. 
An EU–UK agreement on the exchange of PNR data will also have to 
take into account the detailed observations of Opinion 1/15 of the CJEU. In 
this Opinion, the CJEU declared the incompatibility of the EU–Canada PNR 
Agreement with Articles 7, 8, 21 and 52(1) of the Charter in so far as the 
Agreement “does not preclude the transfer of sensitive data from the 
                                                     
533 Art. 4(1) of the EU–US PNR Agreement.  
534 Art. 4(2) of the EU–US PNR Agreement.  
535 Art. 4(3) of the EU–US PNR Agreement.  
536 For instance, it includes provisions on automated individual decisions, non-discrimination, 
transparency, access for individuals, correction and rectification, and redress for individuals 
(Arts 7, 9, 10, 11, 12, and 13 of the EU–US PNR Agreement). The provision on redress, 
however, references US law, and the value it adds for European citizens is unclear.  
537 Art. 19 of the EU–US PNR Agreement. 
538 Case C-326/14, Schrems, Judgment of 6 October 2015, para. 94. See more in section 2.3, part 
I above. 
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European Union to Canada and the use and retention of that data”.539 The 
CJEU requires that the EU–Canada Agreement limits the retention of PNR 
data after the air passengers’ departure to that of passengers in respect of 
whom there is “objective evidence from which it may be inferred that they 
may present a risk in terms of the fight against terrorism and serious 
transnational crime”.540 According to the Court, the Agreement should also 
determine in a “clear and precise manner the PNR data to be transferred 
from the EU to Canada” and should provide that the “models and criteria 
used in the context of automated processing of PNR data will be specific and 
reliable and non-discriminatory”.541 
In addition, the CJEU assessed the rules of the EU–Canada PNR 
Agreement on the oversight of PNR data protection safeguards. The 
Agreement provided that the data protection safeguards for the processing 
of PNR data should be subject to “oversight by an independent public 
authority, or by an authority created by administrative means that exercises 
its functions in an impartial manner and that has a proven record of 
autonomy”.542 The Court clarified that the independence of the supervisory 
authority is of the essence and, as a consequence, it did not find any violation 
with respect to the first part of the above-mentioned provision (‘oversight by 
an independent public authority’). Rather, it was the “formulation in the 
alternative”543 (‘or by an authority…’) that raised some concerns and that 
consequently should be amended, as the EU–Canada PNR Agreement  
seems to permit the oversight to be carried out, partly or wholly, by 
an authority which does not carry out its tasks with complete 
independence, but which is subordinate to a further supervisory 
authority, from which it may receive instructions, and which is 
therefore not free from any external influence liable to have an effect 
on its decisions.544 
                                                     
539 Opinion 1/15 of the CJEU, Judgment of 26 July 2017, para. 232(2). 
540 Ibid., para. 232(3)(d).  
541 Ibid., paras 232(3)(a) and (b).  
542 Art. 10(1) of the EU–Canada PNR Agreement (emphasis added). 
543 Opinion 1/15 of the CJEU, Judgment of 26 July 2017, para. 230.  
544 Ibid. 
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The wording of the other two PNR agreements is slightly different. On 
the one hand, the Australian information commissioner is competent to 
monitor the compliance with data protection rules by the Australian 
government authorities processing PNR data.545 In addition, individuals 
may also “lodge a complaint with the Commonwealth Ombudsman 
regarding their treatment by the Australian Customs and Border Protection 
Service”.546 On the other hand, according to Article 14(1) of the EU–US PNR 
Agreement, compliance with the privacy safeguards in the Agreement is 
“subject to independent review and oversight by Department Privacy 
Officers, such as the [Department of Homeland Security] Chief Privacy 
Officer who ... have a proven record of autonomy”.547 They should have the 
ability to “exercise effective powers of oversight, investigation, intervention, 
and review”548 and to refer violations of law related to the EU–US PNR 
Agreement “for prosecution or disciplinary action, when appropriate”.549 It 
is only in addition to this specific oversight mechanism that Article 14(2) 
provides for independent review and oversight by other bodies that may not 
be sufficiently independent, such as the DHS Office of Inspector General, the 
Government Accountability Office and the US Congress.550  
The EU–US and EU–Australia PNR Agreements are similar in respect 
of dispute resolution mechanisms. In both cases, any dispute arising from 
the interpretation, application or implementation of the agreements should 
give rise to consultation between the parties with a view to reaching a 
                                                     
545 Art. 10(1) of the EU–Australia PNR Agreement.  
546 Art. 10(4) of the EU–Australia PNR Agreement.  
547 Art. 14(1)(a) of the EU–US PNR Agreement.  
548 Art. 14(1)(b) of the EU–US PNR Agreement. See the similar wording of Art. 10(1) of the 
EU–Canada PNR Agreement.  
549 Art. 14(1)(c) of the EU–US PNR Agreement. See the similar wording of Art. 10(1) of the 
EU–Canada PNR Agreement. 
550 Art. 14(2) of the EU–US PNR Agreement. 
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mutually agreeable resolution.551 If consultations fail, either party may 
suspend the agreement or even terminate it.552  
Against this backdrop, the conclusion of a new EU–UK PNR 
agreement, albeit not at all impossible, is likely to take a considerable amount 
of time, as it will have to comply with the high EU data protection standards. 
As the House of Lords’ European Committee submitted, “the CJEU’s ruling 
on the EU–Canada PNR agreement does not bode well for the EU’s ability to 
conclude similar agreements promptly and reliably in future”.553 Should a 
future EU–UK PNR agreement fall foul of EU data protection standards, the 
CJEU could prevent the conclusion of such an agreement. Be that as it may, 
in light of the previous PNR agreements that the EU has concluded with 
third countries, the CJEU should be competent neither for the settlement of 
disputes that may arise nor for the oversight of the potential EU–UK PNR 
agreement.  
Until a PNR agreement is adopted or the exchange of PNR data is 
regulated in a future security treaty, PNR data may be transferred to the UK 
only on a case-by-case basis, provided that the UK offers a level of data 
protection that is essentially equivalent to that guaranteed by EU law, read 
in light of the Charter.  
5.3 Enhancing mutual trust after Brexit: The importance (and 
risks) of ‘soft’ cooperation measures 
Regardless of the challenges that stand in the way of setting out the shape 
and content of the future EU–UK partnership in the field of criminal justice 
and policing, several participants in the meetings of the Task Force and some 
interviewees argued that it is of the essence that the EU and the UK develop 
                                                     
551 Art. 24 of the EU–US PNR Agreement and Art. 23 of the EU–Australia PNR Agreement. 
Art. 25(1) of the EU–Canada PNR Agreement provides that the parties should resolve any 
dispute through diplomatic channels.  
552 Arts 24(2) and 25 of the EU–US PNR Agreement and Arts 23(2) and 25 of the EU–Australia 
PNR Agreement. See the similar wording of Arts 25(2) and 27 of the EU–Canada PNR 
Agreement.  
553 House of Lords, European Union Committee (2016), para. 123.  
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some forms of soft cooperation,554 with a view to enhancing trust in each 
other’s capabilities and strengths.  
As for judicial cooperation, it has been suggested that the UK could 
expand its network of liaison magistrates, as they have been able to give 
considerable support to UK authorities dealing with cross-border crime.555 
The UK has also posted criminal justice advisers in several third countries, 
although they are mostly entrusted with capacity building and policy work. 
Some interviewees and experts have praised the support that UK authorities 
currently receive from the European Judicial Network.556 By the same token, 
other experts have mentioned the positive results achieved by the European 
Judicial Training Network with regard to the enhancement of mutual trust 
among practitioners throughout the EU. Another good example of building 
mutual trust by means of soft measures is represented by the several expert 
groups set up by the European Commission. After all, as submitted by one 
of the participants at the last meeting of the Task Force, “the more you sit 
together the more you get to know each other”. 
These and other similar measures, which do not necessarily require 
membership of the EU (e.g. the secondment of liaison magistrates), are worth 
exploring in the future, as they may enhance trust on the ground among 
practitioners. The UK Government shares this view and it has claimed that 
the UK and the EU “could establish a reciprocal UK secondment programme. 
This would cover EU and UK institutions and agencies. Secondments are 
beneficial to both the UK and the EU, providing a platform for a cadre of 
high caliber officials to gain and deploy skills, expertise and experience.”557 
                                                     
554 See also Gutheil et al. (2018b), p. 31. 
555 See the uncorrected oral evidence to the Home Affairs Sub-Committee of the House of 
Lords’ Select Committee on the European Union, “Brexit: The proposed UK–EU security 
treaty” by T. Wilson, Professor of Criminal Justice Policy, Northumbria University Centre for 
Evidence and Criminal Justice Studies, 21 March 2018, Q17; J. Brisbane, Internal Assurance 
Officer and SRO (Senior Responsible Officer) for EU Exit, Crown Prosecution Service, and D. 
Price, Head of International Justice, Crown Prosecution Service, 16 May 2018, Q109.  
556 See also the written evidence of the Scottish Crown Office and Procurator Fiscal Service to 
the Home Affairs Sub-Committee of the House of Lords’ European Union Committee, “Brexit: 
Future UK–EU security and police cooperation”, FSP0003. 
557 HM Government (2018a), p. 24 (emphasis in the original).  
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Although it is unquestionable that the above-mentioned measures stop 
short of the much more comprehensive and effective support provided by 
Eurojust, they may lay down the foundation of a fruitful cooperation after 
Brexit. Once again in the words of the UK Government, a “stronger mutual 
understanding will ensure closer cooperation and coordination”.558 
These soft measures foster the feeling of being part of a common 
endeavour, which is underpinned by shared values and principles. The EU 
and UK’s commitment to these shared values after Brexit will thus be crucial 
to guarantee the smooth cooperation between the parties. Already on a 
symbolic level, such future cooperation would benefit, for instance, from the 
UK complying with the Charter of Fundamental Rights559 and, more broadly, 
aligning with EU human rights principles, e.g. by showing that its legislation 
abides by EU standards concerning procedural safeguards in criminal 
proceedings. Above all, there is consensus on the view that the UK should 
not leave the ECHR. The UK has taken a critical stance towards the ECHR in 
recent years and this criticism was notably voiced, in different speeches, by 
the current prime minister when she was home secretary.560 At the same 
time, the ECHR represents a key component of the EU, and the UK’s 
commitment to the protection of fundamental rights should not be set aside 
in the future. Respect for the benchmarks set forth in the ECHR is an essential 
precondition to maintain trust and sustain EU–UK cooperation after Brexit. 
Any departure from these principles by either of the parties could lead to the 
freezing and potential termination of cooperation.  
                                                     
558 Ibid.  
559 See the uncorrected oral evidence of A. Bradshaw, Member of the Law Society’s EU 
Committee and Partner, Peters & Peters, to the Home Affairs Sub-Committee of the House of 
Lords’ Select Committee on the European Union, “Brexit: The proposed UK–EU security 
treaty”, 21 March 2018, 9 May 2018, Q78: “it would be helpful for [the UK] to comply with the 
charter, and to be seen to be required to comply with the charter. It would, at least 
symbolically, improve the UK’s credibility in human rights arguments in the eyes of the EU 
27”. 
560 “Theresa May: Fight Europe by all means, but not over this Arrest Warrant”, The Telegraph, 
9 November 2014 (www.telegraph.co.uk/news/politics/conservative/11216589/Theresa-
May-Fight-Europe-by-all-means-but-not-over-this-Arrest-Warrant.html); see also the Home 
Secretary’s speech on the UK, EU and our place in the world, 26 April 2016 
(www.gov.uk/government/speeches/home-secretarys-speech-on-the-uk-eu-and-our-place-
in-the-world). 
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The above remarks seem even more convincing when applied to the 
field of police cooperation, as the latter is on average less formal than judicial 
cooperation and it may occur through less structured avenues. In the 
literature, it has been argued that “[s]trictly informal collaboration through 
direct communication, meetings and the presence of bilateral liaison officers 
not integrated within the EU Liaison Officers’ network ... will continue 
regardless of formal agreements, and a ‘hard Brexit’ may revive these old 
practices”.561 Furthermore, according to the former director of Europol, the 
only effective substitute to Europol would be a “set of bilateral co-operation 
arrangements, where the UK would again have to build up a network of 
officers”.562 This kind of cooperation, although it can hardly achieve the same 
results as the much more advanced EU instruments and agencies,563 may 
work better among law enforcement authorities than among judicial bodies, 
as was confirmed by a number of experts who participated in our meetings. 
As noted by one interviewee, the UK has already posted 44 liaison officers 
in 16 EU countries and this number may increase after Brexit.  
Informal police cooperation seems more problematic than judicial 
cooperation in terms of compliance with rule of law and human rights 
standards. If the UK is left outside Europol and EU databases, the informal 
‘under the radar’ ways of cooperating that will be sought to fill the gap left 
by Brexit in information-sharing mechanisms may violate EU fundamental 
rights related to data protection: 
in the absence of an agreement, we may see back-door sharing 
agreements for data, through informal contacts, emergency 
provisions – the kind of clause that you find at the bottom of a treaty 
and thought would never be used – or intelligence agency sharing, 
where you go through MI5 or MI6, rather than through the police. 
Those could become the main avenues to continue the practicalities 
                                                     
561 Alegre et al. (2017), p. 47.  
562 Oral evidence of R. Wainwright to the Home Affairs Committee of the House of Commons, 
“EU policing and security issues”, 7 March 2017, Q168.  
563 See Hufnagel (2016b), pp. 77–78. 
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of day-to-day security. Obviously, that would be quite worrying. ... 
[I]t would lower hugely the level of accountability.564 
For the very same reason, the collaboration of the UK with its four 
partners in the context of the ‘Five Eyes’ (the US, Canada, Australia and New 
Zealand) has raised several concerns in light of the “lack of transparency and 
accountability”.565  
The Commission has stressed that future cooperation could be 
terminated if the UK departs from the ECHR. This report proposes that any 
post-Brexit agreement between the EU and UK in the field of criminal justice 
and policing should include a freezing mechanism providing for the 
possibility of either the parties to suspend cooperation in cases where human 
rights violations are ascertained. 
                                                     
564 Uncorrected oral evidence of J. Ruiz Diaz, Policy Director, Open Rights Group, to the Home 
Affairs Sub-Committee of the House of Lords’ Select Committee on the European Union, 
“Brexit: The proposed UK–EU security treaty”, 25 April 2018, Q50.  
565 Ibid., Q55.  
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6 OPTIONS FOR THE FUTURE 
hroughout the past decades, the UK has carved its own special status 
into the EU area of freedom, security and justice. The UK’s position is 
based on a model of flexible and differentiated integration in EU 
criminal justice and police cooperation instruments. Despite its sui generis 
position in the AFSJ, the UK has been an active contributor to the 
development of EU criminal law and police cooperation. It has championed 
application of the principle of mutual recognition in the field of judicial 
cooperation. It has also promoted a model of ‘intelligence-led’ (data-driven) 
policing or preventive justice, where retention and exchange of data are the 
key tools to curb transnational crime and face (potential) security threats to 
the detriment of criminal justice standards and guarantees. The EU has 
espoused such a data-driven model of law enforcement to a large extent and 
has developed it further through new operations in the field of security, 
sometimes at the expense of a more ‘criminal justice-led’ approach to the 
fight against crime and terrorism. 
The UK is leaving the AFSJ at a time when the EU is stepping up its 
internal and external security efforts, especially through the establishment 
and implementation of different mechanisms for the access, collection and 
exchange of data, and through the development of cooperation with 
important strategic partners like the US. The most recent Commission 
proposals on interoperability and on production and preservation orders 
T 
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(the so-called e-evidence)566 provide significant examples of such policy and 
normative trends. 
While the UK’s influence on the development of the AFSJ will decrease 
after Brexit, day-to-day cooperation in security matters will continue 
between the EU and UK. As the UK plays a major role in EU criminal justice 
and police cooperation, the two parties have repeatedly stressed their 
mutual interest in maintaining strong cooperation in the field. The chief 
question that remains is under what conditions this cooperation can move 
forward in a principled (rule of law and human rights-compliant) and trust-
based fashion.  
In order to maintain the efficiency and consistency of the current 
system, a clear and high-quality legal framework should regulate future EU–
UK criminal justice and police cooperation. This framework should be based 
on trust and shared values, and the UK’s participation in the European 
Convention on Human Rights constitutes a precondition to sustain a 
principled partnership. This Task Force has examined a number of options 
for such a legal framework, which are set out in this part of the report along 
with possible ways forward in light of Brexit.  
6.1 The transition period 
The conclusion of the Withdrawal Agreement would ensure legal certainty 
as regards ongoing judicial and police cooperation proceedings and other 
crucial issues, such as the rules concerning data transfers and the role of the 
CJEU during the transition period. 
According to the text currently under negotiation, during the 
transition period the UK should remain bound by EU law applicable to it 
upon its withdrawal, unless otherwise agreed. This applies to the AFSJ 
measures that already bind the UK, which can choose to participate in 
instruments amending, replacing or building upon such measures. The UK 
                                                     
566 European Commission, Proposal for a Regulation on European Production and 
Preservation Orders for electronic evidence in criminal matters, COM(2018) 225 final, 17 April 
2018; Proposal for a Directive laying down harmonised rules on the appointment of legal 
representatives for the purpose of gathering evidence in criminal proceedings, COM(2018) 
226 final, 17 April 2018. 
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will not, however, be able to opt into new measures adopted during the 
transition period.  
As for the judicial and law enforcement cooperation proceedings that 
will be ongoing at the end of the transition period (31 December 2020), the 
present version of the draft Withdrawal Agreement – which has not yet been 
agreed upon by the negotiators on this point – provides for the continued 
application of EU law until their completion. 
In the best-case scenario, a common position on the Withdrawal 
Agreement would be reached by autumn 2018, when the Commission Task 
Force on Article 50 needs to submit a proposal to the Council on the 
conclusion of such an agreement. This could stave off a cliff-edge situation 
where the UK exits EU instruments and bodies of judicial and police 
cooperation without any transition provisions. The transition period would 
give the parties more time to work on the shape and content of their post-
withdrawal agreements. 
Should the parties decide to take the path of an adequacy assessment 
for future exchange of information, the UK would also be granted until the 
end of 2020 to prove that, as a third country, it provides adequate 
fundamental rights and rule of law safeguards to lawfully exchange data 
with the EU and its Member States for law enforcement-related purposes.  
The UK Government has recently declared that it will conclude the 
Withdrawal Agreement (alongside the framework agreements for its future 
partnership with EU) “later this year” (2018).567 Yet, negotiators have not yet 
agreed on large parts of the draft Withdrawal Agreement, including key 
provisions related to the role of the CJEU and to data exchange regimes. If 
an agreement is not found by autumn 2018 at the latest, the parties could 
decide to extend the period available to negotiate and conclude the 
Withdrawal Agreement. To this end, Article 50(3) TEU requires unanimity 
in the European Council and the agreement of the UK. 
6.2 An EU–UK security and justice partnership: A new treaty 
and sectoral agreements 
The UK has recently tabled some proposals for its future relationship with 
the EU in the field of police and judicial cooperation. The UK calls for an 
                                                     
567 HM Government (2018a), p. 2.  
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“internal security treaty” to be concluded as a part of a wider “security 
partnership” that would cover not only law enforcement and criminal justice 
cooperation, but also cooperation on wider security issues, such as terrorism, 
irregular immigration, organised crime, cyber threats, and even natural 
hazards and protracted instability.568 
An EU–UK security treaty would show a clear commitment of both 
parties to continue to cooperate although it will have to address several 
issues that pose very different challenges, such as police cooperation, the 
exchange of personal information and participation in EU agencies, on the 
one hand, and extradition and mutual legal assistance on the other. The 
Court of Justice may also have different powers vis-à-vis these issues. The 
proposal to conclude an overarching treaty where instruments established 
under different EU legal bases are put side by side with each other may risk 
blurring the boundaries between criminal justice and police cooperation. 
Security components inspired by the UK’s ‘intelligence-led’ policing model 
may prevail over a more ‘criminal justice-led’ approach to cross-border 
cooperation in the fight against crime, at the expense of the protection of 
fundamental rights. The conclusion of sectoral agreements in the field of 
criminal justice may therefore be politically and legally more acceptable than 
a holistic approach. 
The arrangement proposed by the UK would ensure that cooperation 
between UK and EU Member States’ competent authorities will continue “on 
the basis of existing EU measures in a specific field, with relevant measures 
listed in annexes”.569 The UK Government mentions a range of EU 
agreements providing for comprehensive cooperation between the EU and 
some third countries: the Schengen Association Agreements, the European 
Economic Area Agreements and the European Common Area Agreement. 
There is no precedent, however, for similarly comprehensive agreements in 
the AFSJ with regard to third countries that are not full members of the 
Schengen area. The Commission has submitted that, while the UK seems to 
be seeking some “[s]ort of opt-ins to the EU JHA measures” post-Brexit, i.e. 
as a third country, “no third country has a choice to join the EU JHA 
[measures]”.570 
                                                     
568 Ibid., p. 6. 
569 Ibid., p. 15.  
570 European Commission (2018d), p. 12. 
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The UK’s proposal on a new security treaty raises several questions 
from an EU constitutional law perspective and the Commission has already 
stressed the need for the EU to ensure the integrity of the AFSJ. The fields of 
criminal justice and police cooperation are radically different from trade and 
aviation. Judicial cooperation in criminal matters is based on ‘mutual trust’, 
which is underpinned by the presumption that each Member State ensures a 
high level of protection of fundamental rights, as well as its compliance with 
the rule of law, including an independent judiciary enabling effective judicial 
protection for individuals affected by these measures.  
Fundamental rights, as enshrined in the EU Charter of Fundamental 
Rights and as interpreted by the Court of Justice, represent the benchmark 
of judicial and police cooperation within the EU. While EU primary law 
allows the UK as a Member State to ‘pick and choose’ the instruments in 
which it wishes to participate, no third country could have such an à la carte 
approach.  
Somewhat paradoxically, if the UK wishes to have close cooperation 
with the EU in the field of criminal justice after Brexit, it would have to accept 
more EU law than it currently does as an EU Member State, as it would have 
to abide by the relevant EU acquis – including the acquis on the protection of 
fundamental rights. A new security treaty that essentially replicated the 
status quo would not offer sufficient guarantees that the UK will comply 
with this condition. 
The Commission has stressed that future cooperation could be 
terminated if the UK departs from the ECHR. This report proposes that, to 
ensure the trust required to sustain post-Brexit cooperation, future EU and 
UK partnership agreements in the field of criminal justice and policing 
should include a freezing mechanism providing for the possibility of either 
of the parties to suspend cooperation in cases where human rights violations 
are ascertained. 
6.3 Judicial cooperation in criminal matters: Extradition, 
mutual legal assistance, and seizure and confiscation 
After the transition period, it would be inefficient to revert (where possible) 
to extra-EU instruments – such as the Council of Europe or United Nations 
conventions – or to conclude bilateral agreements with each EU Member 
State to regulate EU–UK judicial cooperation in criminal matters. The latter 
146 | OPTIONS FOR THE FUTURE  
alternative is at odds with the UK Government’s objective and would result 
in a fragmented scenario, although some consistency may be gained if the 
parties conclude a ‘framework agreement’ along the lines of the EU–US 
Agreements on Extradition and Mutual Legal Assistance. 
EU mutual recognition instruments have created a system where 
judicial decisions are executed throughout the EU with minimum formality 
and, on average, within strict deadlines. Should traditional international 
agreements on extradition and mutual legal assistance apply in future EU–
UK relationships, extradition and MLA procedures could be expected to be 
longer and more expensive than they currently are. After Brexit, UK 
extradition and MLA requests are not likely to have the same priority in 
other EU countries, and this could prolong judicial cooperation proceedings.  
At the same time, participation in mutual recognition instruments 
builds on some underpinning principles – mutual trust at the forefront – that 
only apply to EU countries. The UK’s current participation in measures like 
the European Arrest Warrant and the European Investigation Order is 
justified upon the assumption that – as a member of the EU – this country 
complies with the EU fundamental rights acquis, and such compliance is 
subject to the scrutiny of the CJEU. So far, no third countries have joined EU 
mutual recognition instruments.  
In EU law, different alternatives have been developed to enable 
judicial cooperation in criminal matters with third countries and outside 
mutual recognition instruments. Among the existing arrangements on 
extradition, the EU–Norway and Iceland Agreement on surrender could be 
a model to follow, as it would keep the extradition proceedings between the 
UK and EU Member States within the remit of competent judicial authorities. 
The EU–Norway and Iceland Agreement provides for an extradition system 
that replicates the one for European Arrest Warrants to a large extent. Most 
of the rules that have sped up the surrender procedure in the EU also feature 
in the EU–Norway and Iceland Agreement, yet their application is optional. 
The effectiveness of this Agreement is thus likely to depend on the 
declarations of the parties. This report has shown that – outside the EU 
framework – Member States are on average inclined to introduce a number 
of rules and exceptions that have been waived in the EAW Framework 
Decision, notably on dual criminality and the bar on extradition of own 
nationals. 
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The EU–Norway and Iceland Agreement on surrender lays down 
some rules on dispute resolution that would not cross the red lines of the UK 
Government on the CJEU. That said, unlike Norway and Iceland, the UK 
does not participate in the Schengen acquis on the free circulation of people. 
Even though participation in the Schengen acquis may not represent a legal 
prerequisite for cooperation on extradition under the EU–Norway and 
Iceland Agreement, the issue is extremely relevant at the political level and 
the Commission attaches great importance to it.  
Although UK courts have been taking human rights issues into 
consideration in EAW proceedings, defendants are likely to raise more 
claims after Brexit. Despite the expected negative impact on the length of 
proceedings, this might enhance the protection of the rights of persons 
involved in extradition procedures. Still, there is no consensus on this 
potential outcome of Brexit. 
The fall-back option for extradition could be represented by the 1957 
European Convention on Extradition, which may require some amendments 
to domestic legislation (both in the UK and in EU Member States) in order to 
apply to extraditions to and from the UK. Albeit quite outdated if compared 
with the EAW, the 1957 Convention would at least have the advantage of 
providing a common procedure and framework for extradition proceedings 
with EU countries, something that would be lost should the UK rely on 
bilateral agreements with each EU Member State. We present the findings of 
our analysis on the EAW and the alternatives to it in Table 6. 
As for cooperation in the field of mutual legal assistance, the Directive 
on the European Investigation Order has replaced the previous instruments 
of judicial cooperation in criminal matters within the EU and it has turned 
out to be a successful tool. As the EIO has been used in the UK only since 
July 2017, the fall-back options – such as the Council of Europe and the UN 
conventions – do not look as “catastrophic”571 as the alternatives to the EAW 
in the field of extradition. Some of our interviewees agreed that exiting the 
EIO system is perceived as a loss of potential benefit rather than a massive 
change for the worse in cross-border judicial cooperation. To maintain 
smooth cooperation resembling the present scenario, the parties may explore 
the feasibility of a new MLA agreement, which should go beyond the 
existing arrangements between the EU and third countries.  
                                                     
571 House of Commons, Home Affairs Committee (2018a), para. 69. 
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Table 6. European Arrest Warrant and its alternatives  
 EAW 
Framework 
Decision 
EU–Norway/ 
Iceland 
Agreement 
European 
Convention on 
Extradition 
EU–US 
Agreement 
No dual 
criminality 
✔ It depends on 
declarations 
X X 
No political 
offence 
exception  
✔ It depends on 
declarations 
X No provision 
No ban on 
extradition of  
own nationals 
✔ It depends on 
declarations 
It depends on 
declarations 
No provision 
Judge-to-judge 
procedure 
✔ 
(there may be 
a central 
authority) 
It depends on 
declarations 
X 
(4th Protocol 
allows judge-to-
judge 
procedures) 
X 
Time limits ✔ It depends on 
declarations 
X X 
Costs 
(expected)* 
€ n.d. €€€€ €€€€ 
Dispute 
settlement 
n.a. Meeting of 
representatives of 
the governments 
European 
Commission on 
Crime Problems 
of the Council of 
Europe (ECCP) 
Consultations 
between the 
parties  
Transmission 
of case law 
n.a. ✔ ECCP shall be 
kept informed of 
the application 
of the 
Convention 
No provision 
Note: n.a. = not applicable; n.d. = no data (as the agreement has not yet entered into force). 
* A cost–benefit analysis has not been carried out in the context of this research. The ratio 
represented in the table (1:4) builds on the views of the director of public prosecutions at the 
CPS, who declared that, compared with the alternatives, “it is three times faster to use an 
EAW and four times less expensive” (oral evidence of A. Saunders to the House of Lords’ 
European Union Committee, “Brexit: Future UK–EU security and police cooperation”, 12 
November 2016, Q55). See more in section 3.2.1, part II. 
Source: Authors’ elaboration.  
Finally, confiscation and seizure of assets should also be addressed in 
future EU–UK arrangements. Our interviewees praised EU mutual 
recognition instruments on freezing and confiscation; in addition, the UK 
Government has opted into the draft regulation on the mutual recognition 
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of freezing and confiscation orders. The current alternatives – to be found in 
MLA treaties – do not provide for rules and procedures that are comparable 
with the existing EU instruments in terms of speed and ease of cooperation. 
The option of concluding ad hoc arrangements on the matter could be 
considered; such rules may also be included in a more general EU–UK MLA 
treaty. 
As for cooperation in the field of mutual legal assistance, the Directive 
on the European Investigation Order has replaced the previous instruments 
of judicial cooperation in criminal matters within the EU and it has turned 
out to be a successful tool. As the EIO has been used in the UK only since 
July 2017, the fall-back options – such as the Council of Europe and the UN 
conventions – do not look as “catastrophic”572 as the alternatives to the EAW 
in the field of extradition. Some of our interviewees agreed that exiting the 
EIO system is perceived as a loss of potential benefit rather than a massive 
change for the worse in cross-border judicial cooperation. To maintain 
smooth cooperation resembling the present scenario, the parties may explore 
the feasibility of a new MLA agreement, which should go beyond the 
existing arrangements between the EU and third countries.  
Finally, confiscation and seizure of assets should also be addressed in 
future EU–UK arrangements. Our interviewees praised EU mutual 
recognition instruments on freezing and confiscation; in addition, the UK 
Government has opted into the draft regulation on the mutual recognition 
of freezing and confiscation orders. The current alternatives – to be found in 
MLA treaties – do not provide for rules and procedures that are comparable 
with the existing EU instruments in terms of speed and ease of cooperation. 
The option of concluding ad hoc arrangements on the matter could be 
considered; such rules may also be included in a more general EU–UK MLA 
treaty.  
6.4 Data exchange for law enforcement purposes  
The issue of data protection is likely to be among the most controversial after 
Brexit. In Schrems, the CJEU set out some clear principles to follow when 
third countries’ standards on data protection are assessed: third countries 
                                                     
572 House of Commons, Home Affairs Committee (2018a), para. 69. 
150 | OPTIONS FOR THE FUTURE  
should ensure a level of protection of fundamental rights and freedoms that 
is “essentially equivalent” to that guaranteed by EU law “read in light of the 
Charter”.573 
The UK Government calls for a “bespoke UK–EU model for 
exchanging and protecting personal data, which builds on the existing 
adequacy model”574 and which should complement the new internal security 
treaty. It is not clear what an agreement ‘building on the existing adequacy 
model’ would look like. Nevertheless, the European Council was adamant 
in stating that “Union rules on adequacy” should be followed to ensure “a 
level of protection essentially equivalent to that of the Union”.575 The 
Commission has been similarly clear in ruling out any “possibility to 
compromise on adequacy”576 and it even mentioned the possibility of 
including a “guillotine clause”577 on the future EU–UK partnership in the 
field of security and justice, if the adequacy decision is withdrawn or 
declared invalid by the CJEU. 
The procedure based on the Commission’s adequacy decision would 
establish a comprehensive framework of cooperation for data exchange. 
Even though the UK is in the process of implementing the EU data protection 
package, this would not necessarily be sufficient to obtain a straightforward 
adequacy decision. The Commission will have to periodically scrutinise UK 
law, and its application, even in fields that are currently out of the reach of 
EU law, such as national security. The adequacy assessment would also 
cover the UK’s international commitments, such as the agreement that the 
UK and the US are planning to conclude under the US CLOUD Act. 
UK international commitments and other pieces of UK legislation (e.g. 
the Investigatory Powers Act) may turn out to be stumbling blocks for the 
finding that the UK ensures a level of protection of fundamental rights that 
is essentially equivalent to that guaranteed by EU law read in light of the 
Charter. The existing case law of the CJEU does not bode well for the 
compatibility of UK data retention laws and surveillance practices with EU 
                                                     
573 Case C-362/14, Maximillian Schrems v Data Protection Commissioner, Judgment of 6 October 
2015, para. 73.  
574 HM Government (2018a), p. 25. 
575 European Council, Negotiating guidelines, EUCO XT 20001/18, 23 March 2018, para. 14.  
576 European Commission (2018d), p. 11.  
577 Ibid., p. 7.  
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standards. Furthermore, adequacy talks may drag on for years. If an 
adequacy decision is not obtained in due time (i.e. at the end of the transition 
period), the UK would not be allowed to lawfully obtain data from EU 
(public and private) exporters.  
The adequacy decision is not the only option to exchange personal 
information after Brexit. Article 37(1)(a) of Directive 2016/680 on protecting 
personal data processed for the purpose of criminal law enforcement allows 
the transfer of personal data when “appropriate safeguards with regard to 
the protection of personal data are provided for in a legally binding 
instrument”. These appropriate safeguards may be given in sectoral 
agreements (e.g. an international agreement between the UK and Europol 
concluded in accordance with Article 25(1)(b) of the Europol Regulation), 
although this piecemeal approach may further prolong the negotiations. 
Moreover, it seems that such appropriate safeguards as regards data 
protection standards should be assessed in light of the Schrems principles, 
that is, the UK would still be required to ensure a level of protection of 
fundamental rights and freedoms that is essentially equivalent to that 
guaranteed by EU law read in light of the Charter. 
In the absence of an adequacy decision adopted before the end of the 
transition period and of agreements between the UK and the EU providing 
for appropriate safeguards, there is a serious risk of a cliff-edge scenario. To 
mitigate the tremendous effects that this might have on EU–UK exchange of 
data, the option to prolong the transition period could be considered. 
The EU–US ‘Umbrella Agreement’ could be used as a model for future 
EU–UK cooperation on data transfer, although it should go hand in hand 
with bilateral agreements between the UK and EU Member States. Indeed, 
the EU–US Umbrella Agreement “in and of itself shall not be the legal basis 
for any transfers of personal information”578 as it represents a 
“framework”579 for the protection of personal data that is exchanged 
between the US and EU Member States. A key principle set forth in this 
                                                     
578 Art. 1(3) of the EU–US Umbrella Agreement.  
579 Art. 1(2) of the EU–US Umbrella Agreement.  
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Agreement is that the transborder data flow should not compromise the data 
protection standards to which EU citizens are eligible under EU law.580 
6.5 Access to EU databases and information-sharing 
mechanisms 
Cooperation in data-driven law enforcement is one of the main pillars of the 
‘security partnership’ that the UK is seeking to obtain with the EU after 
Brexit. EU and UK negotiators have agreed that at the end of the transition 
period the UK will cease to be entitled to access any network, any 
information system or any database established on the basis of Union law. 
This means that UK’s current position in the field could not be maintained 
after Brexit. New legal and technical arrangements need to be designed for 
regulating the extent to which the UK as a third country will be able to 
lawfully access relevant EU JHA databases and information-sharing 
instruments.  
ECRIS is an information-exchange system to which only EU countries 
have access, whereas SIS II is a Schengen-related measure. There may be 
some leeway to accommodate the UK’s post-Brexit participation in the Prüm 
framework, as the latter is not linked with the Schengen acquis.  
Despite the UK having pushed for the adoption of the EU PNR 
Directive, it could not be part of this instrument as a third country. Should 
the UK wish to access PNR data concerning intra-EU flights, it could 
conclude a PNR agreement with the EU, which would have to abide by the 
data protection standards that the CJEU set out in Opinion 1/15. The 
experience with the EU–Canada and EU–US PNRs shows that the conclusion 
of PNR agreements can take a considerable amount of time.  
To compensate for the exclusion of the UK from EU databases (EU and 
UK), police authorities may continue to exchange information in an informal 
way and without clear legal frameworks regulating similar exchanges. These 
‘under the radar’ avenues of cooperation do not bode well for the protection 
of fundamental rights. 
                                                     
580 See the speech at the Center for Strategic and International Studies by Věra Jourová, 
Commissioner for Justice, Consumers and Gender Equality, “EU-U.S. data flows and data 
protection: Opportunities and challenges in the digital era”, 31 March 2017 
(http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-17-826_en.htm).  
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While ongoing Brexit talks have not addressed the Commission’s new 
proposals aimed at furthering the interoperability of separately developed 
databases, the UK has recently decided to opt into these proposed 
regulations. Yet, the UK’s participation in this legal framework after Brexit 
would pose profound legal challenges. The main problem with the regard to 
the UK joining the interoperability legislation is that the latter questions the 
principle of purpose limitation. 
Through its decision to opt into the Commission’s new interoperability 
proposal, the UK would not only be able to gain access to large troves of 
sensitive data (including, inter alia, EU citizens’ biometrics) during the 
transitional period, but it might also be in a position to copy and retain them 
once it becomes a third country, i.e. after the completion of its withdrawal 
from the bloc. At the same time, each EU database is closely tied to a specific 
EU policy area and relies upon a legal framework setting forth different 
standards/benchmarks demarcating third country cooperation.  
Allowing third countries’ participation in the EU interoperability 
legislation could potentially lead to new forms of mass surveillance by 
foreign authorities (including UK authorities), which may put EU citizens 
and third-country nationals’ fundamental rights at risk. It is significant that 
within a few days of the UK’s notification of its intention to opt into the 
interoperability proposals, the EU’s chief negotiator warned that as a third 
country the UK would not have access to EU databases. 
The very necessity and proportionality of the interoperability 
proposals remain largely contested and challenged, among others, by the 
European Data Protection Supervisor and the Fundamental Rights Agency. 
6.6 EU JHA agencies and bodies and the importance of ‘soft’ 
cooperation measures  
The UK as a third country will have to sign ad hoc agreements with Europol 
and Eurojust to continue to exchange personal information with them. These 
agreements are to be concluded by the Council in accordance with Article 
218 TFEU and not by the agencies themselves, as was the case in the past.  
The UK may keep a relationship with Eurojust that could be partially 
similar to the current one and it may continue to rely on the support of this 
agency, albeit in a more limited fashion. The UK may post liaison 
prosecutors at Eurojust and may continue to participate in JITs financed by 
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the agency, yet it is likely to lose its leading role. The UK, which is the EU 
country that relies most on Eurojust’s financial and logistic support for the 
establishment of joint investigation teams, will not be in a position to 
formally request the setting-up of JITs. Still, a legal basis for JITs with EU 
Member States can be provided by the Second Protocol to the 1959 MLA 
Convention.  
The impact of Brexit on the UK’s future relationship with Europol is 
likely to be more visible. There is no precedent of allowing third countries to 
have direct access to Europol’s databases or to lead Europol’s operational 
projects. The same goes for Denmark, which is considered a third country 
vis-à-vis the agency. The agreement with Denmark is the most advanced 
form of operational cooperation so far established by Europol with a ‘third 
country’. However, the position of Denmark is not comparable with the 
status that the UK will have after Brexit. Among others, Denmark agreed to 
ensure continued membership of both the EU and the Schengen area and to 
explicitly recognise the jurisdiction of the CJEU on all matters related to the 
validity and implementation of its agreement with Europol (including issues 
concerning data protection). 
It will be mostly in the interest of the EU to push for the recognition of 
the European Public Prosecutor’s Office as a competent authority in 
extradition and MLA proceedings with the UK. Yet, it will also be in the 
interest of the UK to keep a strong relationship with the EPPO, as the latter 
may be in possession of information or evidence that UK authorities will 
need to access. 
Several participants in the meetings of the Task Force and some 
interviewees also noted that, beyond the formal cooperation with EU 
agencies by means of agreements, it is of the essence that the EU and the UK 
develop further forms of soft cooperation. Judicial and police cooperation 
require efficient communication and exchange of information, views and 
practices among national competent authorities. The more the parties trust 
each other, the more such exchanges will be smooth and effective.  
As for judicial cooperation, the UK could expand its network of liaison 
magistrates. Although these and other similar measures stop short of the 
much more comprehensive support provided by Eurojust, they are worth 
exploring in the future. The UK Government shares this view and it has 
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claimed that the UK and the EU could establish a reciprocal UK secondment 
programme.581  
Police cooperation is on average less formal than judicial cooperation 
and it may rely on less structured avenues of cooperation. The UK has posted 
44 liaison officers in 16 EU countries and this number may increase. UK law 
enforcement authorities will continue to work together with their European 
colleagues after Brexit, yet cooperation outside clear legal frameworks may 
raise significant legal challenges, especially as regards data protection. 
Member States’ law enforcement authorities will be allowed to cooperate 
with the UK as a third country to the extent that such bilateral collaboration 
does not undermine the coherent application of EU law standards. In other 
words, the unquestionable importance of informal avenues of cooperation 
should not overshadow the relevance of rule of law standards, which would 
call for the adoption of adequate, formal legal instruments setting out the 
rules to follow in the future EU–UK partnership.  
Soft measures of cooperation can foster the feeling of being part of a 
common endeavour, underpinned by shared values and principles. The EU 
and UK’s commitment to these shared values after Brexit will be crucial to 
guarantee smooth cooperation between the parties. Above all, there is 
consensus on the view that the UK should not leave the ECHR, which 
represents a key component of the EU and the UK’s commitment to the 
protection of fundamental rights. 
The Commission has already singled out the continued participation 
of the UK in the ECHR as a prerequisite for future partnership with the EU 
in the fields of police and criminal justice. In particular, the current EU 
approach to such a partnership foresees the inclusion of a “termination 
clause” that would condition the maintenance of cooperation on criminal 
justice on the UK’s participation in the ECHR.582 According to this proposal, 
if the UK leaves the ECHR or is condemned by the Strasbourg Court for non-
execution of ECHR judgments in the area concerned, cooperation with the 
EU would be terminated. 
                                                     
581 HM Government (2018a), p. 24.  
582 European Commission (2018d), p. 7. 
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The EU has already included a termination clause in relevant 
agreements with other third countries.583 In the specific case of the future 
EU–UK partnership, it could serve as an effective tool for ensuring a 
principled and trust-based way forward. 
6.7 Role of the Court of Justice in the future EU–UK security 
and justice partnership 
In the existing EU agreements with third countries on judicial cooperation 
and in the Schengen Association Agreements, the CJEU does not have the 
power to settle disputes among the parties on the application of the Treaties. 
Similar disputes are solved by means of political or diplomatic mechanisms, 
such as consultations. Moreover, third countries’ courts are not bound by the 
decisions of the Court of Justice and there are some provisions to make sure 
that these courts and EU Member States’ courts look at each other to ensure 
smooth application of the agreements.  
The post-Brexit dispute settlement mechanism will ultimately depend 
on the nature and the rules of future EU–UK relationships. The more that EU 
law will apply to the UK after Brexit, the less can the role of the CJEU be 
curtailed in EU–UK agreements. 
Independent of the future outlook of EU–UK relationships, the case 
law of the CJEU will have a significant impact on the UK after Brexit, as the 
Court will remain competent to ultimately and authoritatively interpret EU 
law. The main actors of judicial and police cooperation proceedings are 
national authorities, which, within the EU, will continue to have the power 
or the obligation to ask the CJEU to rule on the compatibility of the UK’s 
requests for cooperation with EU law. Even before Brexit, the Irish Supreme 
Court requested the CJEU to decide whether EAWs issued by the UK should 
continue to be executed, as the surrendered person would be likely to serve 
(part of) his or her sentence in UK prisons after Brexit, when that person 
                                                     
583 See, for instance, the EU–Norway and Iceland MLA Agreement, which “shall” be 
terminated in the event of termination of the Schengen Association Agreement of Norway 
and Iceland. 
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would no longer be able to enjoy his or her rights under the Treaties and the 
Charter.584  
The Court of Justice may also prevent the entry into force of any EU–
UK agreement, if the latter does not comply with EU law, as happened with 
the EU–Canada PNR Agreement in the aftermath of Opinion 1/15. 
                                                     
584 Irish Supreme Court, Minister for Justice v O’Connor [2018] IESC 3, 1 February 2018, which 
has recently been overtaken by R O (Case C-327/18 PPU).  
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Brexit poses several challenges for future interaction between the EU and the UK 
in the areas of criminal justice and police cooperation. A new legal framework 
will be required to sustain the EU’s relations with the UK – an active participant 
in numerous EU criminal justice and police cooperation instruments – once 
it leaves the Union. The negotiations on the exit of the UK from the EU must 
grapple with the crucial questions of how and to what extent can the two parties 
continue to maintain effective arrangements for fighting cross-border crime, 
while at the same time guaranteeing compliance with the rule of law and 
fundamental rights.
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feasibility of retaining the current EU–UK framework for cooperation in these 
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instruments and EU agencies engaged in cooperation in criminal matters and 
to have access to justice and home affairs databases and other information-
sharing tools. In their conclusions, the members offer a set of specific policy 
options for the EU and the UK to consider after Brexit with a view to developing 
an effective partnership in the areas of criminal justice and security based on 
trust and shared values.  
